13‐3368
Jeffrey Navin v. HSBC Bank USA
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER
JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER
THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of October, two thousand
fourteen.
PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE,
CHESTER J. STRAUB,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________
JEFFREY NAVIN,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
‐v.‐ No. 13‐3368
HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE
HOLDERS OF DEUTSCHE ALT‐A
SECURITIES INC., MORTGAGE LOAN
TRUST SERIES 2005‐6 C/O AMERICAS
SERVICING COMPANY FOR NORWEST
1
HOME IMPROVEMENT, WELLS FARGO,
WELLS FARGO BANK,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________________________________
For Appellant: KENNETH R. DAVIS, Stamford, CT.
For Appellees: MARC S. EDRICH (Joseph H. Carlisle, on the brief),
Litchfield Cavo LLP, Simsbury, CT.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
(Stefan R. Underhill, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey Navin (“Navin”) appeals from a decision of the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissing his complaint for failure
to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as well as an
order denying Navin’s motion for reconsideration.1 We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
1 The standards of review are not in dispute. We review de novo a district court’s grant
of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true
and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Krys v. Pigott, 749 F.3d
117, 128 (2d Cir. 2014). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. See Analytical
Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012).
2
The majority of Navin’s claims are barred by the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine
because they were already litigated and decided by Connecticut state courts.
McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010). To the extent that Navin
raises claims under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”),
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42‐110a et seq., that are not barred by Rooker‐Feldman, those
claims are time‐barred as not having occurred within the three‐year statute of
limitations. We have considered all of Navin’s remaining arguments and find
them to be without merit, and we affirm the dismissal of Navin’s complaint for
substantially the reasons stated in Judge Underhill’s well‐reasoned decision.2
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
Defendants‐Appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal for Navin’s failure to file a
2
principal brief that complies with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) and/or
Local Rule 28.1 is DENIED as moot.
3