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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DEBRA A. LANG, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
:
TODD N. SHAFFER, SHERYL K. SHAFFER, :
THOMAS C. SHAFFER AND CAROL E. :
SHAFFER, :
:
Appellants : No. 1435 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment entered August 7, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Civil Division No(s).: 09-4259
BEFORE: MUNDY, WECHT, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM PER CURIAM: FILED OCTOBER 16, 2014
Appellants, Todd N. Shaffer, Sheryl Shaffer, Thomas C. Shaffer, and
Carol E. Schaffer, appeal from the judgment in favor of Appellee, Debra
Lang, entered in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas. Appellants
claim the trial court, following a nonjury trial, erred in finding that Appellee
established her claim of adverse possession over a disputed tract of land.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Appellee did not properly
invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction over her purported quiet title action. We
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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thus vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this memorandum.
The dispute between Appellants and Appellee arose over a 7,400
square-foot tract along the western bank of Pine Creek (“the disputed
tract”). The disputed tract was included in the description of a 14.8-acre
parcel in the following chain of title: (1) a 1976 deed based on a survey
performed by Marlin “Red” Wolfe, (2) a May 19, 1987 deed conveying the
parcel to Appellants’ predecessor, David R. Stinebring, and (3) the April 9,
2009 deed under which Appellants acquired the parcel. As described in their
deed, most of Appellants’ 14.8-acre parcel was on the eastern side of Pine
Creek, with only the disputed tract on the western side of Pine Creek.
Appellee, by virtue of a March 20, 1981 deed, initially acquired an
interest in a parcel known as “tract 3” near the western bank of Pine Creek.
As described in the 1981 deed and Appellee’s successive deeds, her “tract 3”
did not include the disputed tract.
On September 15, 2009, five months after Appellants acquired the
14.8-acre parcel, Appellee filed a complaint to quiet title in the disputed
tract. Appellee’s Compl., 9/15/09, at 3. Appellee alleged she acquired title
to the disputed tract “by reason of adverse possession,” and Appellants
“attempted to exclude [her] from the [disputed tract.]” Id.
The matter ultimately proceeded to a nonjury trial on December 12,
2012. Appellee presented evidence regarding her use of the disputed tract
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for the twenty-one year prescriptive period. Appellants, in turn, presented
evidence that their immediate predecessor, Stinebring, claimed ownership
over the disputed tract, but permitted Appellee, as well as the general
public, to use the disputed tract. According to Appellants, Appellee’s claim
of adverse possession was defeated by Stinebring’s express grant of
permission to use the disputed tract.
At the close of Appellants’ case-in-chief, Appellee proffered rebuttal
evidence, namely, expert testimony that the 1976 survey conducted by
Wolfe erroneously extended Appellant’s 14.8-acre parcel across Pine Creek
to the disputed tract. Appellee thus asserted that Stinebring did not acquire
legal title to the disputed tract and could not have granted permission to use
the tract. Appellants objected to Appellee’s proposed rebuttal evidence,
arguing that it introduced theories not set forth in Appellee’s complaint. The
trial court took the objection under advisement and permitted Appellee to
present her rebuttal evidence
Subsequently, when issuing its verdict on May 6, 2013, the trial court
overruled Appellants’ objection to Appellee’s rebuttal evidence. The trial
court found in favor of Appellee, concluding: (1) Appellants did not have a
claim of right to the disputed tract; and (2) Appellee established adverse
possession of the disputed tract as against Appellants but not “as to ‘the
world.’” Trial Ct. Op. & Verdict, 5/6/13, at 5. Appellants timely filed post-
trial motions, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
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Appellants present three questions on appeal asserting that the trial
court erred in entering a verdict in favor of Appellee. 1 Before considering
Appellants’ questions on appeal, we must consider whether the trial court
had jurisdiction to render its decision in this matter. See Fried v. Fried,
501 A.2d 211, 212 (Pa. 1985) (noting questions relating to jurisdiction are
not waived by failure of parties to raise them and may properly be raised by
a court sua sponte); Huston v. Campanini, 346 A.2d 258, 259 (Pa. 1975)
(noting absence of indispensable party goes to court’s jurisdiction and issue
may be raised sua sponte).
