FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 14 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARGARET MARY SMITH, No. 12-17246
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01242-JAT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James A. Teilborg, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 9, 2014**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Margaret Mary Smith appeals from the district court’s judgment reversing
the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits and remanding for further
administrative proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
review for an abuse of discretion, Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1173 (9th Cir.
2000), and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by remanding for further
proceedings, rather than for an immediate award of benefits, because Smith did not
satisfy all the conditions of the “credit-as-true” rule. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d
1273 (9th Cir. 1996). Although the district court concluded that the ALJ failed to
provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the testimony of Dr. Levine, “there
are outstanding [] issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability
can be made,” and it is not “clear from the record that the ALJ would be required
to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited.” Id. at 1292. As the
district court concluded, “there are conflicting medical opinions regarding
[Smith’s] ability to do work-related activities” and “substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s conclusion that the medical record shows [Smith] is less restricted than
Dr. Levine opined.”
Moreover, district courts retain “flexibility” to remand for further
proceedings “when, even though all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are
satisfied, an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that the
claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir.
2014). In light of this flexibility and the substantial conflicting evidence in the
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record, even if Smith did satisfy the credit-as-true rule, the district court’s decision
to remand for further proceedings was not “beyond the pale of reasonable
justification under the circumstances.” Harman, 211 F.3d at 1175.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by remanding for
further proceedings, the panel need not reach the issue of whether the district court
properly concluded that the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons for discrediting
Smith’s testimony.
AFFIRMED.
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