J-S53030-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE MATTER OF THE INVOLUNTARY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO PENNSYLVANIA
A.N.J., A MINOR
APPEAL OF: W.M.J.W. No. 767 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree entered April 16, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): O.C.D. No. 204-2013
BEFORE: DONOHUE, OLSON, and PLATT*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 08, 2014
W.M.J.W. (“Mother”), appeals from the trial court decree entered on
April 16, 2014, involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her daughter,
A.N.J. (“Child”), born in December of 2010, pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1)
and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). We affirm.
On November 19, 2013, J.M.J., Child’s father, (“Father”), and his wife,
J.L.J. (“Stepmother”), filed a petition for the involuntary termination of
Mother’s parental rights to Child, so that Stepmother may adopt Child. They
filed an amended petition on December 11, 2013. The trial court held a
hearing on the petition on February 24, 2014. At the hearing, Father,
Stepmother, and Mother testified. Child, who was approximately three years
old, was represented by an appointed child advocate, Virginia G. Sharp,
Esquire. Child is currently residing in a home in Venango County with Father
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to Superior Court.
J-S53030-14
and Stepmother, and their child, K.J., born in February of 2014. Father’s
mother, and Father’s sister and her husband, as well as their two children,
also reside in the home. Mother is currently housed at the State
Correctional Institution (“SCI”) Cambridge, Cambridge Springs,
Pennsylvania, where she is serving a sentence with a maximum date of
February 17, 2019. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/14, at 1-2.
The trial court found the following facts from Father’s testimony:
Prior to residing at [his current address], [Father] lived for
approximately seven months [at a different address in Venango
County]. Before residing at [that address], Father resided at
[his current address] for approximately two years. He was
married to [Stepmother] [in November of 2013]. He has one
other child, [K.J.]. . . . When he lived with [] Mother and
[Child,] they lived at his mother’s home[, his current residence].
[] Mother moved out[,] and [Child] continued to reside with
him[,] on either February 14th or 15th of 2011. [] Mother was
arrested on a probation violation for a misdemeanor assault a
few days after she ceased living with [] Father.
[] Father testified that the last time [] Mother asked him to
see [Child] was in January of 2013, during a phone call. He did
not take [Child] to see her. She asked to speak with [Child] in
January of 2013, and he did permit [Child] to speak with []
Mother. He occasionally received collect phone calls from []
Mother throughout 2013, but he did not accept the collect calls.
After [Father] filed the Petition for Involuntary Termination, he
received a phone call from [] Mother about two-three weeks
afterwards inquiring into why [he] was filing the petition, asking
him to send her pictures of [Child], and asking him to take
[Child] to visit her. He has received birthday cards and
Valentine’s Day cards from [] Mother for [Child] since 2011[,]
which he read to [Child]. However[,] from January 2013,
through the filing of the Petition in November of 2013, [] Father
received no cards, no gifts, but perhaps one letter from []
Mother for [Child]. [] Mother does not pay child support. During
her incarceration[,] [] Mother has had [] Father’s phone number,
and his address at [his current address]. [] Mother did not have
-2-
J-S53030-14
Father’s address when he moved to [his prior address], but he
informed her of it when he spoke with her on the phone in
January of 2013. [] Father stopped responding to [Mother’s]
letters sometime prior to marrying his wife. He believes that the
last time [Mother] inquired about [Child] was March of 2013.
[] Father ended contact with [] Mother’s relatives around
October to November of 2011, as he felt uncomfortable taking
[Child] to their house. He received a request for visitation rights
from [] Mother’s step-mother in early 2012, but no follow[-]up
occurred. He has seen Mother’s relatives occasionally at the
playground or grocery store. [] Mother’s relatives have not
offered to provide monetary support and do not send cards or
gifts to [Child].
[] Father provides for the [Child’s] religious needs by
sending her to church with his mother. He sees to her
educational needs, and she is to start Head Start within the next
couple of months, and she is developmentally on track. Father
is employed by Liberty Electronics, where he has worked for the
past three and a half years. He and his wife, [Stepmother], take
[Child] to her doctor’s appointments with Dr. Bishop[,] and her
immunizations are up to date. [Child] has no health issues[,]
and [] Father’s health is also good. [Child] refers to
[Stepmother] as mom.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/14, at 2-3.
The trial court found the following facts from Stepmother’s testimony:
[Stepmother] is not employed. She married [] Father [in
November of 2013], and has a child with him, [K.J.]. . . . She
has helped care for [Child] since January [of] 2013, until
present. She cares for [Child] and plays with her while [] Father
is at work. [Child] calls her mom. A typical day for [Child] looks
like: waking [Child] up between 7-8 a.m., breakfast, a movie,
then playing with toys, lunch at noon, a nap, playing in the
afternoon, eat dinner at 5[.] [Child] plays with [] Father after
dinner[,] then they watch a movie before putting her to bed.
