J-S64032-14
2014 PA Super 245
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM ANTHONY GILLESPIE
Appellant No. 596 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 2, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0001030-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and LAZARUS, J.
OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 27, 2014
Appellant, William Anthony Gillespie, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, following his
jury trial convictions for possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), simple
possession, and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case as follows:
The Sheriff of Erie County is charged with the responsibility
of providing security for the [Erie County] Courthouse. A
single point of entry for the public was created to provide
for the screening of all members of the community
entering this public facility.
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1
35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (a)(16), and (a)(32), respectively.
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An Administrative Order was entered by this [c]ourt…on
April 15, 2003. The Administrative Order provided the
Sheriff’s Department with authority to conduct reasonable
searches of persons and property entering the Courthouse
for the purpose of preventing any potential weapon from
entering the building. The use of searches by a metal
detector was authorized as well as a pat down search of
any person activating a signal from the metal detector. As
part of this process, administrative authority was given to
search “[a]ll packages, briefcases and other containers in
the immediate possession of persons entering [the]
Courthouse property….” [(See Omnibus Pretrial Motion for
Relief, filed 8/21/13, at Exhibit A).]
The Sheriff’s Department has deputies posted at the single
point of entry for the public. As a person enters the
Courthouse through this entrance, there are two possible
lanes to proceed through a metal detector. On either lane,
the person is asked to remove any loose item(s) of
personal property and place them in a plastic bin which is
viewed by a Deputy Sheriff. The person then proceeds
through a metal detector.
All persons entering the Courthouse, regardless of age,
gender or race, are required to go through this process.
Such were the circumstances on March 27, 2013[,] when
[Appellant] entered the Courthouse. Like any other
member of the public, [Appellant] was required to place
any loose items of personal property in the plastic bin to
be viewed by a Deputy Sheriff. [Appellant] was then
required to proceed through a metal detector. Among the
items [Appellant] placed in the plastic bin was a white
plastic bottle bearing a label for Anacin.
Upon observing the plastic bottle [Appellant] placed in the
bin, Deputy Sheriff Stephen Welch shook the bottle “and it
didn’t rattle or anything like a normal bottle would. …
[T]here was something in there, but it didn’t have—like a
normal rattle of just loose pills inside of a hard plastic
container. You could feel it. There was something in
there, but it was kind of like padded.” [(N.T. Preliminary
Hearing, 4/8/13, at 6).] Deputy Welch opened
[Appellant’s] bottle and observed what appeared to be
packages of crack cocaine. The Deputy asked [Appellant]
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for identification and [Appellant] indicated that he did not
have identification with him.
Deputy Welch retained possession of the bottle. It
appeared to Deputy Welch that [Appellant] then headed to
Central Court where preliminary hearings are held in
criminal cases. At no time was [Appellant] detained by
Deputy Welch…. Instead, Deputy Welch notified his
supervisor, Corporal Bowers, of the situation.
A short time later, Corporal Bowers discussed the matter
with Jon Reddinger, an Erie County Detective with the
District Attorney’s Office. Detective Reddinger field-tested
one of the baggies in [Appellant’s] bottle and determined
that it was positive for cocaine.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed September 13, 2013, at 1-4) (footnote and some
internal citations to the record omitted).
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with PWID, simple possession,
and possession of drug paraphernalia. On August 21, 2013, Appellant filed
an omnibus pretrial motion, which included a motion to suppress the
contraband found in Appellant’s pill bottle. Following a hearing, the court
denied Appellant’s motion to suppress on September 13, 2013. The case
proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted Appellant of all counts on January
24, 2014. On April 2, 2014, the court sentenced Appellant to a term of
three (3) to twenty-three (23) months’ incarceration for the PWID
conviction. For the conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia, Appellant
was ordered to pay a $100.00 fine. The conviction for simple possession
merged with PWID for sentencing. On April 8, 2014, Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal. The court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of
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errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Appellant
timely complied.
Appellant raises a single issue for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT
[APPELLANT’S] MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE
FOUND IN THIS CASE IN THAT THE ERIE COUNTY
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT VIOLATED [APPELLANT’S] RIGHT
TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES?
