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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ORONDA A. RAHATT,
Appellant No. 2990 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of October 15, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0001772-2012
BEFORE: ALLEN, OLSON AND OTT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 27, 2014
Appellant, Oronda A. Rahatt, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on October 15, 2013, as made final by the denial of his post-
sentence motion on February 12, 2014. We affirm.
The trial court accurately summarized the factual background of this
case as follows:
On April 18, 2012, in the early evening hours, Officer Kirt Guyer
was on routine uniform patrol for the City of Coatesville Police
Department. Officer Guyer along with Officer Chris McCarthy
were dispatched to the Kool Bar located at 336 E. Lincoln
Highway, Coatesville, Chester County, Pennsylvania for a report
of a black man with a gun following a 911 call from an
anonymous female. The Coatesville Police Department
characterizes the Kool Bar as a nuisance bar because of how
often they are dispatched to the establishment. Specifically,
over the past several years officer[s] responded to this location
for reports of various criminal activities including[,] but not
limited to[,] fights, drug dealing[,] and aggravated assaults.
Upon arriving at the Kool Bar, Officer McCarthy was approached
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by [James Hilton (“Hilton”)] who stated that a black man
wearing a white baseball hat approached him in the bar and
asked if he had a problem. Officer McCarthy knew [Hilton] from
prior encounters. [Hilton] provided a better description of the
suspect while speaking with the officer[s] outside. Specifically,
[Hilton] stated that the suspect was also wearing a pink shirt
during this conversation with the officer[s]. Moreover, [Hilton]
stated that a female friend informed him that she observed the
same black male, wearing a pink shirt and white baseball hat,
pull a gun on a female bar patron. The officers instructed
[Hilton] to return inside the bar and ask his female friend to
come outside and talk with them.
As [Hilton] was returning inside the bar and while the officers
were still in the parking lot, Officer Guyer observed [Appellant]
walk out of the bar with an intoxicated stagger, and wearing a
pink shirt and a white baseball hat. As the officers approached
[Appellant], their suspicion that [Appellant] maybe [sic]
intoxicated was further corroborated by the fact that they
observed [Appellant] with bloodshot eyes and with an odor of
alcohol emanating from his person. At this point, officers
stopped [Appellant] and subjected him to a protective pat-down
search. Prior to frisking [Appellant], Officer Guyer asked him if
he had any weapons on him to which [Appellant] replied, “No.”
However, while frisking [Appellant], Officer McCarthy alerted
Officer Guyer that he felt a bulge in [Appellant’s] right front
pants pocket. Specifically, Officer McCarthy felt a hard, L-
shaped object in that pocket and based on his training and
experience he believed it to be a firearm. Consequently,
[Appellant] was placed in handcuffs as a safety precaution and
Officer Guyer retrieved a black, Makarov []9mm, semi-automatic
handgun from [Appellant’s] right front pants pocket.
Further inspection of the firearm revealed that it had the serial
number filed off the frame. Moreover, the gun magazine
contained five []9mm bullets and a sixth bullet was present in
the chamber of the weapon. A check of [Appellant’s] criminal
history report revealed that [Appellant] was a previously
convicted felon and could not lawfully possess a firearm.
Furthermore, [Appellant] did not possess a valid license to
lawfully carry a firearm on the night in question.
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Trial Court Opinion, 6/10/14, at 2-3 (internal citations and certain internal
quotation marks omitted).
The procedural history of this case is as follows. On April 18, 2012, a
criminal complaint was filed charging Appellant with possession of a firearm
by a prohibited person,1 disorderly conduct,2 carrying a loaded weapon other
than a firearm,3 altering a serial number of a firearm,4 and criminal
trespass.5 On May 24, 2012, a criminal information was filed charging
Appellant with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, disorderly
conduct, and carrying a firearm without a license.6 On February 21, 2013,
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the firearm seized from his person. On
March 26, 2013, a suppression hearing was held at the conclusion of which
the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
On June 7, 2013, defense counsel was permitted to withdraw and
Appellant was permitted to proceed pro se.7 On June 10 and June 28, 2013,
Appellant filed pro se motions to suppress. A second suppression hearing
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4).
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106.1(a).
4
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6117(a).
5
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i).
6
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).
7
Appellant’s previously appointed attorney remained attached to this matter
in the capacity of stand-by counsel.
