FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 09 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-10307
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:13-cr-50030-GMS-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BENNETT LAQUAN WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 7, 2014**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: D.W. NELSON, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Bennett Laquan Williams appeals from the district court’s order revoking his
supervised release, sentencing him to twelve months in prison, and imposing a new
forty-eight month term of supervised release. Specifically, Williams argues that
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the magistrate judge who accepted his admission to a supervised release violation
lacked the authority to do so. Williams also contends that the district court failed
to properly inform him of the maximum penalty at the time of his admission. We
assume that all parties are familiar with the facts of this case and only recite those
facts necessary to this disposition. We affirm.
Discussion
A. Authority of the Magistrate Judge
In United States v. Sanchez-Sanchez, 333 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003),
we held that in order for a magistrate judge to preside over a revocation hearing a
district judge must have “designate[d] the magistrate judge to conduct the
revocation hearing” and the defendant must give “express consent.” Both
requirements are met here. Prior to the hearing before the magistrate judge
Williams consented to “go forward with [his] . . . Admission or Denial Hearing on
Petition for Revocation of . . . Supervised Release . . . .” Further, District Judge
Snow has expressly delegated “Admit/Deny Hearings on Petitions for Revocation
of Supervised Release” to a magistrate judge. We reject Williams’ argument that
such an order must designate a “specific individual magistrate judge” as
inconsistent with the text of the statute, which provides authority to “designate a
magistrate judge to conduct hearings to modify, revoke, or terminate supervised
release . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3401(i).
B. Sentencing
Williams contends that the district court erred by not adhering to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(H), which requires the judge to advise
defendants about “the maximum possible penalty, including . . . supervised
release.” Revocations of supervised release, however, are governed by Rule 32.1,
and courts need not adhere to the strictures of Rule 11 in such proceedings. United
States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977).
AFFIRMED