COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00065-CR
CHARLES JAMES SNYDER APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 8 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1295355
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. Introduction
In two issues, Appellant Charles James Snyder appeals the denial of his
motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction
for failure to identify, arguing that there was no lawful detention. We reverse the
trial court’s judgment and render a judgment of acquittal.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
II. Suppression
In his first issue, Snyder argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress because the State failed to establish that there was a lawful
detention when Forest Hill Police Sergeant Curt Leach asked him to identify
himself.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
We give almost total deference to a trial court’s rulings on questions of historical
fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of
credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact
questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at
673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v.
State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
A detention, as opposed to an arrest, may be justified on less than
probable cause if an officer reasonably suspects a person of criminal activity
based on specific, articulable facts. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 1880 (1968); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000). An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention when he or she has
reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law. Crain v.
State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488,
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492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the
totality of the circumstances, the officer has specific, articulable facts that when
combined with rational inferences from those facts, lead him to conclude that a
particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Ford,
158 S.W.3d at 492. That is, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that
some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred, have some
suggestion to connect the detained person with the unusual activity, and have
some indication that the activity is related to a crime. Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d
375, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). This is an objective standard that disregards
any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether an
objective basis for the stop exists. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492.
B. Suppression Hearing
At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Leach testified that on August 27,
2012, he was on his daily patrol in a high-crime area at around 4:15 p.m. when
he saw a bike tire in some bushes. He drove past the area and saw someone
hiding in the bushes in a fetal position on the ground; he made eye contact with
that person and thought that the person might be trying to hide from him. By the
time Sergeant Leach turned his vehicle around, he could not find the person he
had seen in the bushes. Sergeant Leach stopped a man on a bicycle and then
let that man go after his name checked out clear. Sergeant Leach then drove
back past the bushes—three additional police officers in squad cars joined him—
and found Snyder.
3
At gunpoint, Sergeant Leach asked Snyder why he had been hiding.
When Snyder responded that he had not been hiding, Sergeant Leach
responded by stating, “[W]hat games are you F-ing playing out here.” Snyder
told him that he was not playing games. Sergeant Leach then asked him what
he was doing out there, and Snyder replied, “I don’t know.” Sergeant Leach
asked Snyder if he was drunk or a pervert, and Snyder said, “Neither.”
After Sergeant Leach told Snyder several times to show him his hands, he
warned Snyder that they would tase him. Sergeant Yancy told Snyder that if he
tried to escape, they would shoot him in the side. When Sergeant Leach pulled
Snyder from the bushes, he detained him in handcuffs because he thought
Snyder’s location and actions were suspicious. Sergeant Leach said that he did
not find any weapons or anything illegal on Snyder when he conducted a pat-
down.
Sergeant Leach asked Snyder for his name, and Snyder replied, “Jim
James Morgan.” Sergeant Leach asked Snyder for his date of birth, and Snyder
said, “January 7th, 1957.” Snyder gave the officer the same name, same date of
birth, and same social security number each time he asked. When Sergeant
Leach asked Snyder if he had a driver’s license or state identification, Snyder
told him that he had a Michigan identification. Sergeant Leach said that if this
had been true, he would have been able to find him in the computer system, but
when he checked for driver’s licenses under Jim Morgan in Michigan, he did not
get any returns.
4
Sergeant Leach then asked Snyder if he had ever been arrested and if he
had identification in any other states. Snyder said Ohio, but when Sergeant
Leach tried to find Jim Morgan in the computer with an Ohio identification, he did
not find anyone. Sergeant Leach said at that point, he suspected Snyder was
being dishonest and that he was giving false identifying information. Based on
this, he decided to take Snyder to the Tarrant County Jail to further attempt to
identify him.2 Sergeant Leach acknowledged on cross-examination that just
because nothing comes back when a name is run through the system, this does
not mean that a person is lying. The trial court watched State’s Exhibit 1, the
dashboard camera video-recording of the incident.3
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, Snyder argued that Sergeant
Leach lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and that the detention then
elevated to the level of an arrest without probable cause. The trial court stated
that as to reasonable suspicion, it was a close call but that given the facts—“the
bicycle standing in a bunch of bushes in a high-crime area” and Sergeant
2
Using the Tarrant County jail’s iris scan, Snyder was identified in less than
a minute with his real name and real date of birth, which were not the ones he
had given to Sergeant Leach. The proper identification revealed that Snyder had
an active warrant for his arrest on a probation violation.
