J-S64021-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES RICHARD RENNIS,
Appellant No. 410 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 5, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000339-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and LAZARUS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 09, 2014
Appellant, James Richard Rennis, appeals pro se from the judgment of
sentence of six months’ restrictive intermediate punishment (including 45
days’ house arrest, drug and alcohol treatment, and highway safety school)
and a $200 fine, imposed after he was convicted of three counts of driving
under the influence of a controlled substance (DUI) and careless driving.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
convictions. We affirm.
Following a non-jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the above-stated
offenses based on evidence that he drove his vehicle into a trash can and
door at a drive-through beer distributor, and investigating police officers
determined that he was driving while impaired by a controlled substance.
Testing of Appellant’s blood revealed the presence of cocaine and cocaine
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metabolites. For his convictions of DUI, Appellant was sentenced to
intermediate punishment. He received a $200 fine for his careless driving
offense. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal.1 Herein, he argues
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions.2
Before addressing this claim, we note that Appellant’s brief utterly fails
to comport with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically,
Appellant did not include delineated sections setting forth a “Statement of
Jurisdiction,” “Order or Other Determination in Question,” “Statement of
Questions Involved,” or a “Summary of Argument.” See Pa.R.A.P. 2114-
2116, 2118. Nevertheless, we will overlook these briefing errors in light of
the fact that Appellant’s argument is coherent enough to permit us to
meaningfully review his sufficiency claim.
To begin, we note:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all evidence admitted at trial in the
light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
____________________________________________
1
Appellant was represented by counsel during his trial and sentencing
hearing. Following those proceedings, counsel sought leave to withdraw,
which was granted by the court. Accordingly, Appellant is proceeding pro se
on appeal.
2
The Commonwealth did not submit a brief in this case, instead relying on
the rationale expressed by the trial court in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
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preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089, 1092 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations
omitted).
In his brief, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on
several grounds. First, he disputes the police officers’ testimony that he
exhibited signs of intoxication, offering other legitimate reasons for his
glassy and blood shot eyes, his high blood pressure and heart rate, and his
“jittery” demeanor. See Appellant’s Brief at 2-3. Appellant also contends
that contrary to the officers’ testimony, he “was always in control through all
[the standardized field sobriety] tests given to [him].” Id. at 3. In regard
to the cocaine and cocaine metabolites present in his blood sample,
Appellant maintains that the test results were a “false positive” and explains
his reasons for that conclusion. Id. at 4. Finally, Appellant states that he
did not drive into the door of the beer distributor, and only side-swiped a
trash can because he was “follow[ing] the hand signals” of a beer distributor
employee. Id. at 6. For all of these reasons, Appellant contends that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of DUI and careless driving.
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Appellant is essentially asking this Court to “weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for the fact-finder[,]” which Troy expressly states
this Court may not do. Instead, we must accept the trial court’s
determination that the Commonwealth’s evidence was credible and assess
whether that evidence was sufficient to prove the element(s) of the offenses
for which Appellant was convicted. After carefully reviewing the record, we
conclude that it was.
Appellant was convicted of three counts of DUI under 75 Pa.C.S. §
3802(d)(1)(ii), (d)(1)(iii), and (d)(2). Those sections state:
(d) Controlled substances.--An individual may not drive,
operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a
vehicle under any of the following circumstances:
(1) There is in the individual's blood any amount of a:
…
(ii) Schedule II or Schedule III controlled substance,
as defined in The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device
and Cosmetic Act, which has not been medically
prescribed for the individual; or
(iii) metabolite of a substance under subparagraph
(i) or (ii).
(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the
individual's ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual
physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d).
