An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-120
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 21 October 2014
JOHN A. CASHION,
Plaintiff,
v. Davidson County
No. 11 CVS 3202
LEXINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC.
AND DAVIDSON HEALTH CARE, INC.,
Defendants.
Appeal by plaintiff and cross-appeal by defendants from
order entered 18 October 2013 by Judge Theodore S. Royster, Jr.
in Davidson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 27 August 2014.
Wyatt Early Harris Wheeler, LLP, by Kim R. Bauman, for
plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee.
Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP, by Patti W. Ramseur, Alexander
L. Maultsby, and Elizabeth Brooks Scherer, for defendants-
appellees and cross-appellants.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from the portion of the trial court’s
order granting defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on
plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. On appeal, plaintiff
argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion
for a directed verdict because, reviewing the evidence in the
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light most favorable to plaintiff, he presented evidence that he
was still an employee in April 2011, the date defendants stopped
providing him compensation and benefits. Thus, he argues that
defendants breached the Employment Agreement by failing to pay
him his salary and benefits until the Employment Agreement
expired on 25 September 2011. Defendants contend that plaintiff
resigned and that any salary or benefits he received after his
resignation were gratuitous; therefore, they did not breach the
Employment Agreement because plaintiff was no longer an
employee. After careful review, because there is a factual
issue as to whether plaintiff resigned or was still an employee
at the time defendants stopped providing him any compensation or
benefits, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order
granting a directed verdict for defendants and remand for trial.
In addition, defendants have cross-appealed from the
portion of the trial court’s order granting, on its own motion,
a directed verdict for plaintiff on defendants’ counterclaims of
breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. On cross-
appeal, defendants contend that the evidence presented was
sufficient to submit their counterclaims to the jury. We agree
and reverse the trial court’s dismissal of defendants’
counterclaims because the evidence was at least sufficient to
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raise an issue of fact whether plaintiff breached his fiduciary
duty and committed constructive fraud.
Background
Beginning in 1995, plaintiff John Cashion was president and
CEO of defendants Davidson Health Care, Inc. (“DHC”) and its
affiliate Lexington Memorial Hospital, Inc. (“LMH”)
(collectively, DHC and LMH are referred to as “defendants” or
“the hospitals”). By 2008, defendants were in serious financial
trouble, and they began discussing the possibility of a merger
with Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center (“WFUBMC”),
Novant, and various other potential partners. By September
2008, it became clear that WFUBMC was the front-runner for the
merger.
On 24 September 2008, plaintiff met with Steve Schultz
(“Mr. Schultz”), a WFUBMC representative. The details of this
meeting were summarized in a letter to plaintiff which was
included in the record on appeal. At the meeting, plaintiff was
informed that, after the merger, defendants and WFUBMC would be
“turn[ing] a new page in [their] leadership team.”
Specifically, plaintiff would no longer be president and CEO of
the newly merged hospital; instead, WFUBMC would “consider new
roles” for plaintiff. However, if a new role was not found for
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plaintiff, the parties would discuss their “plans to implement
the severance agreement provided for [plaintiff] by LMH. In
either event, [the parties would] also agree on the most
appropriate positioning of [plaintiff’s]
resignation/retirement/termination from LMH.”
The next day, on 25 September, the hospitals’ Board of
Directors met, without plaintiff, and approved a three-year
Employment Agreement (the “Employment Agreement”) for plaintiff
to remain as president and CEO of the hospitals.1 Plaintiff and
defendants executed the Employment Agreement that same day.
Prior to execution of the Employment Agreement, the parties had
entered into a one-year initial employment agreement in 1995
(the “1995 employment agreement”), which had been renewed
annually.
The Employment Agreement covered a three-year period,
commencing 25 September 2008 and ending three years later on 25
September 2011. Under the terms of the Employment Agreement,
defendants were entitled to terminate plaintiff with or without
cause. Termination without cause required a majority vote of
the Board of Directors and 45 days of written notice to
plaintiff. In the event plaintiff was terminated without cause,
1
According to defendants, the Board of Directors for both LMH
and DHC were made up of the same individuals.
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plaintiff was entitled to severance pay and certain benefits for
24 months. Plaintiff was entitled to terminate his employment
at any time; to do so, plaintiff was required to provide
defendants 90 days of written notice. Should plaintiff invoke
this right, defendants would be “released from any and all
further obligations” under the Employment Agreement.