3
The dashboard camera video shows that when Sergeant Leach arrived at
the scene, two patrol cars were already parked on the street a few feet from
where they detained Snyder. Once Sergeant Leach arrived, one officer pulled
his vehicle closer, and a few seconds later another officer arrived, totaling four
patrol cars. The officers yelled at Snyder to show his hands, threatened to tase
him, and then threatened to shoot him in the side if he ran.
5
Leach’s letting the other bicycle rider go after identifying him—it would deny the
motion. The trial court concluded that Sergeant Leach had probable cause to
arrest once Snyder gave him a fake name.
C. Analysis
Snyder argues that Officer Leach did not have reasonable suspicion that
Snyder had committed any crime and that therefore there was no lawful
detention. Snyder asserts that the only information known to Sergeant Leach
before he took Snyder to the police station was that Snyder was on the side of
the road under a bush and that he told officers his name was Jim James Morgan.
Snyder cites St. George v. State for the proposition that misidentification
together with nervousness is not sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion to
support a detention. 237 S.W.3d 720, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In St.
George, the defendant was a passenger in a car that officers stopped for a traffic
violation. Id. at 722. The defendant initially gave a false name and date of birth,
which the officers were unable to locate in their system. Id. After officers issued
the traffic citation to the driver, they continued to question the defendant about
his identity. Id. They eventually obtained the defendant’s correct name and
discovered he had outstanding warrants. Id. The officers arrested the
defendant, and in a search incident to arrest, they found marijuana on his person.
Id.
The officers in St. George did not learn that the defendant had
misidentified himself until after they had issued the citation to the driver; at that
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point, the lawful detention of the driver and the passenger had ended. Id. at 726.
Had the officers developed reasonable suspicion that the defendant was
engaged in criminal activity during the stop, the continued detention and
investigation would have been reasonable. Id. at 722. However, nervousness
alone is not enough to amount to reasonable suspicion, and “giving a false name
when officers did not know it was false could not give them reasonable suspicion
to investigate further, nor was the fact that the dispatcher found no record of the
first name given by [the defendant] sufficient to raise suspicion of criminal
activity.” Id. at 726; see also Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 328 (stating that the
same standard applies to pedestrians or vehicle occupants).
The State argues that concealment in a high-crime area is sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion and relies on federal cases that are
distinguishable on the facts of this case.4 In the first case, United States v. Sims,
officers reported to a shots-fired call. 296 F.3d 284, 285 (4th Cir. 2002). When
they arrived at the scene, they had the suspect’s description, the defendant was
the only person there and matched the suspect’s description, and the defendant
was located not far from where the shots had been fired a few minutes before the
4
The State equates flight with concealment, but while flight and hiding may
both indicate consciousness of guilt, see, e.g., Jordan v. State, Nos. 02-12-
00470-CR, 02-12-00471-CR, 02-12-00472-CR, 2014 WL 1663404, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Apr. 24, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication), Sergeant Leach’s subjective opinion that Snyder was trying to hide
is not dispositive. See Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001).
7
call. Id. at 287. The court stated that an officer could have reasonably
concluded that the defendant was evading the officers, stating that the
“[defendant’s] behavior, while apparently evasive, was well short of ‘headlong
flight’ and might not have given rise to reasonable suspicion in a different
context.” Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, Sergeant Leach was not responding
to any calls and did not have a description of a suspect because he was not
looking for a suspect, and there were people other than Snyder in the area.
In the second federal case, United States v. Peterson, plain-clothes
officers were patrolling a high-crime area when they saw three men standing on
the sidewalk. 100 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1996). The men ducked behind a car when
they saw the officers. Id. This made the officers suspicious, and they
approached the men. Id. at 10. The court concluded that this was a consensual
encounter because two of the men left without hindrance; because the initial
encounter was consensual, the court did not determine whether the fact that the
men had ducked behind a car, by itself, was sufficient to support reasonable
suspicion. Id. at 9–11. In contrast, Sergeant Leach immediately detained
Snyder during their initial contact by pulling his weapon and ordering Snyder out
of the bushes. Cf. St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 726 (stating that absent
reasonable suspicion, officers may conduct only consensual questioning).
8
Here, Snyder’s false identity was suspected but not known to the police
until after they had already detained him and taken him to jail. 5 See id. Sergeant
Leach saw Snyder at 4:30 p.m. in a high-crime area where no crime had been
reported, and the basis for the stop by Sergeant Leach and three other police
officers was that Sergeant Leach thought Snyder was hiding from him. See
Domingo v. State, 82 S.W.3d 617, 618 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.)
