October 28 2014
DA 13-0102
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2014 MT 288
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
CASEY CLINTON RIDGE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC-12-95
Honorable Karen Townsend, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Joseph P. Howard, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 17, 2014
Decided: October 28, 2014
Filed:
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Casey Ridge appeals from the District Court’s order denying his motion to dismiss
the charges against him. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 In July 2008 the State charged Ridge with issuing a bad check, a felony. The
District Court set a jury trial for May 4, 2009, but Ridge failed to appear. The State
charged Ridge with bail jumping for failing to appear at the scheduled trial. In January
2010 Ridge entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to the bad check and bail jumping
offenses. The plea agreement provided for two suspended sentences and restitution on
the bad check offense. The District Court set sentencing for March 24, 2010. Ridge
subsequently failed to keep appointments with the probation officer and failed to appear
for sentencing.
¶3 Ridge was arrested in the state of Washington and returned to Montana. He
appeared in District Court in January 2011. The State was prepared to honor the prior
plea agreement, but announced that it was considering new charges of bail jumping for
Ridge’s failure to appear at the March 24, 2010 sentencing. The District Court released
Ridge on bail and set a new sentencing date of March 2, 2011.
¶4 Ridge again failed to appear for scheduled appointments with the probation officer
and failed to appear for the March 2, 2011 sentencing. Ridge was subsequently arrested.
Thereafter the District Court conducted a series of proceedings involving several
different lawyers for each side. The judge (at that time Judge McLean) was advised of
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the status of new plea negotiations on October 5, 2011, and again on November 9, 2011.
Finally on December 22, 2011, the District Court allowed the State to void the prior plea
agreement because of Ridge’s failure to appear for sentencing. Ridge apparently
withdrew the guilty pleas and the District Court set separate jury trials on the 2009 bad
check and the bail jumping charges.
¶5 On February 15, 2012, Ridge appeared in District Court and entered an open
guilty plea, without the benefit of a new plea agreement, to the bad check and bail
jumping charges. The District Court declined to adopt the State’s recommendation for
consecutive sentences of ten years with five suspended on each charge along with
restitution of the full amount of the bad checks. Instead, the District Court followed the
recommendation in the prior presentence investigation, sentencing Ridge to consecutive
two-year suspended terms on both charges, and ordering restitution in a compromised
amount in the bad check matter.
¶6 The State thereafter charged Ridge with two new offenses of bail jumping for
failing to appear at the two sentencing proceedings in 2010 and 2011. The State also
filed notice of its intent to seek increased punishment as a persistent felony offender.
Ridge moved to dismiss the new charges on the ground that they, along with the notice of
intent to seek increased punishment and the endorsement of the sentencing judge as a
witness,1 constituted vindictive prosecution. The State responded that in light of Ridge’s
conduct since the original bad check and bail jumping charges, the sentences he received
1
Adding the sentencing judge as a witness precluded that judge from presiding over the cases
involving the newly-filed charges.
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were too lenient and did not hold Ridge accountable for his actions in repeatedly failing
to appear for sentencing. Therefore, the State contended, additional charges for the
subsequent conduct were warranted.
¶7 The District Court denied Ridge’s motion to dismiss, finding that the facts did not
fit within those of other cases in which charges were dismissed for vindictive
prosecution. The District Court found that charging the subsequent bail jumping
offenses, which had been discussed in prior plea negotiations, did not warrant application
of a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Rather, the new charges fell within the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.2
¶8 On December 12, 2012, Ridge pled guilty to the new bail jumping charges without
entering a plea agreement with the State, but reserved his right to appeal the vindictive
prosecution issue. The District Court sentenced Ridge to five years with the Department
of Corrections on the first bail jumping charge (with credit for time served) and to a
consecutive ten years with the Department of Corrections with five years suspended on
the second bail jumping charge. The District Court declined to sentence Ridge as a
persistent felony offender.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 This Court reviews de novo a district court’s decision on a motion to dismiss in a
criminal case. State v. Knowles, 2010 MT 186, ¶ 23, 357 Mont. 272, 239 P.3d 129.
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Judge Larson initially denied Ridge’s motion to dismiss. After Ridge’s attorney made
allegations of misconduct against Larson, he recused himself from the case and Judge Townsend
accepted jurisdiction. At Ridge’s request, she reconsidered the vindictive prosecution issue. She
reviewed the record and entered a second order filed on August 22, 2012, denying Ridge’s
motion.
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DISCUSSION
¶10 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court properly denied Ridge’s motion
to dismiss the charges against him because of vindictive prosecution.
¶11 Prosecutors have wide discretion to determine when a person should be charged
with a crime. State v. Mahoney, 264 Mont. 89, 96, 870 P.2d 65, 70 (1994); Knowles,
¶ 36. The decision of whether or not to prosecute and what charge to file is “particularly
ill-suited for judicial review.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S. Ct.