The day after plaintiff executed the Employment Agreement
with defendants, on 26 September 2008, plaintiff sent a copy of
the 24 September 2008 letter from Mr. Schultz to Chuck Taylor
(“Mr. Taylor”), the hospitals’ Board chairman. The merger with
WFUBMC was approved by the hospitals’ Board of Directors on 25
September, the same day the Board offered plaintiff the new
Employment Agreement, and made public 1 October 2008.
On 2 October 2008, plaintiff sent a memorandum to the
Executive Committee of the hospitals’ Board of Directors and two
representatives of WFUBMC detailing his “Career Plan.” In it,
plaintiff outlined his “personal preference” and plan to “wind[]
down [his] career.” He stated that he would like to continue as
president/CEO until 1 November 2010 in order to receive the
full benefit of his retirement plan. In the alternative,
plaintiff offered to remain in the president/CEO position for
the full three years covered by his Employment Agreement.
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However, he also noted that, “[s]hould [defendants] prefer,
however, to transition to a new President/CEO at an earlier
junction, I would like to suggest that it be handled as a
termination without cause on December 31, 2009 with pay and
benefits to continue through the remaining term of the
[Employment Agreement].” On 28 October 2008, plaintiff sent out
an email and press release noting that he would be “leaving the
role of President and CEO.” Afterward, plaintiff moved all of
his belongings out of the president’s office and ceased doing
any work.
Discussions continued throughout the beginning of 2009
regarding whether plaintiff would be working in a new capacity
for the merged hospital. Emails sent between plaintiff and Mr.
Schultz, who had been named the new president and CEO of the
merged hospital, indicate that both the economic downturn and
organizational delays adversely impacted the discussions about
plaintiff’s “new role.” On 2 January 2009, Mr. Schultz sent
plaintiff an email noting that until the discussions concerning
plaintiff’s new role were complete, “the current Employment
Agreement remain[ed] in force.” However, the discussions did
not result in a new job for plaintiff at the merged hospital.
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The record contains numerous correspondence between
plaintiff and defendants over the next year and a half. On 17
May 2010, plaintiff sent Mr. Schultz an email noting that, since
he is “winding down [his] two years,” he proposed a buy-out of
his company vehicle. In an email dated 8 July 2010, Mr. Schultz
listed several things they needed to discuss including
“confirmation of the specific end date of severance payments to
be made.” Mr. Schultz also requested that plaintiff provide him
with the amount of any income he received “during the period of
[his] severance” because his severance compensation would need
to be offset by this amount pursuant to the terms of the
Employment Agreement. Again, on 20 September 2010, Mr. Schultz
sent plaintiff a letter describing the “details for closure of
the arrangements regarding [his] severance payments and benefits
continuation.” On 26 January 2011, defendants’ accounting
office sent an email to plaintiff requesting him to provide them
with the “usage” amounts on the company car for tax purposes.
Plaintiff responded that he used the car 65% as personal and 35%
as business. As one of the final pieces of correspondence
between the parties, Mr. Schultz sent plaintiff a letter on 14
February 2011 outlining the outstanding financial and
administrative matters that needed to be resolved “[a]s [they]
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move to conclude and finalize all arrangements between
[plaintiff] and [the merged hospital] pursuant to the terms of
[the] Employment Agreement[.]”
On 10 December 2010, plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to
WFUBMC claiming for the first time that plaintiff was “not in
‘severance’ status” but, instead, remained “employed.”
Accordingly, plaintiff’s counsel claimed that he was entitled to
continued employee benefits through 25 September 2011, when the
Employment Agreement would expire. Ultimately, all compensation
from defendants to plaintiff ended 6 April 2011. In sum, over
the 29 months after plaintiff announced that he was leaving his
position, plaintiff received payments of over $560,000 and
several benefits that he otherwise would not have been entitled
to if he was in severance.
After defendants refused to provide any further
compensation or benefits, on 29 September 2011, plaintiff filed
suit against them alleging breach of the Employment Agreement.
Defendants filed counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty and
constructive fraud. The matter came on for trial on 3 September
2013. After four days of plaintiff’s evidence, defendants moved
for a directed verdict. The trial court denied their motion and
also, sua sponte, granted a directed verdict for plaintiff on
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defendants’ counterclaims and dismissed them. Defendants did
not present any evidence at trial and, after additional
evidence, renewed their motion for a directed verdict. Having
heard all the evidence and additional arguments, the trial court
granted defendants’ motion and dismissed plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim. Both plaintiff and defendants timely appealed.