(holding no reasonable suspicion existed to support detention when defendant’s
conversation with officer occurred at 9:00 p.m. in high-crime area, defendant was
part of a group that was lawfully socializing and drinking alcohol without engaging
in disruptive or illegal activities, and the officer was not responding to or
investigating reports of criminal activity);6 Scott v. State, 549 S.W.2d 170, 172–73
5
Sergeant Leach drew Snyder from the bushes at gunpoint and used
profanity as he questioned him, while another officer threatened to shoot Snyder
if he tried to escape. These acts indicate an arrest without probable cause rather
than a mere detention. See Campbell v. State, 325 S.W.3d 223, 234 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (listing factors involved in determining whether a
seizure is an arrest or a detention, including degree of force and the
reasonableness of the intrusion); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20; 88 S. Ct. at
1878–79 (requiring an officer’s actions to be justified at their inception and to be
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in
the first place).
6
In Domingo, after the police officer detected a strong odor of alcohol on
the defendant’s breath, he detained him for further investigation. 82 S.W.3d at
619. Once detained, the defendant gave a false name and date of birth to the
officer. Id. When the officer was unable to locate the defendant in the system,
he suspected that he had been given a false name and took the defendant to the
police station for further identification. Id. At the police station, he confirmed that
the defendant had given him a false name and that the defendant had
outstanding warrants. Id.
9
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (holding that no reasonable suspicion existed when
officer patrolling a high crime area was aware of recent thefts and saw defendant
drive a sparsely traveled street at 1:30 a.m. with “sheeting material” in his car’s
back seat). Compare Jones v. State, 926 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1996, pet. ref’d) (holding no reasonable suspicion existed when officers
saw defendant’s truck emerge at 10:25 p.m. from public park that had previously
been used by people to smoke marijuana, have sex, abandon stolen vehicles,
and conceal minors drinking alcohol and that was located across from some
recently burglarized homes), with Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 766–69
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (concluding that officer reporting to a shots-fired call had
reasonable suspicion to detain defendant when it was 2:26 a.m. in a residential,
low-traffic area, and the officer saw the defendant across the street from the
scene before defendant walked briskly away and appeared nervous, constantly
looking over his shoulder at the officer). Other than Snyder’s location in the
bushes in a high-crime area, no other facts support an inference that criminal
activity had or would be occurring. See Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 53 (holding that
“level of criminal activity in an area . . . [is not] suspicious in and of [itself]”); see
also Gurrola v. State, 877 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (stating that
the high-crime reputation of the area where the detainees were seen is not
enough by itself to support an investigative stop); cf. Williams v. State, No. 01-93-
00874, 1994 WL 400292, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 4, 1994, pet.
ref’d, untimely filed) (not designated for publication) (holding that officer had
10
reasonable suspicion to detain appellant when driver of stolen car had fled scene
of accident, bystanders pointed out the direction in which he had fled, and officer
found appellant hiding under some bushes).
Based on our review of the case law and the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude that the specific, articulable facts here present an insufficient basis
for reasonable suspicion, and we sustain Snyder’s first issue. See St. George,
237 S.W.3d at 726; see also Domingo, 82 S.W.3d at 618.7
III. Sufficiency
In his second issue, Snyder argues that the evidence is insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict because the State failed to prove that there had been a
lawful detention. In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d
763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
7
As in Domingo, before he was taken to jail for identification, Snyder had
provided the same name, date of birth, and social security number each time
Sergeant Leach asked him for his identification. See 82 S.W.3d at 619.
Sergeant Leach testified that he thought Snyder was being dishonest about who
he was and took him to jail for identification because he could not locate “Jim
James Morgan” in the system, Jim and James were similar names, and Jim is a
nickname for James.
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A person commits the offense of failure to identify if he intentionally gives a
false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who
has lawfully arrested or detained him. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(b)(1), (2)
(West 2011). Based on our resolution above, there was no reasonable suspicion
to detain Snyder. Therefore, his detention was unlawful, making the evidence
insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. We sustain Snyder’s second issue.
IV. Conclusion
Having sustained both of Snyder’s issues, we reverse the trial court’s
judgment and enter a judgment of acquittal. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(c).
/s/ Bob McCoy
BOB MCCOY
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; MCCOY and GABRIEL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: October 2, 2014
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