UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4278
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAMAR CRAWLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:13-cr-00206-NCT-1)
Submitted: September 25, 2014 Decided: October 7, 2014
Before KING, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Craven, III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Timothy Nicholas Matkins, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Lamar Crawley appeals from his conviction
and 120-month sentence imposed pursuant to his guilty plea to
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal,
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there are no meritorious issues
for appeal but questioning whether Crawley’s sentence is “too
much.” Neither Crawley nor the Government has filed a brief.
After a careful review of the record, we affirm.
Crawley avers that his sentence is too long,
especially given that he is currently serving a related state
sentence that might not be run concurrently. * The district court
must consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.”
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The sentence
imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to
satisfy the purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
If the sentence imposed is within the appropriate Guidelines
range, we consider it presumptively reasonable. United
States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008). The
presumption may be rebutted by a showing “that the sentence is
*
Counsel states that Crawley is due to be released from
state custody on July 1, 2015.
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unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court imposed a sentence within the
applicable Guidelines range, and it is, thus, deemed by this
court to be presumptively reasonable. See Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at
261. Crawley has not rebutted that presumption on appeal, and
the record provides no support for such a rebuttal. The
after-imposed state sentence and the district court’s failure to
anticipate it do not render Crawley’s sentence unreasonable.
See Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1472-73 (2012).
Thus, the district court committed no substantive error in
imposing Crawley’s sentence, and the court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing the 120-month sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm Crawley’s conviction and
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform his client,
in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If the client requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense
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with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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