FILED
OCT. 16,2014
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
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In re the Marriage of: ) No. 31961-0-111
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SHANNON MARIE LANGFORD, )
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Respondent, )
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v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
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CHAD FRANKLIN LANGFORD, )
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Appellant. )
BROWN, A.C.J. - Chad F. Langford appeals the trial court's denial of his request
to equally split child support with Shannon M. Langford. He contends the court erred by
not granting him a residential schedule deviation since the parties stipulated to split
residential time with their two children. We find no abuse of discretion, and affirm.
FACTS
The Langfords married in 2000, had two children, and separated in 2012. Ms.
Langford works for the State of Washington's Department of Social and Health Services
with a net monthly income of $3,429.46. Mr. Langford is a partner with an advertising
company with a monthly net income of $6,998.32. The parties do not dispute the
No. 31961-0-111
In re Marriage of Langford
court's net income calculation. In the final parenting plan, the court adopted the parties'
stipulation to "share the children equally in one week increment." Clerk's Papers (CP)
at 54. The basic child support obligation for both children is $2,102. The court
allocated .671 of the support obligation to Mr. Langford and .329 to Ms. Langford. Mr.
Langford requested a residential schedule deviation to $472.89 per month for the
resulting $1,449.36 per month transfer payment using a formula he based upon the
equal residential time he spends with the children.
The court denied his request, stating, "With regard to the residential credit, there
was argument that it should be granted ... and I considered what would be in the best
interest of the kids. . .. I'm not going to grant the residential credit in this case. I do not
believe that it's appropriate." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 24-25. In its findings of
fact, the court reiterated, "The court has heard extensive argument regarding the
application of a residential credit for the father for calculating his monthly support
obligation. The court has found that no residential credit shall be granted to the father."
CP at 78 (Finding of Fact 2.20). Mr. Langford unsuccessfully requested
reconsideration. He now appeals.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the trial court erred by abusing its discretion in denying Mr.
Langford's request for a residential schedule deviation when calculating child support.
Mr. Langford contends he should have been granted a deviation since both parents
equally share residential time.
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We review a trial court's decision on an order of child support for an abuse of
discretion. State ex reI. M.M.G. v. Graham, 159 Wn.2d 623,632,152 P.3d 1005
(2007). A trial court abuses its discretion if the decision rests on unreasonable or
untenable grounds. In re Marriage of Leslie, 90 Wn. App. 796,802-03,954 P.2d 330
(1998). We will not reverse the trial court's decision absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. Id. Moreover, the "reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of
the trial COLirt unless the trial court's decision rests on unreasonable or untenable
grounds." Id. at 802.
Chapter 26.19 RCW sets forth the child support schedule. In determining the
amount of child support owed, the trial court begins by setting the basic support
obligation. RCW 26.19.011(1). This is based on the statute's economic table based on
the parents' combined monthly net income considering the number and age of the
children. RCW 26.19.011(1). The economic table is presumptive for combined monthly
net incomes of $12,000 or less, the case here. RCW 26.19.065. The court next
allocates the child support obligation between the parents based on each parent's share
of the combined monthly income. RCW 26.19.080(1). The court then determines the
standard calculation, the presumptive amount of child support owed by the obligor
parent to the obligee parent. RCW 26.19.011 (8). The obligor is the parent with the
greater theoretical support obligation. Here, Mr. Langford is the obligor parent.
The next step, is to consider any deviations from the support obligation. RCW
26.19.011 (4). (8). Relevant here is a requested deviation downward based on
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residential schedule. 1 RCW 26.19.075(1). 'The court may deviate from the standard
calculation if the child spends a significant amount of time with the parent who is
obligated to make a support transfer payment." RCW 26.19.075(1)(d). The purpose of
granting a deviation is to recognize the "increased expenses" that a parent sometimes
has when placement is shared. RCW 26.19.075(1 )(d). The court, however, "may not
deviate on that basis if the deviation will result in insufficient funds in the household
receiving the support to meet the basic needs of the child." Id. The trial court must
enter written findings of fact supporting the reasons for any deviation or denial of a
party's request for deviation. RCW 26.19.075(3).
The court considered Mr. Langford's request for a deviation and stated in its oral
ruling, "I considered what would be in the best interest of the kids. . .. I'm not going to
grant the residential credit in this case. I do not believe that it's appropriate." RP at 25.
In its findings of fact, the court reiterated, "The court has heard extensive argument
regarding the application of a residential credit for the father for calculating his monthly
support obligation. The court has found that no residential credit shall be granted to the
father." CP at 78 (finding of fact 2.20).