(Appellant’s Brief at 2).
Appellant argues the purpose of the Erie County Courthouse policy
regarding searches is to prevent people from bringing firearms and other
dangerous weapons into the facility. Appellant asserts he had no notice he
would be searched for contraband, and the signs at the entrance to the
courthouse were changed after the incident to inform visitors they could be
searched for this purpose. Appellant concedes the government “has a great
interest in keeping the public and courthouse employees safe.” (Appellant’s
Brief at 6). Nevertheless, Appellant contends there was nothing unusual
about the Anacin bottle. Appellant avers Deputy Welch did not testify that
he believed the bottle was a weapon. Appellant concludes the deputy’s
removal of the Anacin bottle from the bin and subsequent examination of its
contents amounted to an unconstitutional search, and the court improperly
denied the motion to suppress. We disagree.
We review the denial of a suppression motion as follows:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
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court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
those facts are correct.
[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution
and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may
reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal
conclusions based upon the facts.
Commonwealth v. Williams, H., 941 A.2d 14, 26-27 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en
banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, “It is within
the suppression court’s sole province as fact finder to pass on the credibility
of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth
v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa.Super. 2006)).
“Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa.
238, 246, 924 A.2d 621, 626 (2007) (internal footnotes omitted). “Not
every search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, for the Fourth
Amendment bars only unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 565 Pa. 140, 149, 771 A.2d 1261, 1266 (2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994, 122 S.Ct. 462, 151 L.Ed.2d 380 (2001). “While
a search is generally not reasonable unless executed pursuant to a warrant,
the Supreme Court of the United States and [the Pennsylvania Supreme
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Court] have recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Id.
The reasonableness of a seizure that is less intrusive than
a traditional arrest depends upon a three-pronged
balancing test derived from Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), in which the
reviewing Court weighs “the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the
interference with individual liberty.” Id. at 50, 99 S.Ct. at
2640[, 61 L.Ed.2d at ___]. To be deemed reasonable
under this standard, such a seizure must ordinarily be
supported by reasonable suspicion, based upon objective
facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.
The existence of individual suspicion, however, is not an
“irreducible” component of reasonableness in every
circumstance. Rather, where regimes of suspicionless
searches or seizures are designed to serve governmental
“special needs” that exceed the normal demands of law
enforcement, they will be upheld in certain instances.
Commonwealth v. Beaman, 583 Pa. 636, 642-43, 880 A.2d 578, 582
(2005) (some internal citations omitted). See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305, 323, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1305, 137 L.Ed.2d 513, ___ (1997) (stating
“where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless
searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for example,
searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other official
buildings”); U.S. v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179-81 (3d Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 945, 127 S.Ct. 111, 166 L.Ed.2d 255 (2006) (holding
warrantless search of passenger at airport checkpoint was justified under
administrative search doctrine and passed Brown test, where search
procedures involved were minimally intrusive and “well-tailored to protect
personal privacy, escalating in invasiveness only after a lower level of
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screening disclosed a reason to conduct a more probing search”; purpose of
search—prevention of highjackings and terrorist attacks—advanced public
interest; “[s]ince every air passenger is subjected to a search, there is
virtually no stigma attached to being subjected to search at a known,
designated airport search point”; “the possibility for abuse is minimized by
the public nature of the search”; and passengers were on notice that they
would be searched); Minich v. County of Jefferson, 919 A.2d 356, 359-60
(Pa.Cmwlth. 2007), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 682, 932 A.2d 1290 (2007)
(holding county ordinance providing that sheriff subject every person
entering county courthouse to point-of-entry search did not violate federal
and state constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures, where “[p]eople who enter courthouses do not have a reasonable
expectation of absolute privacy because society has a duty to protect
members of the public who are required to appear in court for the
administration of justice”; use of metal detector was minimal intrusion; signs
at entrance to courthouse provided notice that weapons could not be carried
in building). See also Commonwealth v. Vecchione, 476 A.2d 403, 408-
10 (Pa.Super. 1984) (holding airport security screening procedures satisfied
Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness, where screening
searches, which included x-ray scans of luggage, were “carefully
circumscribed, in purpose and intrusiveness, in accordance with the need for
the search, i.e., to prevent and deter the carriage aboard airplanes of
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weapons and explosives”; procedures constituted “an administrative search
initiated with the consent of the passenger”; and “purpose of the search is
not to gather evidence for a criminal investigation, but it is conducted as
part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative
purpose”).