Standard of Review
Our review of a trial court’s order granting a motion for a
directed verdict is well-established:
The standard of review of [a] directed
verdict is whether the evidence, taken in
the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, is sufficient as a matter of law to
be submitted to the jury. In determining
the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand
a motion for a directed verdict, all of the
evidence which supports the non-movant’s
claim must be taken as true and considered
in the light most favorable to the non-
movant, giving the non-movant the benefit of
every reasonable inference which may
legitimately be drawn therefrom and
resolving contradictions, conflicts, and
inconsistencies in the non-movant’s favor.
Rink & Robinson, PLLC v. Catawba Valley Enterprises, LLC, __
N.C. App. __, __, 725 S.E.2d 426, 429 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 366 N.C. 241, 731
S.E.2d 414 (2012).
Plaintiff’s Arguments
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The gist of plaintiff’s arguments is that because there is
an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was still an employee
at the time defendants stopped paying him any compensation or
benefits, the trial court should not have entered a directed
verdict for defendants. Specifically, plaintiff contends that
defendants “treated and paid [him] as an employee, not as an ex-
employee under severance.” Furthermore, he argues that
defendants breached the Employment Agreement when they stopped
providing him the compensation and benefits he was entitled to
before the Employment Agreement expired on 25 September 2011.
We agree with plaintiff that the evidence creates an issue of
fact as to plaintiff’s employment status at the time defendants
stopped paying him any compensation or benefits. Therefore, the
issue should have been submitted to the jury.
The Employment Agreement covered a period of three years
and would expire on 25 September 2011. The Employment Agreement
contemplated three different scenarios for the termination of
plaintiff’s employment: (1) plaintiff could be terminated with
cause by the Board of Directors; (2) plaintiff could be
terminated without cause by the Board of Directors which would
entitle him to 24 months of severance; and (3) plaintiff could
terminate his own employment which would end all of defendants’
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obligations to him under the Employment Agreement. However,
contrary to some of the arguments advanced in their brief,
defendants conceded at oral argument that their only argument on
appeal is that plaintiff resigned on 28 October 2008 and claimed
that any benefits or compensation provided to plaintiff after
this point were gratuitous. In other words, defendants
specifically admitted that plaintiff was not in severance status
and, consequently, abandoned this argument on appeal.
Furthermore, while plaintiff admitted that he stepped down from
his position as CEO and president, he specifically denied that
he ended his employment relationship with defendants under the
Employment Agreement. Thus, the only issue on appeal is whether
the evidence, when reviewing it in a light most favorable to
plaintiff, was sufficient to show that plaintiff was still an
employee at the time defendants stopped providing him any
compensation or benefits.
Here, our review of the record leads us to conclude that
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that
plaintiff was still an employee on 6 April 2011. Although the
Employment Agreement related only to plaintiff’s employment as
president and CEO of the hospitals, it also noted that plaintiff
may be required to perform “other duties as may from time to
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time be assigned by the Boards of Directors.” Thus, these
“other duties” may include things that were not ancillary to
being in the role of CEO or president. In his 2 October 2008
memorandum to the hospitals’ Board of Directors, plaintiff
indicated his willingness to remain the president/CEO of the
newly merged hospital until the Employment Agreement expired.
Moreover, even after plaintiff had officially left his position
on 28 October, correspondence from defendants indicated that the
Employment Agreement was still valid and in force. Mr. Schultz
sent plaintiff an email specifically stating that plaintiff’s
Employment Agreement remained “in force” on 2 January 2009. In
fact, defendants’ correspondence suggested that the Employment
Agreement was still in effect until 14 February 2011 when Mr.
Schultz indicated his desire to wrap up some lingering matters
with plaintiff “pursuant to the terms of [the] Employment
Agreement.” If plaintiff had resigned, as defendants contend,
then the Employment Agreement would no longer apply. In other
words, there is a conflict between what defendants said in their
correspondence and their argument on appeal that defendant had
resigned in October 2008.
Furthermore, it is important to note that defendants
continued to pay plaintiff as if he were still an employee. Not
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only did he receive his base compensation, but he also received
certain benefits, including an automobile, cell phone, and
secretarial assistance, that he would not be entitled to if he
resigned or was in severance status. Defendants even inquired
as to plaintiff’s business “usage” of the automobile for tax
purposes and raised no objection when plaintiff claimed he used
it 35% of the time for business purposes. Finally, there is no
evidence in the record that plaintiff provided 90 days written
notice that he was terminating his employment. Although
plaintiff’s press release indicated that he was “stepping down”
from his position, he also noted that he would be employed in
another capacity with the newly merged hospital.
