Rajnikant Patel v. Karnavati America, LLC

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2737-13T4

RAJNIKANT PATEL and
RASIKA PATEL, his wife,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
October 9, 2014
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
KARNAVATI AMERICA, LLC, CADILA
PHARMACEUTICAL, LTD, SCHNEIDER
ELECTRIC, USA, INC.,

Defendants,

and

KARNAVATI ENGINEERING, LTD,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

GLOBEPHARMA, INC.,

Defendant-Respondent.
_______________________________

Argued September 10, 2014 - Decided October 9, 2014

Before Judges Lihotz, Espinosa and
Rothstadt.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County,
Docket No. L-8317-10.

Daniel C. Fleming argued the cause for
appellant (Wong Fleming, P.C., attorneys;
 Mr. Fleming and Mark W. Thompson, on the
brief).

Brian M. Gerstein argued the cause for
respondents Rajnikant and Rasika Patel
(Harkavy, Goldman, Goldman & Gerstein,
attorneys; Mr. Gerstein, on the brief).

Larry E. Hardcastle, II, argued the cause
for respondent GlobePharma, Inc. (Lanciano &
Associates, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Hardcastle
and Michael W. Hoffman, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

LIHOTZ, P.J.A.D.

We examine whether the Law Division properly exercised

personal jurisdiction over defendant Karnavati Engineering, Ltd.

(Karnavati), a corporation located in India.1 Plaintiff

Rajnikant Patel2 alleged the defective design of a RIMEK UNIK-1

tablet press machine (the machine) manufactured in India by

Karnavati caused him to suffer personal injuries while working

on the New Jersey premises of his employer, Neil Laboratories/

Advent Pharmaceuticals (Neil Labs). On our leave granted,

Karnavati appeals from the Law Division's December 19, 2013

order denying its motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for

1
The complaint also named Karnavati's corporate affiliates,
Karnavati America, LLC (KAL) and Cadila Pharmaceutical, Ltd.
(Cadila) as defendants. The motions of KAL and Cadila to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction were granted.
2
For ease, we refer to Rajnikant Patel as the plaintiff,
understanding his wife Rasika Patel has filed a derivative per
quod claim.

2 A-2737-13T4
lack of jurisdiction. R. 4:6-2(b). Karnavati argues the motion

judge's finding of minimum contacts is factually flawed leading

to an erroneous legal conclusion. We agree and reverse.

The recital of the arduous procedural history detailing

plaintiff's efforts to join and serve parties and proceed with

his suit is not necessary to our discussion of whether New

Jersey has jurisdiction over Karnavati. We limit our discussion

to those facts found in the motion record that are relevant to

our analysis.

Plaintiff resides in Middlesex County and is employed by

Neil Labs, working at its facility in East Windsor. Plaintiff

suffered "severe personal injuries" at the facility on November

4, 2008, when a towel he was using to clean the machine while it

was running, caught and pulled his left hand into the machine.

Plaintiff alleges "[t]he safety interlocks [on the machine] were

either bypassed and/or inoperable." Among the claims included

in his complaint are: the machine was "defectively designed,

manufactured, and/or maintained, causing same to fail"; express

and implied warranties were breached; negligence occurred in the

"design, manufacture, sale, distribution, inspection,

maintenance and/or repair" of the machine; and the failure to

warn of the machine's unreasonably dangerous propensities caused

injury.

3 A-2737-13T4
 Karnavati moved to dismiss the complaint in lieu of filing

an answer. Jurisdictional discovery was conducted.3

Mukund Modi, Karnavati's Senior Vice President, filed a

certification averring Karnavati, which manufactures tablet

press machines used in the pharmaceutical industry, was

incorporated and operates in India. Although it manufactured

the machine asserted to cause plaintiff's injuries, Karnavati

never shipped its machines to New Jersey. In fact, since its

incorporation, Karnavati only shipped one product to the United

States, when it sent a different device to Maryland, in December

2003. Modi certified Karnavati is not registered to do business

in New Jersey; does not advertise in New Jersey; has never

engaged in any sales in New Jersey; has never solicited business

from or paid taxes to the state; has never attended trade shows

or conferences "for the purposes of displaying its tablet press

machines, in New Jersey or elsewhere in the United States"; and

has never sent its employees to New Jersey for any reason.