Instantly, the Erie County Courthouse had a single point of entry
where all visitors were screened as a security measure, pursuant to an
administrative order entered by the President Judge of the Erie County Court
of Common Pleas. The order authorized the Sheriff’s Department to conduct
reasonable searches, of persons and property entering the courthouse, to
enforce 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 913 which prohibits the possession of firearms or
other dangerous weapons in a court facility. The order defined “weapon” to
include “any knife, an explosive or incendiary device (whether real or hoax)
or any object that is designed[,] made or adapted for the purpose of
inflicting bodily injury and any ‘weapon’ defined as such by the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code.” (See Omnibus Pretrial Motion for Relief, filed 8/21/13, at
Exhibit A). The order also stated: “All packages, briefcases and other
containers in the immediate possession of persons entering the Courthouse
property shall be subject to inspection.” See id. As Appellant admits, the
government has a substantial interest in preventing people from bringing
weapons into court facilities. The court’s administrative order furthered this
interest by authorizing the search of all visitors for weapons of any kind.
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This authorization included inspection of any containers in the possession of
a person entering the courthouse. If security officials were unable to inspect
containers, which might conceal weapons or other items capable of causing
injury, then the purpose of the search policy would be defeated.2 When
Appellant entered the courthouse, he was required to place any loose items
of personal property in a plastic bin for inspection by a deputy sheriff.
Among the items Appellant placed in the bin was a plastic bottle labeled
Anacin. Deputy Welch shook the bottle and noticed it did not rattle as a
normal bottle of pills would rattle, leading him to believe there was
something else inside the bottle. Deputy Welch then opened the bottle and
observed what appeared to be packages of crack cocaine inside. The search
of Appellant and his property was consistent with the terms and purpose of
the administrative order.
Additionally, the intrusiveness of the search was minimal. Appellant
voluntarily brought an Anacin bottle into a public facility where all members
of the public were subject to a routine search. Appellant did not have a
reasonable expectation of absolute privacy in the courthouse. See Minich,
supra. Initially, the deputy sheriff merely shook the bottle. He opened the
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2
At the suppression hearing, Erie County Sheriff Bob Merski testified that
courthouse security involves intercepting not only traditional weapons such
as guns and knives, but also explosives and chemical substances that may
cause physical harm and can be concealed in a container as small as a pill
bottle. Sheriff Merski testified regarding three incidents in which the
courthouse was shut down because of chemical weapons threats.
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bottle and examined its contents only after he shook the bottle, which
strongly suggested the bottle contained something other than Anacin pills.
The bottle could have contained a small weapon or substance used to inflict
harm on others. The search was no more intrusive than necessary to ensure
public safety in the courthouse. See Hartwell, supra. The search also was
not performed as part of a criminal investigation. After finding the
contraband, Deputy Welch kept the bottle but did not detain Appellant.
Appellant was free to proceed past the security area into the building.
Moreover, Appellant was on notice he would be searched. A sign
posted at the courthouse entrance informed visitors they must pass through
a metal detector, they may be searched, and, “Any item that has the
potential to cause harm will be confiscated.” (See Omnibus Pretrial Motion
for Relief at Exhibit E). Despite this warning, Appellant decided to enter the
courthouse and placed the Anacin bottle in the bin for inspection.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the inspection of Appellant’s
bottle constituted a reasonable search conducted in furtherance of the
legitimate administrative purpose of ensuring public safety in a courthouse.
See Vecchione, supra. See also Chandler, supra; Hartwell, supra;
Minich, supra. Thus, the court properly denied Appellant’s motion to
suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Lazarus joins this opinion.
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President Judge Emeritus Bender concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/27/2014
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Commonwealth v. Gillespie
Combined Opinion