An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-309
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 7 October 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
Mecklenburg County
No. 12 JT 32
A.M.B.
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 16 December
2013 by Judge Elizabeth T. Trosch in Mecklenburg County District
Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September 2014.
Twyla Hollingsworth-Richardson for petitioner-appellee
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services.
J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Theresa M. Sprain
and Carolyn C. Pratt, for guardian ad litem.
STEELMAN, Judge.
The trial court’s conclusion that termination of parental
rights was in the best interests of the juvenile was supported
by the findings of fact required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1110(a).
I. Factual and Procedural History
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On 20 January 2012, the Mecklenburg County Department of
Social Services, Youth and Family Services (DSS) filed a
petition alleging that A.B. was a neglected and dependent
juvenile, based on reports that the child’s mother, J.A.B.
(mother) had engaged in domestic altercations in A.B.’s
presence. The petition also alleged that during the previous six
months mother had lived at five different residences and was
evicted from each due to her behavior. On 20 January 2012 a non-
secure custody order was entered granting DSS custody of A.B. On
12 April 2012, A.B. was adjudicated neglected based on mother’s
substance abuse and her “inability to manage her aggression.”
Following a permanency planning review hearing held on 10
January 2013, the trial court suspended reunification efforts
and changed the permanent plan for A.B. to termination of
parental rights and adoption.
On 15 March 2013, DSS filed a petition to terminate
mother’s parental rights, alleging that grounds existed to
terminate mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(1) (neglect), (2) (failure to make reasonable
progress), (3) (failure to pay reasonable child support) and (7)
(abandonment). DSS also alleged that grounds existed to
terminate the parental rights of A.B.’s father, whose identity
was unknown, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(5) (2013).
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On 16 December 2013, the trial court entered an order
terminating mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1111(a)(1), (2) and (3). The unknown father’s parental
rights were also terminated.
The present appeal is only by mother.
II. Standard of Review
“The termination of parental rights statutes provide for a
two-stage termination proceeding: an adjudication stage and a
disposition stage. In the adjudication stage, the trial court
must determine whether there exists one or more grounds for
termination of parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a). If the trial court determines that at least one ground
for termination exists, it then proceeds to the disposition
stage where it must determine whether terminating the rights of
the parent is in the best interest of the child, in accordance
with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a).” In re D.H., __ N.C. App. __,
__, 753 S.E.2d 732, 734 (2014) (citing In re Montgomery, 311
N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984)).
“We review the trial court’s decision to terminate parental
rights for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App.
94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (citation omitted). “‘The
trial court is subject to reversal for abuse of discretion only
upon a showing . . . that the challenged actions are manifestly
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unsupported by reason.’” D.H., __ N.C. App. at __, 753 S.E.2d at
734 (quoting In re J.L.H., __ N.C. App. __, __, 741 S.E.2d 333,
337 (2012) (internal quotation omitted)).
III. Trial Court’s Determination that Termination was in
the Juvenile’s Best Interests
Mother does not challenge the evidentiary support for the
trial court’s findings of fact or its determination that grounds
existed to support termination of her parental rights, and does
not argue that the court abused its discretion by concluding
that it was in A.B.’s best interest for mother’s parental rights
to be terminated. Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the
trial court erred in its determination that it was in the best
interest of A.B. to terminate mother’s parental rights by
failing to make the findings required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1110(a). We disagree.
Once a trial court determines that statutory grounds for
termination exist, it must “determine whether terminating the
parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1110(a). This statute requires that in making its
determination “the court shall consider the following criteria
and make written findings regarding the following that are
relevant”
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the
juvenile.
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(3) Whether the termination of parental
rights will aid in the accomplishment
of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the
parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between
the juvenile and the proposed adoptive
parent, guardian, custodian, or other
permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
Although N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) requires the trial court
to consider all six of the enumerated factors, it is required to
enter written findings of fact “concerning only those factors
‘that are relevant.’” D.H. at __, 753 S.E.2d at 735 (citations
omitted).
Mother argues that the trial court failed to make findings
of fact on the age of the juvenile, whether termination of
parental rights would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent
plan, or concerning the bond between mother and the juvenile, as
required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a)(1), (3) and (4)
respectively. However, analysis of the trial court’s order
reveals that the court’s findings sufficiently addressed the
relevant factors.
Mother correctly notes that the trial court made no
findings addressing A.B.’s age. However, mother does not
identify any evidence that the child’s age was a relevant factor
in this case, and does not offer any argument as to the
significance of this omission. We conclude the trial court did
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not err by failing to make a specific written finding of fact
concerning A.B.’s age. See D.H. at __, 753 S.E.2d at 735 (“Since
respondent fails to point to any evidence in the record
demonstrating that age was placed in issue as a relevant factor,
such that it had an impact on the trial court’s decision, we do
not believe that the trial court erred in not making specific
findings concerning the children’s ages in its order.”).
Mother also argues that the trial court failed to make
findings pertaining to whether termination of her parental
rights would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for
the juvenile. We first note that, since the permanent plan was
adoption, termination of parental rights is clearly a
prerequisite to achieving the permanent plan. In addition, N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(g) directs a trial court conducting a
permanency planning hearing to determine “the best plan of care
to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a
reasonable period of time.” Thus, the trial court’s findings
regarding the need for “a safe, permanent home . . . within a
reasonable period of time” are relevant to whether termination
will achieve the permanent plan. In its order the trial court
made a variety of findings illustrating the relationship between
termination of mother’s parental rights and the need to achieve
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a safe permanent home for A.B. within a reasonable time,
including the following:
. . .
