[Cite as Grexa v. Hollenbaugh, 2014-Ohio-4746.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO
JOHN T. GREXA, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
CASE NO. 2014-T-0039
- vs - :
WILLIAM HOLLENBAUGH & :
ALL OTHER TENANTS,
Defendant-Appellant. :
Civil Appeal from the Trumbull County Court, Central District, Case No. 2014 CVG
0093.
Judgment: Affirmed.
George E. Gessner, Gessner & Platt Co., L.P.A., 212 West Main Street, Cortland, OH
44410 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
J. Terrence Dull, 724 Youngstown-Warren Road, Suite 11, Niles, OH 44446 (For
Defendant-Appellant).
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, William Hollenbaugh & All Other Tenants, aka William
Hollobaugh, appeals from the April 30, 2014 judgment of the Trumbull County Court of
Common Pleas, Central District, issuing a writ of restitution in favor of appellee, John T.
Grexa, in a forcible entry and detainer action.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. The correct spelling of appellant’s surname is “Hollobaugh.”
{¶2} Joseph and Sandra Toth (“the Toths”) owned real estate located at 8225
Thompson-Sharpsville Road, Masury, Trumbull County, Ohio (“the property”).
Appellant, and others, resided at the property for approximately nine years and paid rent
to the Toths. Appellee and his wife, Kimberly Grexa (“Kimberly”), later purchased the
property from the Toths. However, appellant never paid any rent to appellee or his wife.
{¶3} As a result, on April 13, 2014, appellee had his brother, Robert Grexa
(“Robert”), personally serve a Three-day Notice on appellant to vacate the premises for
the following reasons: “Failure to Pay Rent, New Ownership.” Robert misspelled
appellant’s surname by writing “Hollenbaugh” instead of “Hollobaugh.” Robert gave the
notice to Lolita Hershberger (“Lolita”), appellant’s fiancé and an occupant of the
property. Despite receiving the notice, the occupants did not vacate the property.
{¶4} On April 17, 2014, appellee filed a complaint in forcible entry and detainer
with a claim for rent against “William Hollenbaugh & All Other Tenants.”2 A hearing was
held on April 25, 2014.
{¶5} Appellee did not attend the hearing. However, appellee’s wife and co-
owner of the property, Kimberly, and his brother, Robert, did attend and testify.
Kimberly stated that appellant never entered into any agreement with her or her
husband about occupying the property. She also said that neither she nor her husband
received any rent from appellant or from any other occupant. Robert testified that he
prepared and personally delivered the Three-day Notice. Robert said he guessed how
to spell appellant’s last name.
2. This case originated in the Eastern District Court of Trumbull County. It was later transferred to the
Central District Court due to a conflict which prevented the Eastern District Court judge from hearing the
matter.
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{¶6} Appellant testified that he entered into a contract with the original owners
of the property, the Toths. The one-page, hand-written document appellant referred to
was designated as “Defendant’s Exhibit A,” dated February 14, 2008, and signed by
appellant and Joseph Toth (“Mr. Toth”). Appellant was to pay a total of $135,000 for the
property, which was described as including 8.74 acres.3 Appellant was to pay $2,500
down with monthly payments thereafter until the balance of the total purchase price was
paid in full. The last sentence Mr. Toth wrote on that document states: “This will serve
as our contract until I obtain a[n] actual land contract to be signed.” The document was
never notarized nor recorded.
{¶7} Appellant further testified that Mr. Toth subsequently gave him another
document entitled “Land Contract Installment” which was designated as “Defendant’s
Exhibit B.” However, neither appellant nor Mr. Toth signed that document. Appellant
asserts he refused to sign the contract mainly because it indicated that the Toths would
transfer only 5.24 acres of land to him, instead of the original agreed upon amount of
8.74 acres. Nevertheless, appellant stated he continued making monthly payments to
the Toths, paying a total of $30,600.
{¶8} Around July 2011, a dispute arose between appellant and Mr. Toth over
who would pay the cost of repairs to the sewage system at the property. At that time,
appellant said he stopped making payments to the Toths. As a result, on May 16, 2012,
in Case No. 2012 CVG 115, Mr. Toth filed a “Complaint for Eviction and Money
Damages” against appellant due to “non-payment of rent.” On June 18, 2012, the
3. The document incorrectly lists the purchase price as $13,500. However, testimony at the hearing
established that the actual agreed upon price was $135,000.
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Eastern District Court dismissed that case as “improperly filed,” determining that the
parties entered into a land installment contract.4
{¶9} Appellant additionally testified that during his residency at the property, he
had met appellee on various occasions. One encounter occurred while appellee was
surveying an adjoining neighbor’s property line. Another encounter took place when
appellee was plowing snow from the driveway. Appellant indicated he was surprised to
learn that appellee and his wife had purchased the property that appellant believed he
was buying from the Toths. Appellant said he had a conversation with Mr. Toth in the
fall of 2013, and that it was his understanding that the property was to be re-surveyed
and the sewage system was to be repaired the following spring. However, that never
occurred. Rather, appellant was served with the Three-day Notice from appellee and
his wife, the “new” purchasers of the property.