Additionally, Karnavati never owned, used, or possessed real or

personal property in New Jersey; owned or controlled any state

bank accounts; or maintained insurance for products liability

conduct in the state.

3
Plaintiff never sought or argued additional discovery was
necessary.

4 A-2737-13T4
 Karnavati sold the machine in question to GlobePharma, Inc.

(Globe) in 2002. Globe is a closely held corporation, with a

place of business in New Brunswick. Globe "design[s],

manufacture[s], and s[ells] . . . unit-dose samplers for powders

used in pharmaceutical and nutritional supplement

manufacturing[,]" as well as "new and used pharmaceutical and

nutritional supplement machinery such as . . . table-top rotary

tablet press machines."

The purchase order for the subject machine was prepared by

Globe and sent to Karnavati. Globe sought two machines

described as:

Double Rotary Tablet Press[es], Model KEB—
4/35, with 35 stations for IPT, standard B
tooling, GMP model with sturdy acrylic
guards AC variable speed drive, gravity feed
system, manual lubrication system, safety
interlocks and the modifications suggested
by Neil [Labs], a list of which was already
sent to Mr. Nalk.

In the "Terms & Conditions" section of the purchase order, Globe

provided:

A representative from Neil Labs will visit
Karnavati for trial running of the machines.
A pharmaceutical powder (which will be
shipped from Hyderabad to Karnavati) will be
run on these machines. Neil Labs may bring
their own tooling or they may need tooling
from Karnavati. Neil Labs has to be totally
satisfied before the machines are accepted.
Modifications suggested by Neil Labs are of
essence for acceptance of the machines by
Neil Labs.

5 A-2737-13T4
 The machine was sent by sea, freight on board, to Globe,

which took possession in Mumbai, India. Globe paid for the

machine before it left India.

This was not the first time Globe and Karnavati did

business. In January 1998, Globe and Karnavati executed an

"Exclusive Distribution Agreement," under which Karnavati agreed

to exclusively supply Globe with "pharmaceutical machinery,

especially tablet presses, packaging machinery, and all-purpose

equipment" within the territorial limits of North America, for a

period of two years. Karnavati agreed to provide a "full

warranty for one year for any manufacturing or material defects

towards machines supplied to Globe." Further, the parties

agreed "[i]f specifically required by Globe, [Karnavati] shall

provide training to the personnel appointed by Globe in

installation, operation, and maintenance of the machines" and

provided Karnavati's technicians would assist Globe. Globe

agreed to use its best efforts to generate a specified level of

sales during the two-year agreement term. Globe also assumed

responsibility to promote and advertise the machines using

brochures of the machines supplied by Karnavati. Finally, the

agreement was governed by the laws of India.

Nothing suggests the exclusive distribution agreement

continued beyond the initial two-year period. However, Globe's

6 A-2737-13T4
president certified, in the course of its business, Globe

continued to acquire and resell machinery manufactured by

Karnavati, although not on an exclusive basis.

Following argument of Karnavati's motion to dismiss, the

judge concluded New Jersey courts had jurisdiction because

"there [wa]s a sufficient showing here that the tablet press was

made for and sold to a New Jersey company, for the purpose of

being used in New Jersey." The judge distinguished the facts of

this matter from those presented in the United States Supreme

Court's recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Limited v.

Nicastro, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 180 L. Ed. 2d 765 (2011),

reasoning jurisdiction here was not based on Karnavati's "effort

to market its goods through the United States." Rather,

applying jurisdictional jurisprudence, the judge found the

purchase order demonstrated "the sale and the production of [the

machine] was for the purpose of benefitting a New Jersey company

in New Jersey." Relying on this court's decision in Cruz v.

Robinson Engineering Corporation, 253 N.J. Super. 66 (App.

Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 9 (1992), the judge reasoned New

Jersey courts had personal jurisdiction because Karnavati had

"purposely availed itself of this jurisdiction and c[ould] be

hailed into court . . . in New Jersey to address a personal

7 A-2737-13T4
injury complaint" arising from the use of the machine it

manufactured and designed for Neil Labs.

On December 6, 2013, an order memorializing these findings

was filed. The motion judge filed an amplification of his

determination, pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(b), once leave to appeal

was granted.

"The question of in personam jurisdiction is a mixed

question of law and fact[.]" Citibank, N.A. v. Estate of

Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 532 (App. Div. 1996). In our

review, we examine whether the trial court's factual findings

are "supported by substantial, credible evidence" in the record.

Mastondrea v. Occidental Hotels Mgmt. S.A., 391 N.J. Super. 261,

268 (App. Div. 2007). However, whether these facts support the

court's exercise of "personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a

question of law," which we review de novo. YA Global Invs.,

L.P. v. Cliff, 419 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2011). Plaintiff

bears the burden of pleading sufficient facts to establish

jurisdiction. Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 71; Jacobs v. Walt

Disney World, Co., 309 N.J. Super. 443, 454 (App. Div. 1998).

"[T]erritorial presence in the forum is the basic

prerequisite for subjecting a defendant to its in personam

judgment." Estate of Simpson, supra, 290 N.J. Super. at 526.

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause "'protect[s] a

8 A-2737-13T4
person against having the Government impose burdens upon him

except in accordance with the valid laws of the land.'"

Nicastro, supra, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2786, 180 L. Ed.

2d at 773 (plurality op.) (quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382

U.S. 399, 403, 86 S. Ct. 518, 521, 15 L. Ed. 2d 447, 450

(1966)). "[T]hose who live or operate primarily outside a State

have a due process right not to be subjected to judgment in its

courts as a general matter." Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2787, 180

L. Ed. 2d at 774.

Absent actual territorial presence, jurisdiction may extend

to out-of-state parties that engage in sufficient contacts with

the forum, as long as those contacts satisfy the protections of

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. New

Jersey's long-arm jurisprudence allows "out-of-state service to

the uttermost limits permitted by the United States

Constitution." Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268 (1971).

See also Reliance Nat'l Ins. Co. in Liquidation v. Dana Transp.,

Inc., 376 N.J. Super. 537, 543 (App. Div. 2005) (noting New

Jersey courts exercise in personam jurisdiction "to the

outermost limit of [their] ability to do so"); Pressler &

Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 3.1.1 on R. 4:4-4

(2014). Specifically, the contacts with the forum must be such

that "'the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional

9 A-2737-13T4
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Waste Mgmt.,

Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106, 132 (1994) (O'Hern, J.,

concurring) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,

316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102 (1945)), cert. denied

sub nom., WMX Techs. v. Canadian Gen. Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 1183,

115 S. Ct. 1175, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1128 (1995). See also R. 4:4-

4(b)(1) (providing methods of serving and obtaining in personam

jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants "consistent with due

process of law").

Any jurisdictional analysis must begin with "an examination

of the defendant's minimum contacts with the state[.]" Baanyan

Software Servs., Inc. v. Kuncha, 433 N.J. Super. 466, 476 (App.

Div. 2013). The analysis is fact sensitive and must be

undertaken "on a case-by-case basis." Blakey v. Cont'l

Airlines, 164 N.J. 38, 66 (2000).

It is also well settled that the requisite
quality and quantum of contacts is dependent
on whether general or specific jurisdiction
is asserted, that is, whether the defendant
is subject to any claim that may be brought
against him in the forum state whether or
not related to or arising out of the
contacts themselves, i.e., general
jurisdiction, or whether the claim is
related to or arises out of the contacts in
the forum, i.e., specific jurisdiction.

[Estate of Simpson, supra, 290 N.J. Super.
at 526-27.]

