UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 01-31258
Summary Calendar
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CHRISTELLA B. JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(98-CV-904; 00-CV-1642)
April 30, 2002
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Christella B. Jackson, pro se, appeals the summary judgment
granted BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., on several bases,
against her claims for race, gender, and age discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e—2000e-17; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (ADEA). Jackson contends the
district court erred, inter alia, in holding she had failed to
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact issue on whether
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
BellSouth’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for her firing was
merely pretext for discrimination.
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standard as the district court ... [and] view[ing] the
evidence in a light most favorable to the non-movant”. Vela v.
City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 666 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal
citations omitted). “Summary judgment is proper when ‘there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(c)).
Jackson’s claims are governed by the tripartite burden-
shifting framework of McDonnell Douglass Corporation v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (Title VII). See also Bodenheimer v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1993) (ADEA); Flanagan
v. Aaron E. Henry Comty. Health Servs. Ctr., 876 F.2d 1231, 1233-34
(5th Cir. 1989) (§ 1981). Assuming Jackson established a prima
facie case of discrimination, BellSouth has proffered a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for her termination: Jackson had violated
the company’s Tuition Aid Plan (TAP) by, inter alia, cashing
duplicate reimbursement checks, seeking reimbursement for expenses
that had already been reimbursed, and using reimbursements for non-
tuition-related expenses. As discussed in the district court’s
detailed and comprehensive opinion, Jackson v. Bellsouth
Telecommunications, Inc., 98-CV-0904 (W.D. La. 21 Sept. 2001),
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Jackson has proffered evidence she was unaware of certain TAP
guidelines; but, she has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact on whether her termination was illegally motivated or
the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason proffered for her
termination was false. See Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp.,
La., 234 F.3d 899, 903-904 (5th Cir. 2000).
Although Jackson raised other claims in the district court, as
well as other issues on appeal, she has not briefed them here.
Accordingly, they are deemed abandoned. E.g., Yohey v. Collins,
985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED
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