13-2611
Jin v. Holder
BIA
A089 250 138
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 23rd day of October, two thousand fourteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
8 DENNY CHIN,
9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 HU JIN,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 13-2611
17 NAC
18
19 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
20 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
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25 FOR PETITIONER: Stuart Altman, New York, New York.
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1 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
2 General; Eric W. Marsteller, Senior
3 Litigation Counsel; Claire L.
4 Workman, Senior Litigation Counsel,
5 Office of Immigration Litigation,
6 Civil Division, United States
7 Department of Justice, Washington
8 D.C.
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10 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
11 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
12 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
13 is DENIED.
14 Petitioner Hu Jin, a native and citizen of China, seeks
15 review of a June 27, 2013 decision of the BIA denying his
16 motion to reopen. In re Hu Jin, No. A089 250 138 (B.I.A.
17 June 27, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
18 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
19 “We review the denial of motions to reopen immigration
20 proceedings for abuse of discretion, mindful that motions to
21 reopen ‘are disfavored.’” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515,
22 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314,
23 322-23 (1992)). Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may
24 move to reopen no later than 90 days after the final
25 administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C.
26 § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). That time
27 limitation may be tolled if the alien can demonstrate
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1 ineffective assistance of counsel. Rashid v. Mukasey, 533
2 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2008). To benefit from equitable
3 tolling, the alien must comply with certain procedural
4 requirements; show prejudice as a result of the ineffective
5 assistance; and have exercised due diligence in pursuing the
6 claim. Id. at 130-31.
7 Jin’s motion to reopen was untimely: he filed it more
8 than a year after the agency entered an order of removal
9 against him. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I); 8 C.F.R.
10 § 1003.2(c)(2).
11 In the main, Jin claimed prejudice from his attorney’s
12 failure to notify him that the BIA had dismissed his appeal.
13 That failure, argues Jin, caused him to miss the deadline
14 for filing a petition for review of his removal order.
15 We have previously approved of, and applied, the so-
16 called “presumption of receipt,” under which there is “some
17 presumption of receipt when notice is sent by regular mail.”
18 Lopes v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
19 (approving of presumption); see also Ba v. Holder, 561 F.3d
20 604 (6th Cir. 2009). The alien may, however, rebut that
21 presumption with an affidavit and other evidence. For
22 example, in Lopes, the petitioner’s affidavit asserted that
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1 he “did not receive the notice” of his hearing. 468 F.3d at
2 83. Additionally, Lopes had no motive to miss the hearing:
3 he had initiated the proceeding to receive a benefit, had
4 notified immigration authorities of a prior change in
5 address, and had complied with other disclosure obligations.
6 Id. at 86. In Alrefae v. Chertoff, the petitioner
7 “submitted a notarized letter attesting that he had not
8 received notice because his friend . . . lost his mail, and
9 he offered a police report as support for his claim that he
10 began receiving his mail at [his friend’s] home after his
11 own home was burglarized.” 471 F.3d 353, 360 (2d Cir.
12 2006). Like Lopes, Alrefae also evinced a “general
13 willingness to comply with U.S. immigration laws” and a
14 desire to have his case heard. Id. By contrast, in
15 Fuentes-Argueta v. INS, the presumption of receipt was not
16 rebutted because the petitioner’s only “evidence of
17 nondelivery” was “her own affidavit, which, in fact, nowhere
18 state[d] that the postal service had not attempted to
19 deliver the notice of the . . . hearing or had otherwise
20 improperly disposed of the notice.” 101 F.3d 867, 872 (2d
21 Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Instead, she merely averred that
22 she “was not aware that [she] had a hearing.” Id.
4
1 Here, the BIA found that Jin failed to rebut the
2 presumption that he received a courtesy copy of the BIA’s
3 decision dismissing his appeal. That was no abuse of
4 discretion. Jin’s affidavit in support of his motion to
5 reopen stated: “My former attorney did not inform me that my
6 BIA Appeal had been decided on March 7, 2012. It was only
7 upon going to another attorneys office that I was informed
8 that my BIA appeal had been denied.” Jin did not, however,
9 deny having received the courtesy copy that was addressed to
10 him (a copy of which was part of the administrative record).
11 As the BIA observed, Jin’s affidavit made no reference at
12 all to the courtesy copy. Nor did Jin provide any “other
13 evidence that it was not received at his address of record,”
14 including, for example, that it was “returned as
15 undeliverable.” Because Jin failed to rebut the
16 presumption, his attorney’s alleged failure to notify him
17 about that decision cannot have caused prejudice.
18 The agency also had the discretion to find that Jin
19 otherwise failed to show prejudice. Jin claimed that his
20 attorney “mixed up dates” in his asylum application. Jin
21 does not identify any particular dates. Ambiguity aside,
22 the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was based not on
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1 the dates in Jin’s written application, but rather on the
2 inconsistencies among Jin’s testimony, his wife’s testimony,
3 and their documentary evidence. So, even if Jin’s attorney
4 did mix up dates on his asylum application, those errors
5 caused Jin no harm.
6 Jin’s second claim of prejudice was that his attorney
7 failed to submit his marriage certificate at the merits
8 hearing, which, according to Jin, caused the IJ to “question
9 [t]he validity of his marriage.” But the marriage
10 certificate was submitted. Indeed, inconsistencies between
11 it and Jin’s testimony partly grounded the IJ’s adverse
12 credibility determination.
13 Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
14 decision not to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R.
15 § 1003.2(a), because that decision is “entirely
16 discretionary.” Ali, 448 F.3d at 518.
17 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
18 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
19 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
20 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
21 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
22 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
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1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
2 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
3 FOR THE COURT:
4 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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