{¶10} Lastly, Lolita testified she lived at the property for about five years and
contributed to making some payments to the Toths when she was employed. She
agreed with appellant that approximately $30,000 in payments were made. Lolita
indicated she had never met with appellee or his wife. However, she did meet with
appellee’s brother, Robert, on one occasion, when he handed her the Three-day Notice.
{¶11} On April 30, 2014, the trial court issued a writ of restitution in favor of
appellee in this forcible entry and detainer action. The court found that no land
4. We note that the Central District Court in the instant case referenced that Eastern District Court case in
its April 30, 2014 judgment as follows: “Finally, defendant called to the court’s attention that the prior
record owner of the real estate (Toth) did attempt to evict defendant from the premises in an action filed in
the Trumbull County Eastern District Court, and that the judge of that court dismissed that action based
upon the existence of a land installment contract, at Case No. 2012 CVG 00115E. This court has
reviewed the entry in that case, and is of the opinion that this court is not barred from proceeding here, as
this plaintiff [appellee] was not involved in that action and there is no evidence that he was even aware of
it.”
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installment contract existed. Appellant filed a timely appeal and asserts the following
three assignments of error:
{¶12} “[1.] The trial court committed prejudicial error in granting Appellee a writ
of restitution based upon its opinion that Appellant did not have a land contract with the
prior title owner of the property.
{¶13} “[2.] The trial court erred in awarding a writ of restitution to Appellee where
the Defendant’s name was improperly spelled.
{¶14} “[3.] The trial court erred in awarding a writ of restitution to Appellee where
the Appellee failed to appear for the hearing and make himself available for cross
examination by the opposing party.”
{¶15} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in
granting appellee a writ of restitution based upon its opinion that appellant did not have
a contract with the Toths (the prior title owners of the property). Appellant maintains the
court erred in determining that the February 14, 2008 agreement did not contain all of
the provisions required for a land installment contract under R.C. 5313.02.
{¶16} We are called upon to determine whether appellant and the Toths had a
land installment contract. Upon review, and for the reasons that follow, the record
reveals that no such contract exists.
{¶17} In its most basic form, “‘“[a] contract is generally defined as a promise, or
a set of promises, actionable upon breach. Essential elements of a contract include an
offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained for legal benefit
and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual assent and legality of object and of
consideration.” Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc. (N.D.Ohio 1976), 436 F.Supp.
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409, 414. A meeting of the minds as to the essential terms of the contract is a
requirement to enforcing the contract. Episcopal Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t
of Industrial Relations (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 366, 369 * * *.’ Kostelnik v. Helper, 96
Ohio St.3d 1, 3-4, 2002-Ohio-2985 * * *.” Minister Farmers Cooperative Exchange Co.,
Inc. v. Meyer, 117 Ohio St.3d 459, 2008-Ohio-1259, ¶28. (Parallel citations omitted.)
{¶18} Regarding land installment contracts, R.C. 5313.02 states:
{¶19} “(A) Every land installment contract shall be executed in duplicate, and a
copy of the contract shall be provided to the vendor and the vendee. The contract shall
contain at least the following provisions:
{¶20} “(1) The full names and then current mailing addresses of all the parties to
the contract;
{¶21} “(2) The date when the contract was signed by each party;
{¶22} “(3) A legal description of the property conveyed;
{¶23} “(4) The contract price of the property conveyed;
{¶24} “(5) Any charges or fees for services that are includable in the contract
separate from the contract price;
{¶25} “(6) The amount of the vendee’s down payment;
{¶26} “(7) The principal balance owed, which is the sum of the items specified in
divisions (A)(4) and (5) of this section less the item specified in division (A)(6) of this
section;
{¶27} “(8) The amount and due date of each installment payment;
{¶28} “(9) The interest rate on the unpaid balance and the method of computing
the rate;
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{¶29} “(10) A statement of any encumbrances against the property conveyed;
{¶30} “(11) A statement requiring the vendor to deliver a general warranty deed
on completion of the contract, or another deed that is available when the vendor is
legally unable to deliver a general warranty deed;
{¶31} “(12) A provision that the vendor provide evidence of title in accordance
with the prevailing custom in the area in which the property is located;
{¶32} “(13) A provision that, if the vendor defaults on any mortgage on the
property, the vendee can pay on that mortgage and receive credit on the land
installment contract;
{¶33} “(14) A provision that the vendor shall cause a copy of the contract to be
recorded;
{¶34} “(15) A requirement that the vendee be responsible for the payment of
taxes, assessments, and other charges against the property from the date of the
contract, unless agreed to the contrary;
{¶35} “(16) A statement of any pending order of any public agency against the
property.”