Mr. Langford argues this is insufficient. Where a court must enter required
findings, those "findings must be 'sufficiently specific to permit meaningful review.'" In
re Del. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 218, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). The findings should
1Before 1991, this deviation was referred to as a residential credit. In re
Marriage of Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. 634, 640,316 P.3d 514 (2013) (citing Helen
Donigan, Calculating and Documenting Child Support Awards Under Washington Law,
26 Gonz. L. Rev. 13,45 (1991), review denied, 180 Wn.2d 1010 (2014)).
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indicate the factual bases for the ultimate conclusions, but the degree of particularity
required depends on the circumstances of each case. Id. When written findings are
unclear, we may look to the trial court's oral ruling to help interpret the implicit findings.
In re Marriage of Kimpel, 122 Wn. App. 729, 735, 94 P.3d 1022 (2004). The court in its
oral ruling stated it considered the financial information of the parties and that reducing
the presumptive child support amount would not "be in the best interest[s] of the kids"
and therefore, not "appropriate." RP at 25. While the usual finding in these cases is
that the deviation will result in insufficient funds to the obligee's household, RCW
26.19.075(3) merely requires the court to enter written findings of fact "that specify
reasons for any deviation or any denial of a party's request for any deviation." The trial
court's abbreviated finding of fact unnecessarily complicates appellate review. We urge
diligence in this area. Nevertheless, since we may review the oral ruling in conjunction
with the court's finding of fact, the combination satisfies RCW 26.19.075(3) for review
purposes.
Next, Mr. Langford argues the court should use a concise formula like found in In
re Marriage of Arvey, 77 Wn. App. 817, 894 P.2d 1346 (1995). The Arvey court
established a formula for determining child support when one child resides primarily with
one parent and another child resides primarily with the other parent. Id. at 939. Mr.
Langford argues this formula should be used where parents have equal residential
placement. This argument has been rejected by our Supreme Court in Graham.
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In Graham, Michelle Cunliffe and Richard Graham shared equal residential time
with their two daughters. 123 Wn. App. at 933. The trial court estimated Mr. Graham's
net monthly child support obligation to be $872 and Ms. Cunliffe's to be $437. Id. at
934. However, the court deviated downwards from Mr. Graham's standard calculation,
finding that the girls spent significant time with him and the deviation did not result in
insufficient funds for Ms. Cunliffe. Id. Several years later, the State petitioned for a
modification. In response, Mr. Graham asked the trial court to apply AlVey and reduce
his support obligation further because of the children's residential time with him.
Graham, 123 Wn. App. at 933. Division One of this court rejected Mr. Graham's AlVey
based argument. Id. at 940-41. Our Supreme Court affirmed, holding the plain text of
RCW 26.19.075 gives trial courts discretion to deviate from the standard calculation
based on residential schedule; thus, a new formula was not necessary. In re Marriage
of Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. 634, 636,316 P.3d 514 (2013), review denied, 180 Wn.2d
1010 (2014). Recently, Division One of this court reiterated, "[T]he standard calculation
and residential schedule deviation in the child support schedule apply when parents
share equal residential time." Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. 634, 643, 316 P.3d 514 (2013)
review denied, 180 Wn.2d 1010 (2014).
Based on both Graham and Schnurman, the trial court followed the correct
process. The court first determined the parties' combined monthly net income. The
court identified Mr. Langford as the obligor parent since his obligation was greater than
Ms. Langford's. Using the standard calculation, the court ordered Mr. Langford to pay
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Ms. Langford a $1,449.36 monthly transfer payment. Upon Mr. Langford's request, the
court considered whether his shared residential time with the children necessitated a
downward deviation. The court found that it did not because it was not in the children's
best interest and inappropriate based on the case facts. This process was correct. The
trial court was not bound to apply Mr. Langford's requested deviation. Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a transfer payment from Mr. Langford
to Ms. Langford based on the standard calculation.
Ms. Langford requests attorney fees under RCW 26.09.140, which allows this
court, in its discretion, to order a party to pay for the cost to the other party of
maintaining the appeal, including attorney fees. This provision gives the court discretion
to award attorney fees to either party based on the parties' financial resources,
balancing the financial need of the requesting party against the other party's ability to
pay. In re Marriage of Pennamen, 135 Wn. App. 790, S07-0S, 146 P.3d 466 (2006).
