J.A22038/14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
YVETTE ANDREA ROTUNDO, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
:
PATRICK BRADLEY JONES, :
:
: No. 2213 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered November 13, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Civil Division No(s).: 12-19816 #1
BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED OCTOBER 08, 2014
Appellant, Yvette Andrea Rotundo, appeals from the order entered in
the Berks County Court of Common Pleas dismissing her complaint in
divorce. Appellant challenges the court’s finding that a common law
marriage did not exist between her and Appellee, Patrick Bradley Jones. We
affirm.
The parties began co-habitating “in 1991, right before” their older
daughter, who was twenty-three years old at the time of the hearing, was
born. N.T., 11/1/13, at 9. On August 24, 2012, Appellant filed a complaint
in divorce seeking alimony, equitable distribution of marital property,
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J. A22038/14
alimony pendente lite, spousal support, counsel fees, costs and expenses,
and child custody. She claimed she and Appellee entered into a common
law marriage on May 12, 1996. On September 11, 2012, pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 3306,1 Appellee filed an answer and counterclaim for declaratory
judgment that there was no marriage. A hearing was held on November 1,
2013.
Appellant testified, inter alia, as follows:
[Counsel for Appellant]: Do you believe that you are
married?
A: Yes.
1
Section 3306 provides:
When the validity of a marriage is denied or doubted,
either or both of the parties to the marriage may bring an
action for a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration of
the validity or invalidity of the marriage and, upon proof of
the validity or invalidity of the marriage, the marriage shall
be declared valid or invalid by decree of the court and,
unless reversed upon appeal, the declaration shall be
conclusive upon all persons concerned.
23 Pa.C.S. § 3306. The trial court opined:
As the existence of a valid marriage is a fundamental
requirement to processing an action in divorce, the issue
raised is one of subject matter jurisdiction. The issue of
subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by either party or
the Court at any time. Bernhard v. Bernhard, 668 A.2d
546, 548 [Pa. Super. 1995]. Accordingly, the fact that the
issue was raised through a counterclaim rather than
through a preliminary objection is not fatal.
Trial Ct. Op., 1/28/14, at 1 n.1.
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Q: Do you believe that the words of present intent were
spoken to you?
A: Yes.
Q: And that you also responded?
A: Yes.
Q: . . . [W]hat was the date on which you say that the
words of present intent were spoken to you?
A: It was Mother’s Day, May 12, 1996.
Q: And why are you so sure that it was that date?
A: Because the events that led up to it, and something
that was given to me at the end of the day. It just all
came back in a very distinct memory, and was also a big
turning point in our relationship.
Q: . . . The words of present intent. Where were you
when they were spoken?
A: They were spoken─we had bought─were in the plans
[sic] of buying a house, and the house that I am currently
living in.
Q: Who is we?
A: Me and [Appellee] were buying a house together.
* * *
Q: At that point, you had two children?
A: Correct.
Q: Were the children with you at that─when the time of
the words of present intent were spoken?
A: Yes, they were.
Q: How old were they?
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A: [S.] would have been 5, and [H.] was just like 7 months
old.
* * *
Q: . . . And you were looking to buy a house?
A: We had already been accepted. Our offer was accepted
and we went to the property that afternoon to just take
another look around. . . .
* * *
Q: . . . [W]here exactly were the words spoken on the
property?
A: [T]his is a farmhouse, . . . and [Appellee] and I were
standing on the bridge[.]
And I said to [Appellee], you know, now that we are
buying this house do you think that we should go forward
and have a more formal ceremony as far as the marriage?
And he turned and he looked at me and grabbed me
around my waist, and he looked at me . . . and he said
buying this house is a very big commitment for me. And
he said, I am not taking this lightly. He said as far as I am
concerned, you and I are married, and I am your husband,
and you are my wife, and I am committed to nobody else
but you.
And I looked at him, and I kind of got cute about it
because that was the first time that I heard him call
me─refer to me as his wife, at least to my face. He had
been introducing me as his wife prior to that. But I looked
at him, and I said I am committed to you, and I am your
wife, and, yes, you are my husband.
And we just proceeded to talk more about the property.
But that was the first time the words were spoken in that
way.
* * *
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Q: I show you what has been marked as Exhibit No. 1.
What is that?
A: It is a Mother’s Day card given to me later that day.
Q: All right.
A: By [Appellee].
Q: Is this signed?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: Is it dated?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: What is the date?
A: May 12, 1996.
Q: Would you please read the front of the card?
A: I love you my wife, on Mother’s Day and always. I love
you my wife. . . .