1
Appellants present the following questions:
Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law when it held
that the Appellants’ predecessor in title, despite having a
deed that described the disputed property within the
boundaries of its legal description, did not have sufficient
title to give permission to the Appellee to occupy the tract
of land?
Did the Trial Court err when it found that the Appellee
had established adverse possession of the disputed tract in
the face of clear, uncontroverted testimony of the
Appellants’ predecessor in title that he had given
permission to the Appellee’s husband to cross onto and
use the land in dispute?
Did the Trial Court err when it found that the
Appellants’ predecessor in title posted the disputed
property and erected barriers to it?
Appellants’ Brief at 4.
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Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1061 provides that a quiet title
action may be brought:
(1) to compel an adverse party to commence an action
of ejectment; [or]
(2) where an action of ejectment will not lie, to
determine any right, lien, title or interest in the land or
determine the validity or discharge of any document,
obligation or deed affecting any right, lien, title or interest
in land[.]
Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(1)-(2). Rule 1061 unifies into a “single procedure all of
the diverse procedures by which clouds on title were formerly tried[,]” but
“neither creates a new action nor changes the substantive rights of the
parties or jurisdiction of the courts.” Siskos v. Britz, 790 A.2d 1000, 1006-
07 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Siskos, distinguished an
ejectment action from quiet title actions under Rule 1061(b)(1) and (2), as
follows:
Ejectment is an action filed by a plaintiff who does not
possess the land but has the right to possess it, against a
defendant who has actual possession. Pursuant to Rule
1061(b)(1), “[a] possessor of land is entitled to bring an
action against one who, although not in possession, has
some claim or interest in the land, compelling that person
to assert his or her interest by bringing an action of
ejectment, or be forever barred from attacking the title of
the possessor.” A party will file a Rule 1061(b)(2) Action
to Quiet Title when she is not in possession, does not have
the right to possess the land, and wishes to determine all
rights in the land. “The purpose of an ejectment
action as opposed to quiet title is not to determine
the relative and respective rights of all potential title
holders, but rather the immediate rights between
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plaintiff and defendant involved in that particular
litigation.”
Id. at 1006 (citations omitted). The Siskos Court reiterated the precept
that “a determination of possession is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a ruling
on the merits” under either Rule 1061(b)(1) or (b)(2). Id. at 1008.
Instantly, Appellee filed a complaint captioned as a “Quiet Title
Action.” Appellee’s Compl. She averred she began “clearing and
maintaining” the disputed tract in the summer of 1981 and used the tract
“for the construction of a fire ring, cookouts and camping on a regular
basis.” Id. at 3. She concluded she “continuously, openly, notoriously and
adversely occupied the area” for more than twenty-one years. Id. She
asserted Appellants, after acquiring the 14.8-acre parcel on the opposite
side of Pine Creek, “attempted to exclude [her] from” the disputed tract.
Id. Consistent with its caption, Appellee’s complaint requested the trial
court enter an order “quieting title in and to the [disputed tract] in [her
favor] and forever barring [Appellants] from contesting [her] title and selling
any interests in the property to a third party.” Id. Appellee’s complaint did
not reference Rule 1061.
Appellants, in their answer and new matter, asserted they owned the
land as stated in their deed. They alleged they asked Appellee to “respect
[their] property line” and Appellee “agreed to respect it” in their oral
conversations. Appellants’ Answer & New Matter, 10/12/09, at 3. No
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concession or determination of “possession” of the disputed tract was made
before or at trial.
In light of Siskos, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to enter an order quieting title in favor of Appellee.
If Appellee, as she alleged, were in possession of the disputed tract, the
appropriate form of action was to compel Appellant to commence an action
in ejectment. See Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(1). If, however, Appellee was not in
possession, but asserted an immediate right to possess the disputed tract as
against Appellants, a cause of action in ejectment was available. See
Siskos, 790 A.2d at 1006. Lastly, if Appellee alleged and established she
was not in possession and lacked an immediate right to possession, Rule
1061(b)(2) would govern her action because neither party had recourse to
an ejectment action. See id.; see also Grossman v. Hill, 122 A.2d 69, 71
(Pa. 1956) (noting plaintiffs’ quiet title action was proper because they were
equitable owners of disputed property who did not have present right of
possession). Despite the lengthy proceedings in the trial court, the
jurisdictional question of possession was not presented to the court by the
parties nor determined by the court. As such, we cannot conclude that the
trial court properly entered an order quieting title in favor of Appellee. 2 See
Siskos, 790 A.2d at 1006.
