UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4170
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAWN PATRICK GREENE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:09-cr-00089-F-1)
Submitted: October 20, 2014 Decided: October 28, 2014
Before GREGORY and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shawn Patrick Greene appeals the twenty-four-month
sentence imposed following the revocation of his term of
supervised release. Before this court, Greene asserts several
bases for his contention that this sentence is plainly
substantively unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we
reject his arguments and affirm the revocation judgment.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation
sentence that is both within the applicable statutory maximum
and not “plainly unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal.
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-38 (4th Cir. 2006).
In determining whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we first assess the sentence for reasonableness,
utilizing “the procedural and substantive considerations”
employed in evaluating an original criminal sentence. Id. at
438.
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if
the district court has considered both the policy statements
contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors identified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) (2012). Id. at 439. The district court must also
explain the chosen sentence, although this explanation “need not
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be as detailed or specific” as is required for an original
sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th
Cir. 2010). A sentence is substantively reasonable if the
district court states a proper basis for concluding that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 440.
If, after considering the above, we decide that the
sentence is reasonable, we will affirm. Id. at 439. Only if we
find the sentence to be procedurally or substantively
unreasonable will we evaluate whether it is “plainly” so. Id.
Against these principles, we readily conclude that
Greene’s sentence is reasonable. The sentence is within the
two-year statutory maximum authorized for the underlying Class C
felony offense that resulted in the supervised release order.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 472, 3559(a)(3), 3583(e)(3) (2012). Our review
of the record confirms that the district court considered the
advisory policy statement range of five to eleven months’
imprisonment, the calculation of which was not disputed in the
district court and is not challenged on appeal, and heard the
parties’ arguments regarding the appropriate sentence to be
imposed.
Furthermore, the district court drew upon the
§ 3553(a) factors enumerated in § 3583(e) in sentencing Greene.
The record makes patently clear that, despite the district
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court’s prior lenient treatment, Greene simply could not (or
would not) abide by the terms of his supervised release in that
he frequently smoked marijuana. There is no doubt that Greene’s
repeated and unabated drug use was at the cornerstone of the
district court’s decision to impose the statutory maximum
sentence in this case. We do not find persuasive Greene’s
contention that the sentence is excessive because he is unable
to manage his marijuana addiction and his conduct did not
endanger the public. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440 (holding that
imposition of statutory maximum term of imprisonment was
substantively reasonable, given that the district court
expressly relied on defendant’s “admitted pattern of violating
numerous conditions of his supervised release[,]” despite
several extensions of leniency by the district court).
Greene’s next contention — that a two-year sentence is
greater than necessary to allow Greene to accept that he has a
serious drug problem — is likewise unavailing. To the contrary,
the probation office did everything in its power to help Greene
conquer his addiction without seeking an additional term of
incarceration, but it was incumbent upon Greene to avail himself
of the treatment options secured for and provided to him. This
he simply would not do, thus confirming the necessity of a
lengthy term of incarceration.
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Finally, Greene maintains that the two-year sentence
is contrary to one of the purposes of imposing a revocation
sentence: to provide the defendant with education or vocational
training. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). Greene points out
that serving a two-year prison term will waylay his efforts to
graduate from a technical college. But the revocation sentence
is designed to punish the defendant’s failure to abide by the
terms of his supervised release, Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438
(“‘[T]he sentence imposed upon revocation [is] intended to
sanction the violator for failing to abide by the conditions of
the court-ordered supervision.’” (second alteration in original)
(quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A,
introductory cmt. 3(b))), and the district court’s comments make
plain that it chose the twenty-four-month sentence to sanction
Greene’s substantial breach of the trust and leniency that the
court previously afforded him.
Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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