UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4807
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KELVIN QUADE MANRICH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:11-cr-00122-CCB-20)
Submitted: September 29, 2014 Decided: October 7, 2014
Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bruce A. Johnson, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF BRUCE A. JOHNSON, JR.,
LLC, Bowie, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Kathleen O. Gavin, Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kelvin Quade Manrich, a former officer with the
Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”), appeals the forty-one-month
sentence imposed after we vacated his original sentence and
remanded his case for resentencing. See United States v.
Manrich, 529 F. App’x 322 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-4624). The
only issue in this appeal is whether the district court properly
calculated the loss amount attributable to Manrich for
sentencing purposes. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“USSG”) § 2B1.1(b) (2011). For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the amended criminal judgment.
Following five days of trial testimony, Manrich
entered a straight up guilty plea to conspiracy to obstruct,
delay, and affect commerce by extortion by means of unlawfully
obtaining, under color of official right, money and other
property from Hernan Alexis Moreno and Edwin Javier Mejia, who
jointly owned and operated Majestic Auto Repair Shop, LLC,
(“Majestic”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1951(a) (2012),
and three substantive counts of the same, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 2 (2012). As discussed in our prior opinion,
the overarching purpose of the underlying conspiracy was to
“enrich” the involved BPD officers and to “benefit” Moreno and
Mejia by bribing police officers to use “their official
positions and influence to cause vehicles to be towed or
2
otherwise delivered to Majestic for automobile services and
repair.” (J.A. 14). 1 The scheme was simple: a BPD officer
would respond to the scene of a vehicle accident; the officer
would encourage the vehicle owner to have Majestic tow the
damaged vehicle and/or repair the damage sustained during the
collision. Moreno and Mejia paid the BPD officers a “referral
fee” for directing accident victims to Majestic. This fee, more
appropriately called a kickback, ranged from $250 to $300 per
vehicle. Majestic, in turn, would repair the damage sustained
in the accident. However, for some vehicles, Majestic would
also repair pre-existing damage and/or add to the damage
resulting from the accident. Majestic would then submit an
insurance claim for both the legitimate and fraudulent damage.
Manrich was initially assigned a base offense level of
fourteen. See USSG § 2C1.1(a)(1). This was increased two
levels because the offense involved more than one bribe or
extortion. USSG § 2C1.1(b)(1). The probation officer then
applied an eight-level increase because the foreseeable loss
amount attributable to Manrich was more than $70,000 but less
than $120,000. This was a specific offense characteristic
1
Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix
submitted by the parties.
3
pursuant to USSG § 2C1.1(b)(2), which cross-references the loss
table found in § 2B1.1(b)(1).
To substantiate the loss determination, FBI Agent
Robert Guynn prepared a Loss Summary Chart, which was offered at
the resentencing hearing. Although the conspiracy spanned many
years and involved a substantial number of vehicles, Guynn had
included only fourteen vehicles, all of which were referred to
Majestic either by Manrich or by one of the four officers whose
involvement in the conspiracy Manrich admittedly knew.
At the resentencing hearing, Guynn described how he
compiled this chart. Specifically, Guynn explained that the
data presented in the chart was culled from witness testimony
from the trial and the plea agreements and stipulated statements
of facts accepted by the admitted co-conspirators. Guynn also
explained that he had consulted with insurance adjusters to
determine what percentage of each claim was fraudulent. The
insurance companies paid $63,971.95 for repairs to the fourteen
selected vehicles. Of this, Guynn concluded that $48,966.96 was
paid to repair fraudulent damage. 2
2
Manrich argues on appeal that Guynn did not sufficiently
particularize how he determined the fraud percentage for two
claims that were not 100% fraudulent. But Manrich did not raise
this objection in the district court and, given Guynn’s
testimony, we discern no plain error in the court’s acceptance
of the Loss Summary Chart as to these findings. See United
(Continued)
4
The sentencing court “need only make a reasonable
estimate of the loss.” USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C); see United
States v. Keita, 742 F.3d 184, 192 (4th Cir. 2014) (recognizing
that the loss amount “need not be determined with precision”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Added to the nearly
$49,000 in fraudulent insurance claims are the kickbacks
received by Manrich and his acknowledged co-conspirators, which
total, at minimum, $37,000. 3 The record as supplemented thus
amply demonstrates the basis for the court’s determination of a
loss amount of at least $70,000.
Manrich advances three arguments to undermine this
finding, two of which attack Hernan Moreno’s testimony at the
resentencing hearing. But any concerns regarding Moreno’s
credibility or lack of specific recollection are ameliorated by
Guynn’s testimony, which established a proper foundation for the
Loss Summary Chart.
States v. Hamilton, 701 F.3d 404, 410 (4th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1838 (2013).
3
As the Government aptly points out, we resolved the issue
of the foreseeability of these payments in Manrich’s first
appeal, see Manrich, 529 F. App’x at 325, and will not revisit
the issue here. See MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154, 161 n.10
(4th Cir.) (“[T]he doctrine of law of the case restricts a court
to legal decisions it has made on the same issues in the same
case.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 200 (2013).
5
Finally, Manrich asserts that the fraudulently
obtained insurance proceeds paid to two of his co-conspirators,
Jerry Diggs and Leonel Rodriguez, were improperly included in
the loss amount. Guynn’s determination that both of these
claims were 100% fraudulent is consistent with the plea
agreements entered into by these co-conspirators. On this
record and given our foreseeability ruling in Manrich’s first
appeal, see Manrich, 529 F. App’x at 325, there is no error in
finding these amounts were reasonably foreseeable to Manrich. 4
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Government
satisfied its burden of proving a loss amount between $70,000
and $120,000, which supported the eight-level increase in
Manrich’s offense level. As this is the only issue in dispute,
we affirm the amended criminal judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
4
For the first time on appeal, Manrich argues that the
$15,215 paid to Rodriguez should be excluded from the loss
determination because the fraudulent conduct underlying that
claim occurred prior to Manrich’s entrance into the conspiracy.
But even if this entire amount were excluded, the combined loss
amount would still exceed $70,000. Thus, because Manrich cannot
establish any prejudice resulting from including this amount in
the loss determination, he does not satisfy the rigorous plain
error standard applicable to this newly raised claim. See
United States v. Byers, 649 F.3d 197, 213 (4th Cir. 2011)
(“Plain error review is strictly circumscribed and meeting all
four prongs is difficult, as it should be.” (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted)).
6
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
7