10 A-2737-13T4
 To establish general jurisdiction, "[a] defendant must have

contacts with th[e] State that are 'so continuous and

substantial as to justify subjecting the defendant to the

jurisdiction.'" Baanyan, supra, 433 N.J. Super. at 474 (quoting

Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at 123). "[This] standard for

establishing general jurisdiction is fairly high, and requires

that the defendant's contacts be of the sort that approximate

physical presence." Wilson v. Paradise Village Beach Resort &

Spa, 395 N.J. Super. 520, 528 (App. Div. 2007) (internal

quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, "[s]pecific

jurisdiction is available when the 'cause of action arises

directly out of a defendant's contact with the forum state.'"

Baanyan, supra, 433 N.J. Super. at 474 (quoting Waste Mgmt.,

supra, 138 N.J. at 119). "In the context of specific

jurisdiction, the minimum contacts inquiry must focus on 'the

relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the

litigation.'" Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317,

323 (1989) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.

Ct. 2569, 2579, 45 L. Ed. 2d 683, 698 (1977)). "[W]hen the

defendant is not present in the forum state, it is essential

that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully

avails [itself] of the privilege of conducting activities within

the forum state, thus invoking the benefit and protection of its

11 A-2737-13T4
laws." Baanyan, supra, 433 N.J. Super. at 475 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Here, no one disputes Karnavati's contacts with New Jersey

are not sufficiently continuous or substantial to warrant an

exercise of general jurisdiction. The motion judge concluded

the facts do support application of specific jurisdiction.

Thus, the ultimate question is whether Karnavati submitted to

the judicial power of New Jersey in connection with its

activities directed at the State, justifying specific

jurisdiction "'in a suit arising out of or related to the

defendant's contacts with the forum.'" Nicastro, supra, __ U.S.

at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2788, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 775 (plurality op.)

(quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466

U.S. 408, 414 n. 8, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872 n. 8, 80 L. Ed. 2d

404, 411 n. 8 (1984)). See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,

471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 542

(1985) (emphasizing the critical inquiry is whether "the

defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such

that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court

there"); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228,

1240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 1298 (1958) (holding generally the

exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless the defendant

"purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting

12 A-2737-13T4
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits

and protections of its laws").

Defendant argues "there is absolutely no evidence that

[Karnavati] ever purposely availed itself of the right to do

business in New Jersey[.]" It maintains the holding in Nicastro

defeats plaintiff's claims of specific jurisdiction. The

essence of defendant's position, which is repeated before us, is

the single sale of a product to an independent corporation in

India, even if accompanied by the knowledge the product will be

delivered to a user in New Jersey, is insufficient to allow the

application of long-arm jurisdiction. The trial judge rejected

consideration of Nicastro, finding it factually distinguishable

from this matter.

In Nicastro, a British manufacturer sold its machines to an

independent distributor in the United States, and had no

contacts with New Jersey, where the plaintiff was injured while

using one of the machines sold in the United States. Nicastro,

supra, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2785-86, 180 L. Ed. 2d at

772-73 (plurality op.). Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief

Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas, delivered the

opinion of the court; Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion

joined by Justice Alito; and Justice Ginsburg, joined by

Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented.

13 A-2737-13T4
 The majority opinion stemmed the apparent extension of

jurisdiction over foreign defendants under what had become known

as "the stream of commerce theory," which was first announced in

World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-

98, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 502 (1980) ("[A]

forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process

Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation

that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the

expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the

forum State."). See also Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom

Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460 (1986) (adopting stream of commerce

theory when considering extra-territorial jurisdiction).

Justice Kennedy specifically examined the holding of the New

Jersey Supreme Court, which concluded "a foreign manufacturer

that places a defective product in the stream of commerce

through a distribution scheme that targets a national market,

which includes New Jersey, may be subject to the personal

jurisdiction of a New Jersey court in a product-liability

action." Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 201 N.J. 48, 73

(2010). The majority of the Court reversed the New Jersey

Supreme Court's holding, rejecting its expansion of the stream

of commerce theory to the point where "a producer is subject to

jurisdiction for a products-liability action so long as it

14 A-2737-13T4
'knows or reasonably should know that its products are

distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might

lead to those products being sold in any of the fifty states.'"

