Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 566
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-14-538
Opinion Delivered October 22, 2014
JUSTIN FRISBY APPEAL FROM THE CLEVELAND
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[No. JV-2012-11-5]
V.
HONORABLE LARRY CHANDLER,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN JUDGE
SERVICES and MINOR CHILDREN
APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge
Appellant Justin Frisby appeals from the order terminating his parental rights to his
children: W.F. (dob February 15, 2006) and R.F. (dob April 3, 2010).1 Pursuant to Linker-Flores
v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), and Arkansas
Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i), Frisby’s attorney has filed a no-merit brief and a motion to
withdraw, addressing all of the adverse rulings made at the termination hearing, explaining why
each adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal, and requesting to be relieved as
counsel. Frisby was provided with a copy of his counsel’s brief and motion and informed of
his right to file pro se points. Frisby has not filed pro se points. We affirm.
We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Thompkins v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 413, at 2. At least one statutory ground must exist, in addition to
1
The parental rights of the children’s mother, Sunni Frisby, were also terminated. She
is not a party to this appeal.
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 566
a finding that it is in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights; these must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence. Id. (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (Supp. 2013)). Clear
and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm
conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Id. at 2. The appellate inquiry is whether
the trial court’s finding that the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is
clearly erroneous. Id.
W.F. and R.F. came into the custody of the Arkansas Department of Human Services
(DHS) in December 2012 after their mother, Sunni, left R.F. unattended at home while she was
in the woods with a knife looking for Frisby. She was under the influence of
methamphetamines, which led to her arrest. Frisby was not at home at the time of Sunni’s
arrest. He had been incarcerated in October 2012 based on charges of breaking or entering,
possession of drug paraphernalia, and methamphetamine use. Upon DHS’s removal of the
children from the Frisby home, they were placed in foster care. Later, W.F. was placed in the
custody of his maternal aunt and uncle, and R.F. was placed in the custody of his maternal
grandmother. Both parties with custody of the children have indicated their desire to adopt
them.
The children were adjudicated dependent-neglected in January 2013. The goal of the case
was reunification, and a case plan was developed for Frisby. A review-hearing order was entered
in April 2013, wherein the trial court noted that Frisby “mostly” complied with the case plan.
Although he had submitted to drug testing, completed a psychological evaluation, and
completed inpatient drug treatment, he had not attended counseling. Frisby was ordered to
2
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 566
attend and complete counseling and to remain drug free. Another review-hearing order was
entered on June 27, 2013, wherein the trial court found that Frisby was complying with the case
plan, and he was ordered to continue to do so. In an October 25, 2013 review-hearing order,
the trial court found that Frisby had submitted to random drug screening, completed a
psychological evaluation and inpatient drug treatment, and attended counseling; however, he
had not regularly attended NA/AA meetings, did not have employment or stable housing, and
had criminal charges pending. Frisby was ordered, among other things, to submit to a hair-
follicle test.
A permanency-planning order was entered in January 2014. In that order, the trial court
noted that Frisby’s hair-follicle test was positive for methamphetamines, he lacked employment
and stable housing, and he had pled guilty to criminal charges. The goal of the case was changed
to adoption. Thereafter, DHS filed a petition to terminate Frisby’s parental rights. A
termination hearing was held on March 11, 2014, and on April 2, 2014, the trial court entered
an order granting DHS’s petition. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of parental rights was in W.F.’s and R.F.’s best interest, that the children were
adoptable, and that Frisby’s drug addiction and use demonstrated potential harm of returning
the children to his custody. The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence of
statutory grounds under Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (failure to
remedy conditions that caused removal), (b)(3)(B)(vii)(a) (subsequent factors), (b)(3)(B)(viii)
(sentenced in a criminal proceeding for a time constituting a substantial period), and
(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A) (aggravating circumstances).
3
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 566
In the no-merit brief submitted to this court, Frisby’s counsel accurately explains that
the only adverse ruling was the termination decision. He argues that there is no meritorious
argument to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination of Frisby’s
parental rights. We agree.
The trial court found that the children had been out of the parents’ custody for fifteen
months; Frisby failed to follow the recommendations of the drug-treatment facility upon
discharge; he failed to attend NA/AA meetings as recommended; he relapsed and used
methamphetamines in October 2013; he was offered to attend inpatient drug treatment but
declined; he pled guilty to breaking or entering and possession of drug paraphernalia in March
2014 and was sentenced to serve five years’ imprisonment; and he was incarcerated at the time
of the hearing. The trial court further found that, despite the services DHS provided to Frisby,
he began the case with a drug addiction and concluded the case—fifteen months later—with
a drug addiction. These findings support the trial court’s conclusion that DHS met its burden
of proving the ground for termination set forth in Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-
341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a). Because DHS is required to prove only one statutory ground for termination,
it is not necessary for us to consider arguments pertaining to the other statutory grounds.
Hamman v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 295, at 14, 435 S.W.3d 495, 504.
Further, there is no meritorious argument to be raised on the best-interest requirement.
The evidence demonstrated that W.F. and R.F. would be at risk of potential harm if returned
to Frisby’s custody given that he was addicted to drugs and incarcerated for a period of five
years. Moreover, there was testimony at the termination hearing that the children were
4
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 566
adoptable. Therefore, on this record, the trial court’s decision to terminate Frisby’s parental
rights was not clearly erroneous, and we agree with his counsel that any appeal challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence would be wholly without merit.
Therefore, after examining the record and Frisby’s counsel’s no-merit brief, we
determine that there has been compliance with our no-merit rules and that this appeal is
without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating Frisby’s parental rights and grant
his attorney’s motion to be relieved from representation.
Affirmed; motion granted.
GLOVER and WOOD, JJ., agree.
Travis Ragland, for appellant.
No response.
5