In sum, there is a conflict in the evidence as to
plaintiff’s employment status that should have been resolved by
the jury. Construing the evidence in plaintiff’s favor, there
was sufficient evidence that he remained an employee; thus, the
trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in defendants’
favor. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s
order granting a directed verdict for defendants on plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim and remand for trial.
Defendants’ Cross-Appeal
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In their cross-appeal, defendants contend that the trial
court committed reversible error by granting a directed verdict
on their counterclaims before they had a chance to present
evidence and that there was sufficient evidence on their claims
for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud to submit
the issue to the jury. Defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty and
constructive fraud claims are based on their allegations that
plaintiff, as president and CEO, failed to disclose to
defendants that, at the time he signed the Employment Agreement
and secured himself much better benefits should he be terminated
without cause, he already knew that his position would be
terminated once the merger occurred.
“A claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires the
existence of a fiduciary duty,” T-WOL Acquisition Co., Inc. v.
ECDG S., LLC, __ N.C. App. __, __, 725 S.E.2d 605, 617 (2012),
and that “the fiduciary failed to act in good faith and with due
regard to [the other party’s] interests,” Toomer v. Branch
Banking & Trust Co., 171 N.C. App. 58, 70, 614 S.E.2d 328, 337
(2005).
Even assuming, without deciding, that the trial court was
not procedurally prohibited from granting a directed verdict for
plaintiff on defendants’ counterclaims before defendants
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presented any evidence, we conclude that it was improper in
light of the evidence at the time it was entered. Here, it is
undisputed that plaintiff owed defendants a fiduciary duty as
the president and CEO. Defendants contend that plaintiff
breached that duty by wrongfully failing to disclose to them
that he already knew that he would be replaced once the merger
occurred. Construing the evidence in defendants’ favor, the
evidence was sufficient to submit the issue to the jury.
Defendants had no knowledge about plaintiff’s meeting with
WFUBMC’s representatives on 25 September 2011, the day before
defendants approved the Employment Agreement for plaintiff.
Specifically, defendants were unaware of the fact that plaintiff
had been informed that he would not remain in his current
position as president and CEO once the merger occurred. Even
knowing this, plaintiff secured himself a better deal should he
be terminated without cause because the Employment Agreement
would give him 24 months of severance as opposed to only 12 in
the 1995 employment agreement. Thus, defendants pled sufficient
facts to at least raise an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff
breached his fiduciary duty.
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Similarly, the evidence was sufficient to submit
defendants’ constructive fraud claim to the jury. This Court
has noted:
A constructive fraud complaint must allege
facts and circumstances (1) which created
the relation of trust and confidence, and
(2) led up to and surrounded the
consummation of the transaction in which
defendant is alleged to have taken advantage
of his position of trust to the hurt of
plaintiff. Further, an essential element of
constructive fraud is that defendants sought
to benefit themselves in the transaction.
State ex rel. Long v. Petree Stockton, L.L.P., 129 N.C. App.
432, 445, 499 S.E.2d 790, 798 (1998) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). As discussed, construing the evidence
in a light most favorable to defendants, the evidence was
sufficient to support their contention that plaintiff took
advantage of his position and wrongfully failed to disclose that
his position would be terminated once the merger occurred.
Furthermore, this omission led to a better deal for plaintiff
once the merger occurred because he would receive double the
amount of severance under the terms of the Employment Agreement.
Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to raise an issue of
fact whether plaintiff committed constructive fraud, and the
issue should have been resolved by the jury.
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In summary, defendants pled sufficient facts in support of
their counterclaims that required their submission to the jury.
Consequently, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order
granting, on its own motion, a directed verdict for plaintiff on
defendants’ counterclaims.
Conclusion
In sum, because the evidence was sufficient to at least
raise an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was an employee
at the time defendants stopped paying him compensation and
benefits, the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion
for a directed verdict. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s
order entering a directed verdict for defendants on plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim. In addition, construing the evidence
in a light most favorable to defendants, there was sufficient
evidence to support defendants’ counterclaims for breach of
fiduciary duty and constructive fraud, and they were also an
issue for the jury. Accordingly, we also reverse the trial
court’s order dismissing defendants’ counterclaims.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Judges DILLON and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).