Under RAP 1S.1(c), the parties had until 10 days prior to the date this appeal is'set on
the docket to file affidavits, setting forth their financial need and ability to pay. They did
not comply; thus, Ms. Langford's request is denied.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
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Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
Brown, A.C.J.
'CONCUR:
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LAWRENCE-BERREY,1. (dissenting) - The majority affirms the lower court's
decision to deny the father a residential credit deviation. In doing so, the majority
combines insufficient written findings with an erroneous "best interest of the kids" oral
finding. Chapter 26.19 RCW, which governs setting child support, does not contemplate
a "best interest of the kids [sic]" standard. Because two wrongs do not make a right, I
dissent.
I agree with the first part of the majority's analysis: The presumptive child support
obligation is determined by reference to the statute's economic table. This table uses the
parents' combined net monthly income and the number and ages of the children to
determine the basic support obligation. This table uses these variables to arrive at a
precise figure for parents with combined net incomes of $12,000 and less.
I also agree with the second part of the majority's analysis that the presumptive
child support obligation for an obligor parent is determined by mUltiplying the obligor
parent's percentage of total net income by the basic support obligation.
I part with the majority when it states, "[t]he obligor is the parent with the greater
theoretical support obligation." Majority at 3. Under settled law, the obligor parent is the
noncustodial parent:
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Child support payments have historically been the obligation of the
noncustodial parent. . . . The historical presumption was reflected in the
Uniform Child Support Guidelines, which were approved in 1982 by the
Washington State Association of Superior Court Judges (ASCJ).
. .. As this court recently noted,
[i]n those situations [where children reside a majority of the
time with one parent], the obligor parent is the one with
whom the children do not reside a majority of the time and
that parent makes a transfer payment to the parent with whom
the children primarily reside.
In re Marriage ofHolmes, 128 Wn. App. 727, 738-39, 117 P.3d 370 (2005) (quoting
State ex reI. MMG. v. Graham, 123 Wn. App. 931, 939, 99 P.3d 1248 (2004), a.ff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 159 Wn.2d 623, 152 P.3d 1005, abrogated on other
grounds by In re Marriage ofMcCausland, 159 Wn.2d 607, 152 P.3d 1013 (2007».
But under the majority's reasoning, a parent who has his children only 30
overnights per year can receive a substantial child support payment from the custodial
parent if the latter earns substantially more than the former. Such a result is contrary to
historical practice. Id.
Here, because both parents have equal overnights with their children, there is no
custodial parent. In such a scenario, it is as equally random and erroneous to order the
father to pay his presumptive payment to the mother as it would be to order the mother to
pay her presumptive payment to the father. Yet the former is exactly what the lower
court did.
This randomness is resolved by RCW 26.19.07 5( 1)(d), which provides:
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The court may deviate from the standard calculation if the child spends a
significant amount of time with the parent who is obligated to make a
support transfer payment. The court may not deviate on that basis if the
deviation will result in insufficient funds in the household receiving the
support to meet the basic needs of the child or if the child is receiving
temporary assistance for needy families. When determining the amount of
the deviation, the court shall consider evidence concerning the increased
expenses to a parent making support transfer payments resulting from the
significant amount of time spent with that parent and shall consider the
decreased expenses, if any, to the party receiving the support resulting from
the significant amount of time the child spends with the parent making the
support transfer payment.
The legislature granted courts discretion on whether to allow a deviation and in
determining the amount of the deviation. This discretion is necessary to accomplish the
legislative purpose of equitably apportioning the child support obligation between the
parents. RCW 26.19.001. Indeed, this purpose of equitable apportionment is achieved
by adhering to the legislature's directive that courts consider the actual increase and
decrease in expenses brought about by an obligor parent having a significant amount of
residential time.
Some expenses are variable (e.g., food, transportation, and entertainment) and
depend upon the degree of residential shifting; whereas some expenses are fixed (e.g.,
housing) and depend very little upon the degree of residential shifting. In tum for
granting courts discretion to grant or deny deviations, the legislature tasked courts to
make well-reasoned decisions. This task is accomplished by requiring courts to actually
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Here, the legislative purpose of achieving a well-reasoned decision has been
thwarted not once but twice: First, the written findings clearly are inadequate. The
majority concedes this; second, the oral finding applies the wrong legal standard, not the
standard set forth in RCW 26.19.075.
I, therefore, would reverse the lower court and remand for entry of appropriate
findings using those considerations specifically set forth in RCW 26.19.075(1)(d).
Lawrence-Berrey,
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