[Stepmother] prepares the meals for their family. [Stepmother]
testified that [Child], “feels like she’s mine.” She wishes to
adopt [Child].
Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/14, at 3-4.
-3-
J-S53030-14
The trial court found the following facts from Mother’s testimony:
[] Mother, as of one year prior to the birth of [Child], was
unmarried[,] and she remains unmarried. Initially, [Child]
resided with both [Mother and Father]. On or about February
14, 2011, [Mother and Father] separated[,] and [Child] was left
in the care of her [Father]. [] Mother became incarcerated a few
days later[,] on February 17th, 2011. She was incarcerated at
the Venango County Jail for about seven months before she
received a state sentence. While she was at the Venango
County Jail[,] she visited weekly with [Child] when [] Father
would bring [Child] to the jail. The last time [] Mother visited
with [Child] was in September of 2011[,] before she was
transported to SCI Muncy. After being transported to SCI
Muncy, [] Mother wrote letters to [] Father and occasionally
made phone calls. She estimates that she wrote a letter to []
Father about once or twice a month while at SCI Muncy[,] and
spoke to [Child] on the phone once or twice. [] Mother was next
transferred to SCI Cambridge[,] where the letters and phone
calls initially continued. [] Mother and [] Father would talk about
how [Child] was doing and her daycare. [] Mother asked []
Father to send pictures of [Child] or to bring [Child] to visit her,
but he told her that he would not because he did not want her to
be at a prison. [] Mother never filed any custody action to
compel visitation with [Child] at SCI Cambridge. In 2012,
Mother stopped receiving correspondence from Father. []
Mother would call [] Father collect from the prison[,] and he no
longer accepted [] Mother’s calls. She spoke with [Child] once in
March of 2013, on the phone and then once in December[,] after
Father filed his Petition for Involuntary Termination. Mother
stated that she and [Child] talked about colors, Dora the
Explorer, My Little Pony, sang the A, B, C’s, and that she told
[Child], “mommy loves you.” [] Mother was aware that []
Father was not taking [Child] to see her maternal extended
family.
While incarcerated[,] [] Mother obtained her G.E.D.
[“General Educational Development” degree] in May 2012,
completed a ten[-]week parenting class, and completed an anger
management/violence prevention course. The parenting class
began in October of 2013 and was completed December 31,
2013. She has also completed a money smart budgeting course.
She believes that she will likely be released on parole in June of
this year. Her plan is to reside with her mother. Upon her
-4-
J-S53030-14
release, she would like to enroll in Vo[-]tech to take a course in
Cosmetology and become a beautician. If Mother does not
receive parole, her maximum date is February 17, 2019.
[] Mother contends that she has tried to maintain a
relationship with [Child] while [she has been] incarcerated. She
wrote letters to [Child] with [Child’s] name addressed on the
envelope. She mailed [Child] several cards. She sent a
Christmas present for [Child] to her mother’s house through the
Angel Tree program. She applied[,] through Reverend
Johnson[,] in July of 2013, for her three children to be a part of
the Angel Tree Prison Fellowship Program before [] Father filed
the Involuntary Termination Petition. See Respondent’s Ex. A.
[] Mother said she had the present sent to her mother’s address
as she was not sure what was going on with [] Father, although
she admitted that she knew his phone number and his mother’s
address. She did not ask [] Father if he gave [Child] the letters
she wrote. She said she wrote only eight letters to [Child] while
she has been incarcerated because [Child] is so young she
wouldn’t really understand them. [] Mother estimates that she
spoke with [Child] on the phone approximately four times. She
claims that every time she wrote her mother she inquired about
[Child]. [] Mother admits that she has provided no monetary
support for [Child]. She states that he[r] job in the prison does
not pay well. [] Mother has not performed any parental duties
for [Child] since her incarceration in the Venango County Jail in
February of 2011.
[] Mother has two other children who she speaks to [sic]
semi-regularly on the phone when the girls are at her mother’s
home. She said they know that they have a sister [] [Child]
although they do not have a relationship with her. She talks on
the phone to her mother and the girls every couple of months
when her mother puts money on her phone [account].
[] Mother reported that she talked to a parenting worker in
October of 2013, to learn how she might be able to compel
visitation with [Child]. [] Mother does have a custody order
regarding her other two children which was obtained through a
PFA proceeding. The custody order permits the girls to visit with
their grandmother, but the girls are not to be brought to the
prison to visit with [] Mother.
