J-A26004-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KHIRI ARTER
Appellant No. 396 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 4, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0001297-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY MUNDY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 08, 2014
Appellant, Khiri Arter, appeals from the February 4, 2014 judgment of
sentence of three months and 15 days’ imprisonment, to be followed by two
years’ county intermediate punishment, imposed following the revocation of
his parole and probation. After careful review, we affirm.
Appellant’s sole argument on appeal is that the exclusionary rule under
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution prevents the
Commonwealth from introducing evidence at his parole and probation
revocation proceedings that was suppressed by another judge for the
purpose of a criminal trial. Appellant’s Brief at 10, 13. Our Supreme Court
has previously held that the Pennsylvania Constitution does not generally
provide parolees with greater protection than the Fourth Amendment when it
comes to searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d
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1031, 1039 (Pa. 1997). The Supreme Court has held the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not apply in revocation proceedings.
Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998). Our
Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether the Pennsylvania
Constitution’s exclusionary rule gives heightened protection in revocation
proceedings.
However, in Commonwealth v. Lehman, 851 A.2d 941 (Pa. Super.
2004), this Court held that “[a]lthough there are instances where Article I,
Section 8 mandates greater protection of privacy interests than does the
Fourth Amendment … in the context of probation violation hearings
and application of the exclusionary rule, we hold that the state
constitution affords no greater protection than does the federal
constitution.” Id. at 943 (emphasis added). We are aware that the
Lehman Court did not appear to engage in the four-part analysis that our
Supreme Court requires for deciding whether the Pennsylvania Constitution
provides higher protections than the Federal Constitution. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 897, 895 (Pa. 1991).
Instead, the Lehman Court concluded “that absent direction from our
supreme court to the contrary, no deviation from the approach of the U.S.
Supreme Court … is warranted.” Id. This forecloses Appellant’s argument
that the Pennsylvania Constitution’s exclusionary rule extends to revocation
proceedings.
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It is axiomatic that one three-judge panel of this Court “is not
empowered to overrule another panel of th[is] … Court.” Commonwealth
v. Beck, 78 A.3d 656, 659 (Pa. Super. 2013). Although Appellant has
conducted an Edmunds analysis here, Lehman is a binding conclusion of
state constitutional law that this Court must follow until overruled by this
Court sitting en banc, or by our Supreme Court. Therefore, we may not
grant Appellant the relief that he seeks, and we conclude his sole issue on
appeal is devoid of merit on this basis. Accordingly, the trial court’s
February 4, 2014 judgment of sentence is affirmed.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/8/2014
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