{¶36} Appellant correctly points out that a land contract may be enforceable
even if it does not strictly comply with all of the foregoing R.C. 5313.02 requirements. In
fact, this court held the following in Phillips v. May, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2003-G-2520,
2004-Ohio-5942, ¶21:
{¶37} “‘Despite the mandatory language of R.C. 5313.02, it is well-established
that a land contract may be held to be enforceable as between parties even though it
does not strictly comply with the requirements of R.C. 5313.02.’ Gollihue v. Russo, 152
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Ohio App.3d 710, 714, 2003-Ohio-2663, at ¶33 * * *, citing Real Flo Properties v. Kelly
(Dec. 17, 1999), 6th Dist. No. L-99-1099, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6030, at *6 (‘a
document need not strictly comply with R.C. 5313.02(A) in order to be deemed an
enforceable land installment contract’), and Shimko v. Marks (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d
458, 461-462, * * * (substantial compliance with the statutory requirements of R.C.
5313.02 was sufficient to establish a valid installment contract).” (Parallel citations
omitted.)
{¶38} In this case, the record reveals a one-page, hand-written document,
designated as “Defendant’s Exhibit A,” dated February 14, 2008, and signed by
appellant and Mr. Toth. This document meets some of the R.C. 5313.02 requirements
for a land installment contract, including: a date, a contract price, a down payment, and
payment due dates. See R.C. 5313.02(A)(2), (4), (6), and (8). However, this purported
land contract is not, in fact, an agreement. Rather, it is merely a statement of intent to
enter into a formal land installment contract in the future.
{¶39} As stated, appellant was to pay a total of $135,000 for the property, which
was described as including 8.74 acres. Appellant was to pay $2,500 down with monthly
payments thereafter until the balance of the total purchase price was paid in full. The
last sentence Mr. Toth wrote on that February 14, 2008 document states: “This will
serve as our contract until I obtain a[n] actual land contract to be signed.” (Emphasis
added.) Thus, the document on its face declares that it is not a land installment
contract. Furthermore, the document was never notarized nor recorded.
{¶40} The record also reveals that Mr. Toth subsequently gave appellant
another document entitled “Land Contract Installment,” designated as “Defendant’s
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Exhibit B.” This latter document further supports the fact that the former document was
only a statement of intent rather than a contract. We stress again that neither appellant
nor Mr. Toth signed the “Land Contract Installment.” In fact, appellant testified at the
hearing that he refused to sign the “Land Contract Installment” because he did not
agree with its terms. Specifically, the “Land Contract Installment” indicated that the
Toths would transfer only 5.24 acres of land to appellant, instead of the prior agreement
of 8.74 acres. Thus, as evidenced from the “Land Contract Installment” and by
appellant’s own admission, there was no “meeting of the minds,” an essential element
required for any enforceable contract. Meyer, supra, at ¶28.
{¶41} Based on the facts presented, no land installment contract existed
between appellant and the Toths. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting appellee a
writ of restitution.
{¶42} Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶43} In his second assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred
in awarding a writ of restitution to appellee because appellant’s name was improperly
spelled.
{¶44} Appellant’s brief reveals that his argument contains no citations to any
authority or statute to support his position under this assignment. See App.R. 16(A)(7)
(“[t]he appellant shall include in its brief * * * [a]n argument containing the contentions of
the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the
reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record on which appellant relies.”)
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{¶45} Nevertheless, upon review, we find the trial court committed no error. As
stated, although appellant’s surname was misspelled (“Hollenbaugh” instead of
“Hollobaugh”), he still received the Three-day Notice and a copy of the complaint. In
fact, appellant attended the April 25, 2014 hearing, acknowledged he was the person
named as the defendant in the complaint, and defended his position. Also, the proper
spelling of appellant’s last name was clarified on the record. See Civ.R. 60(A) (“Clerical
mistakes * * * may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on the
motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.”)
{¶46} Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶47} In his third assignment of error, appellant maintains the trial court erred in
awarding a writ of restitution to appellee because appellee did not attend the April 25,
2014 hearing and, thus, was not available to be cross-examined.
{¶48} As previously addressed, no land installment contract existed between
appellant and the Toths (the original owners). Appellee and his wife, Kimberly, later
purchased the property from the Toths. Thus, Kimberly is a co-owner. Appellant
correctly points out that appellee did not attend the hearing. However, Kimberly did.
Kimberly asserted her and her husband’s interest in the property. She testified that
appellant never entered into any agreement with her or her husband about occupying
the property. She also said that neither she nor her husband received any rent from
appellant or from any other occupant. Appellant’s attorney cross-examined Kimberly.
{¶49} In addition, appellee’s brother, Robert, testified that he prepared and
personally delivered the Three-day Notice. Robert gave the notice to Lolita, appellant’s
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fiancé and an occupant of the property. Robert said he guessed how to spell
appellant’s last name. Appellant’s attorney also cross-examined Robert.
{¶50} Based on the facts presented, we fail to see that appellant suffered any
prejudice due to appellee’s failure to attend the hearing.
{¶51} Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit.
{¶52} For the foregoing reasons, appellant’s assignments of error are not well-
taken. The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Central District,
is affirmed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.,
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
concur.
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