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was held on July 8, 2013 at the conclusion of which the trial court denied
Appellant’s motions to suppress. Trial commenced on August 19, 2013. On
August 21, 2013, Appellant was found guilty of possession of a firearm by a
prohibited person and carrying a firearm without a license. On October 15,
2013, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of five to ten years’
imprisonment.
On October 24, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se post-sentence motion
and notice of appeal.8 On December 2, 2013, the trial court ordered
Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
(“concise statement”). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). That same day, at
Appellant’s request, the trial court appointed counsel for this direct appeal.
On February 12, 2014, Appellant’s post-sentence motion was denied via
operation of law.9 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(b). On May 16, 2014,
Appellant filed his concise statement, which included his sole issue on
appeal. On June 9, 2014, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant presents one issue for our review:
8
This Court could have quashed Appellant’s notice of appeal as interlocutory
in nature. See Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1082 n.1 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Four months after the notice of appeal was
filed, however, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final when his
post-sentence motion was denied by operation of law. Pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 905(a)(5), the notice of appeal
was thereafter deemed filed as of February 12, 2014.
9
We note that the clerk of courts failed to enter an order denying
Appellant’s post-sentence motion by operation of law as required by
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(B)(3)(c).
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Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to
suppress physical evidence?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a
suppression motion is limited to determining whether the [trial] court’s
factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Stem,
96 A.3d 407, 409 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “[O]ur scope of
review is limited to the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
suppression court.” In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013) (citation
omitted). “We may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so
much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
in the context of the record as a whole.” Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d
102, 106 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
We note the procedural posture of this case and how that impacts our
scope of review in this case. The relevant suppression hearing in this case
occurred in March 2013 and the trial occurred in August 2013. In October
2013, our Supreme Court decided L.J. In L.J., our Supreme Court held that
this Court’s scope of review when reviewing a suppression court’s denial of a
suppression motion is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression
hearing. L.J., 79 A.3d at 1085. However, our Supreme Court chose to
apply this rule prospectively instead of retroactively. Id. at 1088-1089. As
the suppression hearing and trial in this case occurred prior to L.J., we may
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review both the evidence presented at trial and the evidence presented at
the suppression hearing. See id. at 1089 (“All litigation commenced
Commonwealth-wide after the filing of [L.J.], will be considered in accord
with [that] opinion.”).
Appellant argues that the police officers detained him, and patted him
down for weapons, without reasonable suspicion. Thus, he contends that
the search violated both the state and federal constitutions. “As we have
explained, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 8 of [the Pennsylvania] Constitution protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures. To safeguard these rights, courts
require police to articulate the basis for their interaction with citizens in
three increasingly intrusive situations.” Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66
A.3d 373, 378 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal alterations, quotation marks, and
citation omitted).
We have described three types of police/citizen interactions, and the
necessary justification for each, as follows:
The first of these is a mere encounter (or request for
information) which need not be supported by any level of
suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or respond.
The second, an investigative detention, must be supported by
reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and period
of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to
constitute the functional equivalent of arrest. Finally, an arrest
or custodial detention must be supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 73 A.3d 609, 613–614 (Pa. Super. 2013),
appeal denied, 87 A.3d 320 (Pa. 2014) (internal alteration, quotation marks,
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and citation omitted). On a motion to suppress, the burden is on the
Commonwealth to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
evidence seized from Appellant was legally obtained. See Commonwealth
v. Howard, 64 A.3d 1082, 1087 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 74 A.3d
118 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
In this case:
[T]he frisk at issue constituted an investigative detention in the
nature of a protective weapons search which is governed by
Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)] . . . and requires that police
have reasonable suspicion either that criminal activity was afoot
or that appellant was armed and dangerous to them:
It is well-established that a police officer may conduct a brief
investigatory stop of an individual if the officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude that criminal
activity may be afoot. Moreover, if the officer has a reasonable
suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the
detained individual may be armed and dangerous, the officer
may then conduct a frisk of the individual’s outer garments for
weapons. Since the sole justification for a Terry search is the
protection of the officer or others nearby, such a protective
search must be strictly limited to that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or
others nearby. Thus, the purpose of this limited search is not to
discover evidence, but to allow the officer to pursue his
investigation without fear of violence.
Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 89 A.3d 679, 683 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted).
As we have explained:
Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable
cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends
on the information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability in the totality of the circumstances. . . . In assessing
the totality of the circumstances, courts must also afford due
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weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the
facts in light of the officer’s experience and acknowledge that
innocent facts, when considered collectively, may permit the
investigative detention.
The determination of whether an officer had reasonable
suspicion . . . is an objective one, which must be considered in
light of the totality of the circumstances.
Clemens, 66 A.3d at 379 (ellipsis and citation omitted).
In this case, the officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot and that Appellant was armed and dangerous. The incident in
question occurred at a nuisance bar. An anonymous caller to 911 said that
an African-American male at the location was armed. Hilton informed the
officers that an individual matching Appellant’s description had threatened a
female bar patron with a firearm. Hilton’s description of Appellant was not
general. Instead, it was a very specific description – an African-American
male wearing a white baseball cap and a pink shirt.
Appellant’s argument that the anonymous tip was insufficient to
provide the officers with reasonable suspicion ignores the fact that the
information from the anonymous tip was corroborated by Hilton. See
Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. 2010) (citation
omitted) (“An anonymous tip, corroborated by independent police
investigation, may exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability to supply reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory stop.”). Furthermore, Hilton was known to the
police officers who arrived on scene. See Commonwealth v. Washington,
63 A.3d 797, 803 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“a tip from an informer known to the
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police may carry enough indicia or reliability for the police to conduct an
investigatory stop”). Although further investigation and corroboration may
have been necessary to obtain probable cause to arrest Appellant, the
officers only needed reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk. We
conclude that the officers in this case had the requisite reasonable suspicion.
Although the evidence was sufficient to give the officer’s reasonable
suspicion that Appellant possessed a firearm, and therefore the officers could
lawfully conduct a Terry frisk, Appellant contends that the evidence used to
establish that the police had reasonable suspicion should not have been
admitted as it violated his right to confront witnesses guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment
provides that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” U.S. Const. amend.
VI. The Sixth Amendment has been applied to the states through
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 403 (1965).
We conclude that Appellant’s confrontation rights were not violated.
In order for the Confrontation Clause to be applicable, a defendant must be
denied the right to confront a witness. Witnesses are “those who bear
testimony.” Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1153 (2011) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Testimony is a “solemn declaration
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”
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Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Appellant relies upon Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004),
for the majority of his Confrontation Clause argument. The facts in the
instant case; however, are distinguishable from the facts in Crawford. In
Crawford, the defendant stabbed a man who had attempted to rape his
wife. Id. at 38. At trial, the state played a tape of defendant’s wife
describing the stabbing. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States
emphasized that the Confrontation Clause does not bar admission of
statements offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. Id. at 59 n.9 (citation omitted). It concluded; however, that in
Crawford the wife’s statements were offered for the truth of the matter
asserted and, therefore, concluded that the defendant’s Confrontation Clause
rights had been violated. See id. at 68.
In this case, the statements of Hilton, the female bar patron, and the
female that called 911 included within Officer Guyer’s testimony were not
solemn declarations made for the purpose of establishing or proving
Appellant’s guilt. Instead, they were merely being offered to show why
Officer Guyer believed that criminal activity may be afoot and Appellant may
be armed, and therefore conducted a Terry frisk. In other words, Officer
Guyer’s recitation of what Hilton told him, and what the 911 caller had
relayed to police, was merely used to explain his course of conduct. It is
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well-settled that such course of conduct testimony does not violate the
Confrontation Clause. Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 A.2d 220, 258 (Pa.
2006); Williams v. Chrans, 894 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1990); see
Commonwealth v. Dargan, 897 A.2d 496, 500 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(citations omitted) (course of conduct testimony is not hearsay and the
Confrontation Clause only applies to hearsay); see also Commonwealth v.
Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1037 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted) (“It is
well established that certain out-of-court statements offered to explain the
course of police conduct are admissible because they are offered not for the
truth of the matters asserted but rather to show the information upon which
police acted.”); Illinois v. Sangster, 8 N.E.3d 1116, 1132 (Ill. App. 2014)
(double hearsay is admissible to show course of conduct). Thus, Appellant’s
rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated. Accordingly, the
trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/27/2014
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