-5-
J-S53030-14
[] Mother has been informed about the option of entering
into a voluntary Act 101 post-adoption agreement with [] Father
and his wife. [] Mother is opposed[,] as she remembers that her
biological mom did not fight for her and her brother, but just
gave them up. [] Mother wants [Child] to know that her mother
cared enough to fight for her, she loves [Child] and wants better
for her. She feels strongly that [Child] is her daughter[,] and
that she carried her for nine months as she grew and gave birth
to her and[,] thus, “that’s my baby.” [] Mother will not
voluntarily relinquish her parental rights to any of her children.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/14, at 4-6.
The trial court found the following facts from the testimony of Mother’s
stepmother, T.B., who lives in Franklin, Pennsylvania:
[T.B.] testified that she talks to [Mother] every other
weekend when she has custody of [Mother’s] other two children.
She has no visitation with [Child] although she is in the process
of working with Mr. McIntyre[fn] to hopefully set up
arrangements. She stated that she sent Father a letter when
she was setting up visitation with [Mother’s] two other children,
seeking visitation but visitation was not set up at that time. She
received a Custody Order in 2013 that allows her to have time
with [Mother’s] two older children so that they will get to know
[Mother’s] side of the family. [T.B.] did not have the money to
file a custody action against [] Father and is waiting to save the
money for that action. She does not communicate with []
Father. She states that she does not have a phone number for
[] Father. She has the Angel Tree Christmas Present from
[Mother] for [Child]. She did not deliver the present. The tag
says, “mommy loves you, and hopefully, I’ll be home soon.”
[Mother’s] two other children opened their Angel Tree presents
at Christmastime at her home.
___________________________________________________
fn
The identity of Mr. McIntyre in relation to this case is unclear
from the record. See N.T., 2/24/14, at 73-74.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/14, at 7 (footnote added).
-6-
J-S53030-14
The trial court stated the following with regard the recommendation of
the child advocate, Attorney Sharp:
[The child advocate] met with [Child] on January 21, 2014.
Due to [Child’s] young age, she did not specifically ask her what
she wanted in regards to the termination. She identifies
[Father] as daddy, but does not recognize [Mother] as her
mommy. She talked about her paternal grandparents, and her
baby brother that is coming. She did not talk about her older
half-siblings. Based on the testimony, evidence, and statutory
requirements, Attorney Sharp believes it is in the best interest
and welfare of [Child] for the petition to be granted. Attorney
Sharp would encourage Mother to put information about herself
on file for [Child] to be able to obtain when she reaches the age
of majority.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/14, at 7; N.T., 2/24/14, at 81-82.
On April 16, 2014, the trial court entered the decree terminating
Mother’s parental rights, dated April 9, 2014. On May 7, 2014, Mother filed
a notice of appeal, but failed to file a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On May 13, 2014,
the trial court entered an order directing Mother to file a concise statement
within five days after entry of the order. Mother complied, filing her concise
statement on May 19, 2014.1 See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa.
Super. 2009) (stating that, failure to file a concise statement along with the
notice of appeal in a children’s fast track matter will result in a defective
notice of appeal, to be decided of a case-by-case basis); cf. In re J.P. v.
S.P., 991 A.2d 904, 907-908 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating that failure to file a
1
We note that May 18, 2014 was a Sunday, thus, Mother had until Monday,
May 19, 2014 to timely comply. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.
-7-
J-S53030-14
concise statement along with a notice of appeal in a children’s fast track
matter, and failure to comply with a subsequent order of the trial court to
file the concise statement, will result in waiver of the issues on appeal).
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its
discretion in determining that [Mother’s] parental rights should
be terminated as being in the best interest of the minor child
was against the weight of the evidence presented because the
evidence presented at trial showed that the natural mother did
not demonstrate a settled purpose to relinquish her parental
rights?
Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its
discretion in determining that [Mother’s] parental rights should
be terminated when failing to adequately consider the mother’s
efforts to maintain contact and a relationship with the minor
child?
Mother’s Brief, at 6.2
Mother argues that she did not demonstrate a settled purpose to
relinquish her parental rights, and that the trial court’s decision was against
the weight of the evidence. She contends that the trial court did not take
into consideration the relevance of the length of her incarceration, and the
remedy that release from incarceration would provide.
Additionally, Mother asserts that the trial court failed to consider her
efforts to maintain contact and a relationship with Child. Mother alleges that
the trial court did not afford any consideration to Father’s actions that
2
Although Mother’s issues do not specify subsections (a)(1) and (b) of
Section 2511, it is clear from her discussion in her brief that she challenges
the termination of her parental rights under those subsections.