To prove these offenses, the Commonwealth presented the testimony
of Sherri Kacinko, Ph.D., who was the toxicologist who tested the blood
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sample drawn from Appellant shortly after he drove his vehicle. N.T.,
11/25/13, at 51-52. Dr. Kacinko testified that Appellant’s blood “contained
cocaine” and “the cocaine metabolite benzoylecgonine.” Id. at 61-62. She
also stated that the test conducted on Appellant’s blood “is a specific test for
which there are no identified substances that will give a false positive, and
the nature of the testing is such that it is considered a very specific test for
cocaine.” Id. at 63. Based on Dr. Kacinko’s testimony, the Commonwealth
proved that Appellant committed DUI under section 3802(d)(1)(ii) and (iii).
Additionally, the Commonwealth’s evidence also proved that Appellant
committed DUI under section 3802(d)(2). The first police officer who
arrived at the scene, Brookville Police Officer Vince Markle, testified that
Appellant’s speech was slurred and “[h]is actions were slower than normal.”
Id. at 13. Officer Markle conducted three field sobriety tests, which
Appellant was unable to successfully complete. Id. at 13-14. Based on
Appellant’s performance during those tests, and Officer Markle’s training and
experience, he concluded that Appellant “was under the influence of some
type of drug” to a “degree that rendered him incapable of safe driving[.]”
Id. at 15, 22.
After Officer Markle transported Appellant to the police station, he was
evaluated for a second time by Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Robert C.
Means, who is a certified drug recognition expert (DRE). Id. at 28. Trooper
Means testified as an expert in the field of drug recognition. Id. at 32-33.
The trooper explained that during his evaluation, Appellant “had a confused
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but very alert appearance[,]” and Appellant “seemed very jittery, had a hard
time sitting still.” Id. at 34. Appellant “complained of having a dry mouth.”
Id. at 35. Trooper Means noted that Appellant’s blood pressure was high
and he had “an above-normal pulse rate[,]” both of which indicated the
“presence of a possible stimulant.” Id. Trooper Means also conducted field
sobriety tests of Appellant and concluded that “each test administered …
indicated that he was impaired on a drug, unable to complete any of the
tests satisfactorily, had a difficult time following simple instructions, [and]
often needed repeated [instructions] as to what I wanted him to do.” Id. at
35-36. As an example, the trooper testified that he had to repeatedly tell
Appellant not to begin performing the sobriety tests until instructed to do so.
Id. at 46.
Trooper Means also testified that during one phase of the evaluation,
Appellant’s nasal cavity was examined and the trooper “observed that … the
interior of his nostril cavity was red, it was raw, and it was irritated. There
was also a white residue present within [Appellant’s] nasal cavity itself.” Id.
at 37. When questioned about the white residue, Appellant claimed that “he
had snorted candy.” Id. at 37. Trooper Means asked Appellant what kind of
candy he had snorted, and Appellant stated “that he was snorting Pixy Stix
because he had a sweet tooth.” Id. Appellant also told the trooper at
various points throughout the evaluation that he had taken Tylenol and
Tramadol, which “made him dizzy,” and that he had also taken a caffeine pill
earlier that morning. Id. at 36, 45. Based on Trooper Means’ evaluation,
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and his expertise, training, and experience, he opined that Appellant “was
impaired on a narcotic analgesic as well as a stimulant.” Id. at 38.
We conclude that the testimony of Officer Markle and Trooper Means
provided sufficient evidence to prove that Appellant was driving his vehicle
while under the influence of a drug to a degree that impaired his ability to
safely operate his vehicle. Accordingly, the Commonwealth proved Appellant
committed DUI under section 3802(d)(2).
Likewise, the testimony of the beer distributor employee that Appellant
drove his vehicle “into [a] trash can and smacked a rail on the door” of the
building because he “cut it a little too close” was sufficient to support
Appellant’s conviction of careless driving. N.T. at 4-5, 6; 75 Pa.C.S. §
3714(a) (“Any person who drives a vehicle in careless disregard for the
safety of persons or property is guilty of careless driving, a summary
offense.”). Therefore, all of Appellant’s convictions must be upheld.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/9/2014
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Com. v. Rennis, J.
Combined Opinion