Nicastro, supra, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2793, 180 L. Ed.

2d at 780 (plurality op.) (quoting Nicastro, supra, 201 N.J. at

76-77).

In setting aside jurisdiction based on what equated to a

defendant's knowledge of foreseeable consequences because such a

basis offended the traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice requirements of due process, the majority of

the justices re-focused review on whether long-arm jurisdiction

applies, examining "whether the defendant's activities manifest

an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign. In other

words, the defendant must 'purposefully avai[l] itself of the

privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus

invoking the benefits and protections of its laws[.]'" Id. at

__, 131 S. Ct. at 2788, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 775 (quoting Hanson,

supra, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S. Ct. at 1240, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1298).

"The defendant's transmission of goods permits the exercise of

jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have

targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the

defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the

forum State." Ibid. Further, Justice Kennedy flatly rejected

15 A-2737-13T4
the New Jersey Supreme Court's reliance on public policy

concerns, including a state's "'strong interest in protecting

its citizens from defective products,'" explaining: "[t]hat

interest is doubtless strong, but the Constitution commands

restraint before discarding liberty in the name of expediency."

Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2791, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 778 (quoting

Nicastro, supra, 201 N.J. at 75).

Justice Breyer agreed the New Jersey Supreme Court's

opinion must be reversed, but wrote separately, providing

precedential support to avoid what he viewed as the inclusion of

unnecessarily "broad pronouncements that refashion basic

jurisdictional rules." Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2793, 180 L.

Ed. 2d at 780 (Breyer, J., concurring). In concluding personal

jurisdiction was not supported, he explained:

None of our precedents finds that a single
isolated sale, even if accompanied by the
kind of sales effort indicated here, is
sufficient. Rather, this Court's previous
holdings suggest the contrary. The Court
has held that a single sale to a customer
who takes an accident-causing product to a
different State (where the accident takes
place) is not a sufficient basis for
asserting jurisdiction. See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980).
And the Court, in separate opinions, has
strongly suggested that a single sale of a
product in a State does not constitute an
adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant, even if that
defendant places his goods in the stream of

16 A-2737-13T4
 commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such
a sale will take place. See Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.,
Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 111, 112, 107 S.
Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987) (opinion of
O'Connor, J.) (requiring "something more"
than simply placing "a product into the
stream of commerce," even if defendant is
"awar[e]" that the stream "may or will sweep
the product into the forum State"); id., at
117, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (jurisdiction should
lie where a sale in a State is part of "the
regular and anticipated flow" of commerce
into the State, but not where that sale is
only an "edd[y]," i.e., an isolated
occurrence); id., at 122, 107 S. Ct. 1026,
94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (indicating
that "the volume, the value, and the
hazardous character" of a good may affect
the jurisdictional inquiry and emphasizing
Asahi's "regular course of dealing").

[Nicastro, supra, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct.
at 2792, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 779 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).]

In this matter, plaintiff and Globe challenge Karnavati's

position that it is not subject to suit in New Jersey, and

advance the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion in

favor of New Jersey's exercise of personal jurisdiction.

Factual support for the Law Division's conclusion is garnered

from the 1998 distribution agreement between Karnavati and

Globe, which is suggested to establish Karnavati's knowledge its

products would be sold in New Jersey; the subject machine was

sold pursuant to the distribution agreement; and the machine was

17 A-2737-13T4
custom-made specifically for and sold to Neil Labs, a New Jersey

company, for use in New Jersey, evidencing Karnavati's intent to

benefit an entity in the State. Regarding this last point, the

judge's opinion noted: the purchase order expresses the machines

must be tailored to Neil Labs' specifications and must include

"safety interlocks and . . . modifications suggested by Neil

[Labs]"; "[m]odifications suggested by Neil Labs" were "of

essence" for its acceptance of the machines; and Neil Labs could

"send a representative to Karnavati for a trial run to ensure

operation."

