[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2014-Ohio-4784.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 27256
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
LARRY W. JOHNSON COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 12 05 1240
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: October 29, 2014
HENSAL, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Larry Johnson appeals a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas
that ordered his sentences for rape and gross sexual imposition to run consecutive to each other
and to the sentence he received in a different case. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} In 2012, the Grand Jury indicted Mr. Johnson for rape, sexual battery, and gross
sexual imposition. After Mr. Johnson pleaded guilty to rape and gross sexual imposition, the
trial court sentenced him to 11 years imprisonment for the rape offense and 5 years for gross
sexual imposition. On appeal, this Court determined that the maximum term for his rape offense
was 10 years, so it reversed his sentence and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial
court ordered him to serve 10 years for rape and 5 years for gross sexual imposition. It ordered
the sentences to run consecutive to each other and to the sentence he had received in a different
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case. Mr. Johnson has appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court incorrectly imposed
consecutive sentences.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IN
VIOLATION OF R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
{¶3} Mr. Johnson argues that the trial court did not make the findings that are required
to run the sentences he received in this case consecutive to each other. This Court reviews
sentences pursuant to the two-step approach set forth in State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-
Ohio-4912.
First, [we] must examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all applicable
rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is
clearly and convincingly contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the trial
court’s decision in imposing the term of imprisonment is reviewed under the
abuse-of-discretion standard.
Id. at ¶ 26.
{¶4} Revised Code Section 2929.14(C)(4) provides that, “[i]f multiple prison terms are
imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses,” a trial court may require the
offender to serve the terms consecutively “if the court finds that the consecutive service is
necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger
the offender poses to the public.” The court must also find “any” of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant
to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-
release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more
courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses
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so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects
the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive
sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a-c). In this case, the trial court found that consecutive sentences were
necessary to protect the public or punish Mr. Johnson and that they were not disproportionate to
the seriousness of Mr. Johnson’s conduct or the danger that he poses to the public. It also found
that Mr. Johnson committed the offenses while under supervision, in accordance with Section
2929.14(C)(4)(a).
{¶5} Mr. Johnson argues that, although the fact that a criminal defendant committed a
new offense while under supervision for another might justify running the new offense
consecutive to the old one, it does not justify running two offenses that are within a single case
consecutive to each other. He asserts that, in order to make the prison term for two offenses in a
single case run consecutive, a court must find that either Section 2929.14(C)(4)(b) or (c) applies.
{¶6} No authority is offered in support of this argument and it overlooks the plain
language of Section 2929.14(C)(4). According to the statute, a trial court may order “multiple
prison terms * * * for convictions of multiple offenses” to run consecutive if it finds the two
conditions in the lead paragraph and “any” of the circumstances listed in subsections (a), (b), or
(c). R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). There is no indication in the statute that a finding under Section
2929.14(C)(4)(a) cannot support the imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses
within a single case.
{¶7} Mr. Johnson also argues that the trial court did not adequately explain why
consecutive sentences are necessary. He notes that, when he was originally sentenced on his
prior offense, he was only given two years of community control. He argues that the mere fact
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that he violated community control did not justify the trial court ordering his sentences in this
case to be served consecutive to each other and consecutive to the term he received in the other
case.
{¶8} The Ohio Supreme Court has recently explained that, “[i]n order to impose
consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is required to make the findings mandated by
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing
entry, but it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio
St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, syllabus. We, therefore, reject Mr. Johnson’s argument that the trial
court had to specify why it imposed consecutive sentences in addition to making the findings
required under Section 2929.14(C)(4).
{¶9} Mr. Johnson further argues that the trial court erred when it imposed his sentence
because even the prosecutor suggested that he receive only 10 years. This assertion, however, is
not supported by the record. According to the transcript of the sentencing hearing, the
prosecutor acknowledged that, in light of this Court’s decision, the maximum term that the trial
court could impose for rape is 10 years. He, therefore, recommended “10 years on the rape and
keep everything else the same.” When the court sentenced Mr. Johnson the first time, it ordered
his sentences to be served consecutive to each other and to his sentence in the other case.
Accordingly, when the prosecutor asked the court to “keep everything else the same,” he was
advocating for consecutive sentences.
{¶10} Upon review of the record, we conclude that Mr. Johnson has not established that
the trial court failed to comply with the applicable sentencing rules and statutes or that it abused
its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences. See Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-
Ohio-4912, at ¶ 26. His assignment of error is overruled.
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III.
{¶11} The trial court did not violate Section 2929.14(C)(4) when it imposed consecutive
sentences on Mr. Johnson. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J.
MOORE, J.
CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:
DONALD GALLICK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.