NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 27, 2014*
Decided October 28, 2014
Before
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 14-‐‑1474 Appeal from the United
States District Court for the
JOSEPH J. KELLY, Northern District of Illinois,
Plaintiff-‐‑Appellant,
Western Division.
v.
No. 11 C 50024
DENNIS HOCKING, Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.
Defendant-‐‑Appellee.
Order
Joseph Kelly was on supervised release when Dennis Hocking, a police officer from
Peru, Illinois, accompanied police from Ottawa, Illinois, in a search of Kelly’s home
there. The search uncovered a cache of property stolen from local storage units, and
Kelly was convicted in state court on multiple counts of burglary. He contends in this
suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 that Hocking violated the Fourth Amendment. This action is
* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).
No. 14-‐‑1474 Page 2
proper, notwithstanding Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because contentions that
police violated the Fourth Amendment during an investigation do not necessarily draw
a conviction’s validity into question. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007).
Kelly maintains that Hocking violated the Fourth Amendment by participating in
the execution of a warrant that was not supported by probable cause and by seizing
items that, Kelly insists, were not described by the warrant. The district court’s opinion
demonstrates that neither of these contentions is correct.
More than that: neither the warrant nor probable cause was necessary for this
search. Kelly agreed to terms of supervised release under which he consented in ad-‐‑
vance to a search of his home. Such consents are valid, see Samson v. California, 547 U.S.
843 (2006), so the police did not need a warrant or probable cause. See also, e.g., United
States v. Huart, 735 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2013); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill. 2d 35, 43–52
(2008) (demonstrating that the Illinois system of “mandatory supervised release” is
functionally the same as California’s system of parole discussed in Samson).
Kelly’s remaining arguments have been considered but do not require discussion.
AFFIRMED