3. [A.B.] was adjudicated neglected on 15
March 2012. . . .
. . .
14. [Prior to the adjudication of neglect],
the mother had at least five different
addresses[.]. . . All of these residences
were disrupted due to the mother’s
behaviors.
. . .
20. From October 17, 2001 until . . . 2005,
[mother] had seven referrals involving her
children. As a result . . . mother’s
parental rights to her oldest three children
were terminated.
. . .
22. [DSS] has been involved with the family
since 2001 for issues related to [mother’s]
substance abuse, mental health, and history
of altercations, aggressive behavior, as
well as the lack of housing stability, . . .
[and] the injurious environment of the
juveniles. [Mother] has failed or refused to
comply with recommended therapy services for
her and substance abuse treatment since
[2001.]
. . .
25. There is a risk to [A.B.’s] permanence,
if placed in the home of the mother[,] due
to the mother’s pattern of coping that she
displayed prior to custody and ever since; a
style . . . illustrated by aggression,
defensiveness and lack of insight. Her
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pattern has led to conflict and criminal
arrest.
34. [Mother] lacks verifiable employment and
lacks stable housing. . . .
. . .
46. The juvenile is bonded to her placement
provider and is doing extremely well in her
placement. She functions as a member of the
family. She is in a potential adoptive
placement. The likelihood of [A.B.’s]
adoption is high.
47. That while [A.B.] . . . knows [that
mother is] her mother, [mother’s] lack of
insight into the [effect that] patterns . .
. symptomatic of [her] mental illness have
had on her ability to provide [a] safe and
stable home . . . make termination of
parental rights in [A.B.’s] best interests.
Since mother does not challenge these findings of fact,
they are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97,
408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). The court’s findings of fact clearly
illustrate the unlikelihood of any imminent change in mother’s
behavior and the resultant need to terminate parental rights in
order to facilitate A.B.’s adoption. While the trial court did
not explicitly state that termination of mother’s parental
rights would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for
the juvenile, it is apparent that the court considered this
factor.
Mother also contends that the trial court failed to make
sufficient written findings of fact regarding the bond between
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mother and the juvenile. Although the court did not use the
specific word “bond,” it made numerous findings addressing
mother’s emotional and mental health issues and her lack of
involvement with A.B., including the following:
. . .
26. [Mother’s] psychological testing
illustrated that she is an individual who is
hostile, impulsive and acts out with minimal
to no awareness or concern regarding
consequences of her actions, and tends to
blame others for altercations and conflicts.
27. [Mother’s] psychological testing
indicated that she is angry, paranoid and
distrusting of others.
28. Dr. Hancock’s evaluation included the
following diagnoses for [mother]: Bipolar,
Cannabis Dependence, and Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits.
. . .
31. . . . [Mother] is not engaged in any
known therapy and has not been engaged in
any consistent therapy or mental health
program since [A.B.] was placed in [DSS’s]
custody[.] [Mother] informed Dr. Hancock . .
. that she does not need therapy.
32. . . . [Mother] was discharged from [the]
Salvation Army Women’s Shelter in late
December 2012 due to “intolerable and
belligerent behavior towards staff and
residents.”
33. At the 30 August 2012 hearing, [mother]
was provided with an opportunity to visit
[A.B.] at her daycare. [Mother] only visited
with [A.B.] at her daycare four times
between August 2012 and [the] 10 January
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2013 court date despite being provided bus
passes. [Mother] has not engaged in shared-
parenting, although [it is] available.
[Mother] did not . . . attend [A.B.’s]
family counseling and community-based
rehabilitation services . . . [or] the
Children’s Developmental Services
appointments as recommended.
. . .
36. . . . [Mother] has not provided any
consistent emotional or other support for
[A.B.], and has not consistently taken
advantage of opportunities to further
develop a relationship with the child.
. . .
38. [Mother] is not engaged in any
therapeutic, psychological or psychiatric
services.
. . .
47. That while [A.B.] . . . knows [that
mother is] her mother, [mother’s] lack of
insight into the [effect that] patterns . .
. symptomatic of [her] mental illness have
had on her ability to provide [a] safe and
stable home . . . make termination of
parental rights in [A.B.’s] best interests.
Mother’s unwillingness to address serious mental health issues
clearly affects her ability to form an appropriate bond with
A.B., and her unwillingness to take advantage of the
opportunities to spend time with A.B. further impacted the
relationship between mother and child. The trial court’s
findings make it clear that the court considered the bond
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between mother and child when determining that termination was
in A.B.’s best interest.
The better practice is for a trial court to make findings
that clearly track the statutory requirements for findings on
relevant issues. However, although the trial court did not
employ the specific language of the statute, the court’s order
adequately addressed how termination will facilitate the
permanent plan and the bond between mother and child. As this is
mother’s only challenge to the termination order we conclude
that the court did not err and that its order should be
AFFIRMED.
Judges CALABRIA and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).