Additionally, plaintiff and Globe reiterate the

applicability of our analysis in Cruz, which the trial judge

found persuasive. Cruz involved a products liability claim by a

New Jersey plaintiff injured on the New Jersey industrial

premises of his employer while using a heavy-duty urn filter

press manufactured by the California defendant. Cruz, supra,

253 N.J. Super. at 68. This court found no need to consider the

stream of commerce theory when analyzing the jurisdictional

challenge. Rather, we found adequate, undisputed facts proving

the defendant manufacturer had engaged in "purposeful conduct"

with New Jersey, warranting the exercise of specific

jurisdiction. Id. at 73. Assessing the defendant's contacts,

we noted the machine at issue was "a major industrial piece of

18 A-2737-13T4
equipment," described as the "cornerstone" of the employer's

"entire industrial operation, custom-ordered, custom produced

and taking over a year to fabricate." Ibid. The facts clearly

demonstrated the defendant manufacturer "certainly understood

. . . that the subject of the agreement was not only to be

shipped to New Jersey but was, moreover, the sine qua non of

[the employer's] plant, the predicate of the whole New Jersey

operation." Ibid.

Although Cruz involved a single direct sale to New Jersey,

the imposition of jurisdiction was based on the facts that

demonstrate significant, repeated interactions occurred over the

course of one year between the New Jersey employer which

purchased the machine and the foreign manufacturer. Id. at 74.

Letters, phone calls and personal meetings took place as the

parties worked together to customize and deliver the machine.

Id. at 74. Again, both parties knew the New Jersey employer had

no business without the machine. Id. at 75. The totality of

these numerous contacts were found to satisfy due process

allowing New Jersey's exercise of jurisdiction over the

nonresident manufacturer, a decision that did "'not offend

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"

Nicastro, supra, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2787, 180 L. Ed.

19 A-2737-13T4
2d at 774 (plurality op.) (quoting Int'l Shoe, supra, 326 U.S.

at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 158, 90 L. Ed. at 102).

We cannot agree the facts in this matter square with those

in Cruz. This transaction, between Karnavati and Globe, took

place through Karnavati's office in India. The record does not

reflect the level of interaction between Karnavati and Neil Labs

in New Jersey, distinguishing these facts from the significant

contacts shown between the manufacturer and buyer in Cruz. In

Cruz, the contacts between the manufacturer and the forum

included a series of deliberate interactions over an extended

period, to ensure the machine, which was essential to the

buyer's operations, complied with the buyer's required

specifications for use in New Jersey. Here, there is no

information supporting a finding of a course of interaction

between Neil Labs and Karnavati in negotiating this sale, or

showing the parties worked together to customize the machine for

use in New Jersey.

Further, unlike in Cruz, the record does not support a

finding the machine was either unique or pivotal to Neil Labs'

New Jersey operations. The purchase order drawn up by Globe

allows Neil Labs the right to inspect the machine prior to its

delivery; however, we are not told whether this occurred, and,

if inspection in fact took place, the record is silent as to the

20 A-2737-13T4
time and place, and whether the inspection was conducted by

Globe or Karnavati.

Contrary to the motion judge's finding, Karnavati's sale to

Globe was not pursuant to their exclusive distribution

agreement, because that agreement had expired two years earlier.

We also reject the trial judge's determination that Karnavati

merely used Globe as an intermediary to ship the machine. In

fact, Neil Labs was Globe's customer and it was Globe which

ordered the machine. There is no legal relationship between

Karnavati and Globe; they are separate and distinct entities,

independently conducting their respective businesses. Thus, we

are left with only the purchase order, which the motion judge

concluded supplied Karnavati's contacts with the forum, placing

it on notice it would be subject to suit in New Jersey. We

disagree.