2
We note we have sua sponte amended the parties’ pleadings where
possession was not determined and the trial court improperly proceeded in a
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Furthermore, even if we were to assume that the parties and the trial
court properly proceeded in a quiet title action under Rule 1061(b)(2), a
further jurisdictional problem would arise. As noted above, Appellee
presented evidence Appellants did not have legal title to the disputed tract
based on a defect in their chain of title, and that her deed did not include the
disputed tract. However, Appellee failed to identify the true owner of the
tract before the allegedly inaccurate 1976 Wolfe survey.
“[A] party is indispensable ‘when his or her rights are so connected
with the claims of the litigants that no decree can be made without impairing
those rights.” City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 581
(Pa. 2003) (citation omitted). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
articulated the following considerations a court must weigh in determining if
a party is indispensable in an underlying action:
1. Do absent parties have a right or an interest related to
the claim?
2. If so, what is the nature of that right or interest?
3. Is that right or interest essential to the merits of the
issues?
quiet title action. See Moore v. Duran, 687 A.2d 822, 827 (Pa. Super.
1996); Sutton v. Miller, 592 A.2d 83, 88-89 (Pa. Super. 1991). However,
we did so where there was no prejudice to the parties’ rights. See Sutton,
592 A.2d at 89. Instantly the failure to determine which party possessed
the disputed tract and whether either party could maintain an action in
ejectment is not a mere technicality, as it affected the parties’ rights to a
jury and their burdens of proof in the underlying matter. See Siskos, 790
A.2d at 1006, 1009.
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4. Can justice be afforded without violating the due
process rights of absent parties?
Mechanicsburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Kline, 421 A.2d 953, 956 (Pa. 1981).
“In determining whether a party is indispensable, the basic inquiry remains
‘whether justice can be done in the absence of a third party.’” Pa. State
Educ. Ass’n v. Dept. of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 50 A.3d 1263, 1277 (Pa.
2012).
This Court has observed:
A party was said to be indispensable in Hartley v.
Langkamp & Elder, 243 Pa. 550, 90 A. 402 (1914) “when
he has such an interest that a final decree cannot be made
without affecting it, or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that the final determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. . . . Thus
were the object of a bill is to divest a title to
property, the presence of those holding or claiming
such title is indispensable.” Id. at 555-556, 90 A. at
403-404.
Miller v. Benjamin Coal Co., 625 A.2d 66, 67-68 (Pa. Super. 1993)
(emphasis added).
Instantly, Appellee conceded her deed did not include the disputed
tract, but disputed the accuracy of the 1976 survey on which Appellants’
deed was based. Thus, because a quiet title action generally seeks to
determine the “relative and respective rights of all potential land holders,”
see Siskos, 790 A.2d at 1006, Appellee would have been obligated to join
the true owner of the disputed tract, whose interests were necessarily
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affected and whose presence at trial was indispensable. See Miller, 625
A.2d at 67-68.
The trial court appears to have recognized the practical and
jurisdictional problems raised by the relief requested by Appellee. Although
the court attempted to tailor its order by finding that Appellee established
adverse possession as against Appellants only, it essentially granted relief in
the form of ejectment. As noted previously, however, neither the parties
nor the court considered the threshold question of possession under
Pa.R.C.P. 1061.
We thus conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter
judgment in this case. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment in favor of
Appellee and remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of
possession for the purposes of Pa.R.C.P. 1061. The parties may thereafter
proceed in a jurisdictionally viable manner without prejudice to Appellee’s
ability to amend her complaint.3 See Siskos, 790 A.2d at 1006, 1009.
Judgment vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
3
If Appellee is in possession of the disputed tract, then the trial court may
enter an order under Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(1) compelling Appellants to
commence an ejectment action. See Siskos, 790 A.2d at 1009. If the
court finds that Appellee was not in possession of the disputed tract, she will
have the opportunity to amend her complaint to commence an ejectment
action or allege that a Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(2) action is proper and include any
indispensable party. See id.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/16/2014
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Lang, D. v. Shaffer, T.
Combined Opinion