-8-
J-S53030-14
created and placed barriers in the path of her parent-child relationship. She
requests this Court to reverse the termination of her parental rights.
We review the appeal from the termination of parental rights in
accordance with the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to
accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36
A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion). As has been often
stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because
the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.
Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,
34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630,
634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As [our Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T., there are
clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of
review in these cases. [The Supreme Court] observed that,
unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the
fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial
judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and
often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child
and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the
facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in
dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must
resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its
own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must
defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are
supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not
the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re
Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).
-9-
J-S53030-14
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained:
[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
Id. quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).
This court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of Section
2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(1), which provides as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
We have explained this Court’s review of the evidence supporting the
involuntary termination of a parent’s rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1)
as follows:
- 10 -
J-S53030-14
To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of
conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing
of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to
relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to
perform parental duties.
***
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform
parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of
inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her
conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of
termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations
omitted).
[T]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact
must be steady and consistent over a period of time,
contribute to the psychological health of the child, and
must demonstrate a serious intent on the part of the
parent to recultivate a parent-child relationship and must
also demonstrate a willingness and capacity to undertake
the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish his
parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this
question.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006
(Pa. Super 2008) (en banc).
In In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 550 Pa. 595, 602, 708 A.2d
88, 91 (1998), our Supreme Court stated that Section 2511 does not require
that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental
- 11 -
J-S53030-14
claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform parental duties, as or joins
the two portions of the statute.
Further, regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has
stated as follows:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental
duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A
child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely
passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court
has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which
requires affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association with
the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place
of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good
faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her
ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all
available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed
in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional
needs.
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004).
We find no merit to Mother’s argument that the trial court failed to
consider that Father posed an obstacle to her contact with Child from prison.
With regard to Section 2511(a)(1), the trial court found that Mother was
- 12 -
J-S53030-14
incarcerated a month and a half after Child’s birth, and has performed few
parental duties since that time. Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/14, at 2. The trial
court determined:
[] Mother has only had one telephone call with [Child] for a
period of at least eight months prior to the filing of the Amended
Petition on November 19, 2013. She has failed to contact
[Child] on her birthday or holidays besides sending a handful of
cards for her. In [Child’s] approximately three years of life she
has received a total of eight letters/cards from [] Mother. Her
last in person visit with [Mother] was in August of 2011 when
she was only eight months old. [] Mother has also not
performed any parental duties since February of 2011. []
Mother has failed to provide support for [Child], including
financial support.
***
. . . [Father] has proved by clear and convincing evidence
that . . . [] Mother [] has refused or failed to perform her
parental duties for a period of at least six months as is required
by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1). [Mother] has not seen [Child]
since August of 2011. [Mother] has not had any contact with []
Father regarding [Child] since March of 2013 until after the filing
of the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights.
[Mother] has mailed only eight cards or letters to [Child]
throughout her entire life. Although [] Mother did request for a
2013 Christmas present [to] be sent to [Child] through the Angel
Tree Ministry, she did not have it sent to the [] Father’s address,
which she had since January of 2013, nor did she give her step-
mother Father’s phone number, which has not changed since []
Mother was incarcerated[,] so that step-mother could coordinate
delivery of the Christmas present. [] Mother has not used any of
her earnings in the jail to call [] Father to speak with [Child].
After talking to the Parenting Advisor at SCI Cambridge, []
Mother did not initiate any custody proceedings to compel
visitation with [Child] during her incarceration.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/14, at 8-9.
- 13 -
J-S53030-14
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court considered that Mother sent
only a total of eight cards or letters for Child between September of 2011
and September of 2013, although she was presented with the opportunity to
send eight free letters each month of her incarceration. Trial Court Opinion,
5/29/14, at 3. Further, the trial court considered that Mother took one
parenting class while she was incarcerated, and that she spoke with a
parental custody worker at the jail, but took no steps after the class and
conversation to file a request for visitation with Child. Id.
The trial court found that, from August of 2011 to the time of the
termination hearing, Mother had no in-person contact with Child, who was
only eight months old, and Mother was content to let other people parent
Child, never seeking to compel any visitation with her in prison. Trial Court
Opinion, 4/9/14, at 9; Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/14, at 4. The trial court
properly considered the fact that Mother was incarcerated in 2011, and was
hopeful that she would be released on parole in June of 2014. Id. at 5. See
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 822, 827-828, 830-831 (stating the trial
court may consider a parent’s incarceration in ruling on a termination
petition under Section 2511(a)(1) or (2)). Mother’s hope that she would be
released on parole in June of 2014, however, was not a certainty. N.T.