First, we reject the contention that Karnavati's

fulfillment of Globe's purchase order in India, which referenced

Globe's intended resale to a New Jersey resident, suggested the

regularity in manner and magnitude of sales to a distributor or

retailer in a forum state requisite to the exercise of

jurisdiction by the forum under a post-Nicastro stream of

commerce theory. The facts presented speak generally of other

national sales, and offer no evidence of Karnavati's marketing

21 A-2737-13T4
or promotional efforts. There is no showing Karnavati directed

marketing efforts or sales to New Jersey; evinced an intent or

purpose to serve the forum by designing the machine for the New

Jersey market; or established lines of communication, such as a

website, to provide service or advice to New Jersey actual or

potential customers. The facts in this record fail to support a

finding Karnavati engaged in sales efforts "to serve, directly

or indirectly, the market for its product in other States," as

was found in World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 297, 100

S. Ct. at 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 501-02. See also Nicastro,

supra, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2792, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 779

(Breyer, J., concurring) (finding stream of commerce

inapplicable when no "'regular . . . flow' or 'regular course'

of sales'" is shown); Asahi, supra, 480 U.S. at 117, 107 S. Ct.

at 1035, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 107 (Brennan, J., concurring)

("[S]tream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or

eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from

manufacture to distribution to retail sale.").

Second, the facts do not demonstrate the nonresident

Karnavati purposefully availed itself of "the privilege of

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the

benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson, supra, 357 U.S.

at 253, 78 S. Ct. at 1240, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1298. As noted above,

22 A-2737-13T4
the record lacks proof of Karnavati's course of dealing with the

forum generally or with Neil Labs specifically, with respect to

effectuating the sale of the machine. Neither plaintiff nor

Globe discuss the extent of contacts specific to this machine,

facts found essential to this court's finding in Cruz. Other

than pointing to the language in the purchase order, Globe and

plaintiff fail to identify specific actions by Karnavati which

demonstrate its desire to conduct business in New Jersey.

Plaintiff and Globe do not reveal whether Karnavati altered its

standard machine in preparing the order at issue; whether

Karnavati's employees offered Neil Labs training or expertise;

or whether Neil Labs called Karnavati at any time with regard to

the machine order.

In extending jurisdiction based upon purposeful availment,

we measure a nonresident defendant's purposeful conduct

connecting it to the forum, not "the unilateral activity of

another who merely claims a relationship to the defendant[.]"

Charles Gendler, supra, 102 N.J. at 471 (quoting Hanson, supra,

357 U.S. at 253, 78 S. Ct. at 1240, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1298). See

also Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at 121. Simply stated, the

issue is notice: "[t]he defendant's contacts with the forum

state must be such that it 'should reasonably anticipate being

haled into court there.'" Charles Gendler, supra, 102 N.J. at

23 A-2737-13T4
470 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 297, 100

S. Ct. at 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 501).

Here, we are presented only with Globe's purchase order,

which noted its sale to Neil Labs. We would be hard-pressed to

conclude Karnavati's sale of a machine to Globe in India, for

Globe's resale to Neil Labs in New Jersey shows Karnavati's

purposeful availment of business opportunities that support the

exercise of personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. More is

needed. The trial court's determination that the necessary

jurisdictional contacts were satisfactorily shown on these

limited facts alone was erroneous.

Globe also maintains the effects of the expired

distribution agreement evince Karnavati's contacts with the

State, and such past contacts support personal jurisdiction.

Certainly, Globe's prior relationship gave it familiarity with

Karnavati's products. However, as Justice Kennedy explained in

Nicastro, when a defendant manufacturer's conduct consists of

mere "sales efforts" to sell its machines in the United States

through a distributor, but does not target the New Jersey market

in particular, jurisdiction in the specific State forum does not

lie. Nicastro, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2786, 180 L. Ed. 2d

at 773 (plurality op.). Absent additional evidential support

activities within the forum, Globe's theory is unpersuasive.

24 A-2737-13T4
 As noted above, plaintiff bears the burden of pleading

sufficient facts to establish jurisdiction. Following our

review of this record, we conclude he has failed to do so. The

record is insufficient to support the conclusion Karnavati's

conduct surrounding the sale of the tablet press machine

involved in plaintiff's injuries constituted "purposeful acts"

for which Karnavati would be on notice that it would be subject

to suit in New Jersey. Accura Zeisel Mach. Corp. v. Timco,

Inc., 305 N.J. Super. 559, 566 (App. Div. 1997).

Reversed.

25 A-2737-13T4