N.T., 11/1/13, 8-10, 12-14. Appellee testified that he never told Appellant
he was her husband and she was his wife. Id. at 38.
On November 13, 2013, the trial court entered an order dismissing the
complaint in divorce. This timely appeal followed. Appellant was not
ordered to filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on
appeal. The trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Did the trial court
commit an abuse of discretion and/or commit an error of law in finding that
a common law marriage did not exist between the parties?” Appellant’s
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Brief at 5. Appellant argues “that the parties exchanged words in the
present tense for the purpose of establishing a marital contract.” Id. at 9.
In support, Appellant cites her testimony at the hearing. Id. at 9-12, 20-21,
23-24. Appellant avers “[i]t is clear from [her] testimony that the words of
present intent were spoken and that [Appellee] then followed and reinforced
those words with a card addressed to ‘My Wife.’” Id. at 12. Appellant
contends that on March 19, 2003, Appellee presented her with a ring in front
of their children and he stated that it represented their marriage. Id. at 20-
21. She claims she met her burden of proof that the parties entered into a
common law marriage.2 Id. at 25. We disagree.
We first note the relevant standard of review where the court finds
that there is no common law marriage: “That finding, if supported by
competent evidence, is entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury.
A decree based thereon will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of
discretion or an error of law.” In re Estate of Kovalchick, 498 A.2d 374,
376 (Pa. Super. 1985).
This Court has stated:
2
In 2005, the legislature abolished common law marriage in Pennsylvania:
“No common-law marriage contracted after January 1, 2005, shall be valid.
Nothing in this part shall be deemed or taken to render any common-law
marriage otherwise lawful and contracted on or before January 1, 2005,
invalid.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 1103. This amendment does not impact the case at
bar, as Appellant claims “the parties entered into a common law marriage
when the exchange of words were spoken [in 1996] and these words were
then spoken again some years later in front of the parties’ children with the
presentation of a ring [in 2003.]” See Appellant’s Brief at 25.
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Marriage in Pennsylvania is a civil contract by which a
man and a woman take each other for husband and wife.
There are two kinds of marriage: (1) ceremonial; and (2)
common law. A ceremonial marriage is a wedding or
marriage performed by a religious or civil authority with
the usual or customary ceremony or formalities.
Because claims for the existence of a marriage in the
absence of a certified ceremonial marriage present a
“fruitful source of perjury and fraud,” Pennsylvania courts
have long viewed such claims with hostility. Common law
marriages are tolerated, but not encouraged. . . .
A common law marriage can only be created by an
exchange of words in the present tense, spoken with
the specific purpose that the legal relationship of
husband and wife is created by that. Regarding this
requirement for an exchange of words in the present
tense, this Court has noted:
[I]t is too often forgotten that a common law
marriage is a marriage by the express agreement of
the parties without ceremony, and almost invariably
without a witness, by words—not in futuro or in
postea, but—in praesenti, uttered with a view and
for the purpose of establishing the relationship of
husband and wife.
The common law marriage contract does not require any
specific form of words, and all that is essential is proof of
an agreement to enter into the legal relationship of
marriage at the present time.
The burden to prove the marriage is on the party
alleging a marriage, and we have described this as a
“heavy” burden where there is an allegation of a common
law marriage. When an attempt is made to establish a
marriage without the usual formalities, the claim must be
reviewed with “great scrutiny.”
Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1019-20 (Pa. 1998)
(emphasis added, footnotes and citations omitted).
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Instantly, after careful review of the record, including the notes of
testimony of the November 1, 2013 hearing, the parties’ briefs, and the
well-reasoned decision of the Honorable Scott E. Lash, we affirm on the
basis of the trial court’s decision, finding that the evidence did not establish
a common law marriage. See Trial Ct. Op. at 1-11 (finding, inter alia: (1)
testimony of both parties was self-serving and of questionable credibility;
(2) complaint in divorce contradicted Appellant’s testimony that parties were
married on May 12, 1996, setting forth the date of the marriage as March
19, 2003; (3) Appellant failed to state date of marriage on her child support
complaint; (4) deed for property purchased in 1996 “set forth that the
parties are owners ‘as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as
tenants in common;” (5) parties refinanced property in 2010 and Appellant
stated marital status was “single;” (6) parties’ federal tax returns were filed
as “head of household” or as “single”). We discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court. See Estate of Kovalchick, 498 A.2d at 376. Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint in divorce.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/8/2014
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Rotundo, Y. v. Jones, P.
Combined Opinion