2/24/14, at 65. Thus, the trial court considered all of the evidence that
Mother asserts related to her inability to maintain contact with Child, and
concluded that it was Mother’s own actions and inactions, as opposed to any
- 14 -
J-S53030-14
obstacles placed by Father, that created the situation where Child does not
know her.
After our careful review of the trial court’s application of the law to the
facts of this case, we find no reason to disturb the trial court’s conclusions
that Mother failed to perform her parental duties with regard to Child, that
her explanations for her lack of contact lacked credibility, and that she failed
to sustain her burden of proof with regard to the post-abandonment contact.
Thus, the trial court’s determinations regarding Section 2511(a)(1) are
supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record. See
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827.
After we determine that the requirements of Section 2511(a) are
satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of Section 2511
(b) are satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009. Section
2511(b) provides:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
- 15 -
J-S53030-14
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating
parental rights under Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child
pursuant to Section 2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008.
In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under Section
2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare
of the child have been properly interpreted to include
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In
re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M.,
[620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the
determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires
consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and
child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the
effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond.
In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791; see also In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa.
2013).
Here, the trial court found the following:
[T]here is a minimal bond between [Mother] and [Child].
[Mother] was only physically present for a substantial amount of
time for the first two months of [Child’s] life. [] Mother then had
short weekly visits with [Child] at the Venango County Jail for
the next seven months of [Child’s] life. Since August of 2011,
[Mother] has spoken with [Child] on the phone a total of four
times. [] Father’s wife has bonded with and has a mother-
daughter relationship with [Child]. [Stepmother] has been
involved in [Child’s] life as a mother figure for the past year of
[Child’s] life. She treats [Child] as her own. [Child] recognizes
[Stepmother] as her mother, and does not understand her
relationship to [] Mother. [Stepmother] expressed her desire to
adopt [Child] if the [trial court] terminates [Mother’s] rights.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/14, at 10.
- 16 -
J-S53030-14
Thus, Mother has never attended to Child since February of 2011, and
has been incarcerated since that time, while Father and, for the past year,
Stepmother, have been caring for Child. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/14,
at 3-4. The trial court stated that Father has been providing solely for
Child’s physical needs since Mother’s incarceration. Id. at 4. Father has
been her primary provider for her emotional needs, with Mother sporadically
calling collect or sending cards to inform Child that she loves her. Id.
Additionally, the trial court found that Father has taken care of Child’s
medical needs, attended doctor’s appointments with Child, and has planned
for her education with enrollment in Headstart. Id. We find that there is
competent evidence in the record to support the trial court’s determination
that Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare would
best be met by involuntarily terminating her parental rights. In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827.
Moreover, this Court has observed that no bond worth preserving is
formed between a child and a natural parent where the child has been in the
care of another person for most of the child’s life, and the resulting bond
with the natural parent is attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa.
Super. 2008). The trial court found that Child does not recognize Mother as
her mother, has no knowledge of her half-sisters on her mother’s side, and
has a very minimal bond with Mother.
- 17 -
J-S53030-14
As part of its bonding analysis, the trial court appropriately examined
Child’s relationship with her caregivers, Father and Stepmother, who have
cared for her in Mother’s absence. See In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267-268
(stating that existence of a bond attachment of a child to a parent will not
necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition, and the court must
consider whether the child has a bond with the caregivers). The trial court
found that Child is strongly bonded with Stepmother, whom she considers to
be her “mom.” See Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/14, at 3. The trial court also
found that Father and Stepmother provide stability, love, financial security,
and a healthy environment in which to raise Child. Id. Moreover, the trial
court found that Child has a relationship with K.J., her half-brother on
Father’s side. Id. at 3-4.
Mother failed to “exhibit [the] bilateral relationship which emanates
from the parent[’s] willingness to learn appropriate parenting . . . .” In re
K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa. Super. 2008). She did not put herself in a
position to assume parenting responsibilities so that she could develop a real
bond with Child. See In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Thus, the trial court properly found that the termination of Mother’s
parental rights would not destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship with Child. Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/14, at 3.
- 18 -
J-S53030-14
While Mother claims she loves Child,3 this Court has held that a
parent’s love of her child, alone, does not preclude a termination. See In re
L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that a parent’s own
feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination
of parental rights). We have stated that a child’s life “simply cannot be put
on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.P., at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon
the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 856.
As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial
court’s credibility and weight assessments regarding Child’s needs and
welfare and the bond analysis, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights as to Section 2511(b).
See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827. Accordingly, we affirm
the termination decree.
Decree affirmed.
3
See N.T., 2/24/14, at 45, 71.
- 19 -
J-S53030-14
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/8/2014
- 20 -