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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
PEDRO JONES
Appellant No. 741 MDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA ORDER February 12, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0003127-2008
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 29, 2014
Appellant, Pedro Jones, appeals pro se from the February 12, 2014
order dismissing his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On September 23, 2009, a jury convicted Jones of robbery. The trial
court later sentenced him to a period of 5½ to 11 years’ imprisonment.
Jones filed a direct appeal and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence
on December 7, 2010. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 23 A.3d 571 (Pa.
Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum). Jones did not file a petition for
allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.
On June 20, 2011, Jones filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA
court appointed counsel and subsequently entered an order denying the
petition. Jones appealed the denial and this Court affirmed by way of a
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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memorandum filed on May 24, 2013. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 81
A.3d 1005 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme
Court then denied Jones’s petition for allowance of appeal.
On December 18, 2013, Jones filed the instant pro se PCRA petition,
his second. The PCRA court, by way of a memorandum opinion and order
issued its notice of its intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 based
upon its finding that “[Jones’s] claims fail to set forth any facts which would
form the basis for an exception to the one year filing requirement pursuant
to Section 9545(b)” and that it “lack[ed] jurisdiction to consider the
petition.” Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1/8/14, at 1-3. On January 17,
2014, Jones filed a response. The PCRA court then dismissed the petition on
February 12, 2014. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Jones maintains that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his conviction and that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to move for a judgment of acquittal on that basis. As will be briefly
explained below, Jones’s petition is patently untimely and does not plead an
exception to the time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the
judgment of sentence becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “The
PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a
court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Flanagan,
854 A.2d 489, 509 (Pa. 2004).
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Jones’s judgment of sentence became final on January 6, 2011, thirty
days after this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence and the time in
which to seek an allowance of appeal in our Supreme Court expired. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Jones had one year from that date to file a petition
for collateral relief, specifically, until January 6, 2012. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§9545(b)(1).
Jones filed the instant petition on December 18, 2013, well beyond the
January 6, 2012 date. Therefore, as Jones’s second PCRA petition was not
timely filed, “the courts have no jurisdiction to grant [him] relief unless he
can plead and prove that one of the exceptions to the time bar provided in
42 [PA.CONS.STAT.ANN.] § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies.” Commonwealth v.
Pursell, 561 Pa. 214, 220, 749 A.2d 911, 914-915 (2000). See also
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 824 A.2d 331, 335 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en
banc).
Our review of Jones’s pro se PCRA petition reveals that he has failed to
plead any of the exceptions enumerated to the PCRA’s time bar, thereby
divesting this Court of jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886
A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (“It is well settled that allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness
requirements of the PCRA.”).
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/29/2014
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