1524, 1530 (1985). “Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general
deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to
the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607, 105 S. Ct. at
1531. The prosecutor is entrusted to “determine the extent of the societal interest in
prosecution” and an “initial decision should not freeze future conduct.” United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2493 (1982).
¶12 The imposition of punishment upon the person charged is the “very purpose” of
most criminal proceedings and the presence of a “punitive motivation” on the part of the
prosecutor is a justified and legitimate response to criminal conduct. Goodwin, 457 U.S.
at 372-73, 102 S. Ct. at 2488. Despite the deference to prosecutorial discretion, courts
have found improper prosecutorial vindictiveness in some cases. Actionable prosecutorial
vindictiveness can arise when the state subjects a defendant to more serious charges
arising from the same facts, in retaliation for the defendant’s exercise of statutory or
constitutional rights. Knowles, ¶ 31.
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¶13 “A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial
de novo, without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious
charge for the original one.” Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 2103
(1974) (prosecutor filed more serious charges arising from the same conduct when the
defendant filed an appeal of his conviction); Knowles, ¶ 35 (when a mistrial occurred the
prosecution filed more serious charges arising from the same conduct when the defendant
refused to plead guilty). If the court finds that the increased charges are the result of
prosecutorial vindictiveness it can dismiss the charges based upon a violation of due
process. Knowles, ¶ 37.
¶14 In some cases courts have recognized that actual proof of prosecutorial vindictive
intent is difficult to produce, and that if the facts indicate a likelihood of vindictiveness,
then it can be presumed. Knowles, ¶ 31. A presumption of vindictiveness is not
appropriate in all cases, Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381, 102 S. Ct. at 2492-93, and is not
appropriate when the prosecutor has no personal stake in the defendant’s decision.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 383, 102 S. Ct. at 2494 (prosecutor has no stake in defendant’s
election for a bench trial and therefore no reason to act vindictively in response).
¶15 Ridge complains that the State’s decision to charge him with additional offenses of
bail jumping after he was sentenced for the original bad check and bail jumping charges
was improperly vindictive. He contends that the prosecutor retaliated against his decision
to plead guilty to the original charges by filing the additional charges. We conclude that
Ridge failed to support his allegation of prosecutorial vindictiveness after plea
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negotiations broke down and the District Court properly rejected Ridge’s motion to
dismiss the charges.
¶16 “Confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment following the
rejection of a plea bargain cannot form the basis for a claim of prosecutorial
vindictiveness.” State v. Smith, 280 Mont. 158, 165, 931 P.2d 1272, 1276 (1996);
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978). Allowing such a claim
would contradict the premises that underlie the accepted practice of plea bargaining.
Smith, 280 Mont. at 165, 931 P.2d at 1276. Here, Ridge and the State engaged in plea
negotiations that apparently involved the potential of the State not filing the additional
bail jumping charges if Ridge agreed to an increased sentence on the original bail
jumping charge. These plea negotiations were not successful and Ridge entered new
guilty pleas without successfully bargaining for a plea on the subsequent bail jumping
offenses. While Ridge had the right to plead guilty he did not have the ability to compel
the State to give him the benefit of a plea negotiation on the new charges that was never
accepted by the State. When Ridge pled guilty to the original charges, he bore the risk
that new bail jumping charges could be filed.
¶17 In most cases in which a court has found prosecutorial vindictiveness that violates
due process, the prosecutor increases the severity of the charges arising from the same
underlying conduct after the defendant exercised a right provided by law. Blackledge,
417 U.S. at 28, 94 S. Ct. at 2102; Knowles, ¶ 30. Here the additional charges brought
against Ridge did not arise from the same conduct as the original charges (bad check and
the 2009 bail jumping). Rather, the additional bail jumping charges arose from Ridge’s
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subsequent and separate conduct when he failed to appear for scheduled court
proceedings in 2010 and 2011. Ridge does not contend that the additional charges were
not justified by his conduct, and in fact he pled guilty to those charges. The charges were
objectively justified by Ridge’s conduct and his decisions to fail to appear for scheduled
court proceedings.
¶18 Ridge entered an open plea agreement without the benefit of a plea bargain. It is
clear that he was aware that new charges could be filed, as the State had announced
during prior hearings. The later bail jumping charges were prompted not by Ridge’s
decision to plead guilty, but by the sentence imposed by the District Court, which the
prosecutor believed failed to reflect the seriousness of Ridge’s subsequent conduct. The
State argues that the “societal interest in prosecution” in Ridge’s case justified additional
charges. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382, 102 S. Ct. at 2493. We have previously held that a
prosecutor does not act with unfair vindictiveness by seeking a heavier sentence in
response to repeated conduct that was met with lenient sentences. State v. Roundstone,
2011 MT 227, ¶ 41, 362 Mont. 74, 261 P.3d 1009.
¶19 Ridge had no entitlement to escape responsibility for his continued failure to
comply with the law, and the prosecutor had a right and responsibility to exercise
professional judgment as to what charges were warranted. There is no support for a
finding of vindictive prosecution.
¶20 The District Court is affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
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/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ JIM RICE
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