J-S61035-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
v. :
:
KENNETH A. SENOSKI, :
:
Appellant : No. 734 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order April 16, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Criminal Division, at No: CP-02-CR-0007565-1995
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED OCTOBER 07, 2014
Kenneth A. Senoski (Appellant) pro se appeals from the April 16, 2014
order which denied his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
A prior panel of this Court summarized the factual and procedural
history of this case.
On May 19, 1997, [A]ppellant was convicted by jury trial of
aggravated assault, criminal attempt (rape), and recklessly
endangering another person. The conviction arose from a
stabbing and
on April 28, 1995. The victim recognized [A]ppellant as being
home about a week earlier. Appellant was initially sentenced to
imprisonment, but on November 17, 1997,
following a motion for modification, the court re-sentenced
affirmed the judgment of sentence on August 2, 1999, and our
[S]upreme [C]ourt denied appeal on November 23, 1999.
Commonwealth v. Senoski, 745 A.2d 46 (Pa.Super. 1999)
(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 743, 747
A.2d 367 (1999).
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S61035-14
On August 20, 1999, [A]ppellant filed, pro se, his first
petition pursuant to the PCRA. Counsel was appointed on May 4,
2000, and on August 17, 2001, an amended petition was filed.
On September 3, 2002, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent
to dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 907, 42 Pa.C.S.A. On December 4, 2002, the
PCRA court dismissed the petition. This [C]ourt affirmed the
decision on April 7, 2004, and our [S]upreme [C]ourt denied
appeal on December 29, 2004. Commonwealth v. Senoski,
852 A.2d 1254 (Pa.Super. 2004) (unpublished memorandum),
appeal denied, 581 Pa. 699, 864 A.2d 1204 (2004).
On October 6, 2008, [A]ppellant filed his second petition
pursuant to the PCRA pro se. Counsel was appointed, but
- Turner-Finley
practice on December 4, 2008. See Commonwealth v.
Turner, 581 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1998); Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). On January
Appellant filed his third PCRA petition pro se on June 30,
2010. On August 2, 2010, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907
hearing. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from this order on
August 11, 2010, together with a fourth PCRA petition. On July
11, 2011, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's fourth PCRA
third PCRA petition on December 27, 2011, as being taken from
an interlocutory order. On December 27, 2011, the PCRA court
d PCRA petition as untimely.
Commonwealth v. Senoski, 69 A.3d 1296 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished
memorandum at 1-3) (unnecessary bolding omitted).
petition was filed untimely, and the references to new DNA evidence did not
meet any of the PCRA timeliness exceptions. Senoski, supra, at 4-5. On
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J-S61035-14
March 5, 2014, Appellant filed his fifth PCRA petition, which is at issue in this
appeal. On March 26, 2014, the PCRA court issued a notice of its intention
to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and on April 16, 2014, the PCRA
Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 12 A.3d 477, 479 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or
subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
of sentence became final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner
proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545.
petition is facially untimely: his judgment of sentence became final in 2001.1
In his brief to this Court, Appellant does not invoke any exception set forth is
42 Pa.C.S. §
memorandum in his last appeal, we instructed him on the law regarding the
timeliness of a PCRA petition.
1
Our Supreme Court d
November 23, 1999. Accordingly, Appellant had 90 days, or until February
22, 2000, to file timely a writ of certiorari to our Supreme Court. U.S. Sup.
Ct. Rule 13. Accordingly, Appellant had until February 22, 2001 to file
timely a PCRA petition. The instant petition was filed on March 5, 2014,
over 13 years late.
-3-
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Although [A]ppellant claims to have new evidence, he does
not expressly invoke any time of filing exception, such as the
one that pertains to after-discovered facts. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1)(ii). In point of fact, it is difficult to distill anything
-
a rambling, incoherent discourse. Appellant makes bald
assertions supported by little legal argument and cites case
authority with no meaningful discussion.
Senoski, 69 A.3d 1296 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished memorandum at 4).
Although he includes a partial copy of the PCRA statute, see
Brief at 5, that section does not reference the timeliness exceptions.
Moreover, Appellant makes only vague references to certain evidence either
Accordingly, because Appellant did not plead facts that would establish
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/7/2014
-4-
Com. v. Senoski, K.
Combined Opinion