NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOV 05 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-10143
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 5:05 cr-0812 RMW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SUIBIN ZHANG,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Ronald M. Whyte, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 14, 2014
San Francisco, California
Before: TASHIMA, McKEOWN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Suibin Zhang appeals from the district court’s judgment after a bench trial
finding him guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 1832 of various forms of theft of Marvell
Semiconductor’s trade secrets. Zhang raises three contentions on appeal: (1) He
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict; (2) he challenges
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
an evidentiary ruling of the district court; and (3) he contends that his Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial was violated.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, United States v. Chung,
659 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2011); evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and
factual determinations underlying those rulings for clear error, United States v.
Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012); and Sixth Amendment public trial
claims de novo, United States v. Waters, 627 F.3d 345, 359 (9th Cir. 2010). We
affirm.
1. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we “consider the
evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” United
States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Then, we
determine whether the “evidence, so viewed, is adequate to allow any rational trier
of fact [to find] the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
(emphasis and alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying
that standard, we hold that sufficient evidence supports the verdict.
First, sufficient evidence shows that Marvell took “reasonable measures” to
protect its trade secrets. Marvell “advis[ed] [users] of the existence of a trade
secret, limit[ed] access to [the] trade secret on [a] ‘need to know basis,’ and
controll[ed] . . . access” to the extranet by requiring usernames and passwords,
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additional passwords and licenses for certain documents, and the user’s agreement
to a Terms of Use. Chung, 659 F.3d at 825; see also MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 521 (9th Cir. 1993). A rational trier of fact could
find that these measures were “reasonable,” despite Marvell’s delegation of some
protective obligations to its partners.
Second, sufficient evidence shows that Zhang “knowingly” misappropriated
trade secrets. Although Zhang did not personally sign the Marvell non-disclosure
agreement (“NDA”), his August 6, 2003, e-mail and his acceptance of a limited
license agreement incorporating the NDA indicate familiarity with the document.
Substantial circumstantial evidence indicates that Zhang signed an NDA with
Netgear.1 The extranet website and Terms of Use repeatedly referred to the
protection of “Confidential Information,” including a directive that, “[u]pon
termination, You must immediately destroy any downloaded [materials] and return
any printed Materials.” And, lastly, Zhang’s evasiveness when questioned by the
FBI indicates his awareness of the information’s confidentiality. This evidence
1
Below, we reject Zhang’s challenge to the admission of a spreadsheet
supporting this conclusion. In any case, we “assume that the evidence at trial was
properly admitted” when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. United States
v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 131 (2010) (per curiam).
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adequately supports the inference that Zhang acted knowingly. See McDaniel, 558
U.S. at 133; Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1169.
Third, sufficient evidence shows that Zhang stole or misappropriated
Marvell information. A rational trier of fact could discredit Zhang’s speculative
argument that the downloads were relevant to a new chassis project, because no
evidence indicates that Zhang in fact worked on the chassis project, other than the
project’s general listing on a “plan of record.” In any case, the volume and timing
of Zhang’s downloads are highly suspicious, given that Zhang’s work never before
required him to download nearly so many files (or, for that matter, anyone’s work
at Netgear). Further, Zhang not only downloaded the files, he transferred them to
his Broadcom laptop at his new employment. Lastly, as noted, Zhang acted
evasively when questioned by the FBI. The evidence again suffices. See
McDaniel, 558 U.S. at 133; Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1169.
Fourth, sufficient evidence shows that Zhang intended to convert the
Marvell information for his or Broadcom’s economic benefit. Zhang rightly notes
that he never sold the documents or sent around economically valuable secrets.
But sufficient evidence indicates that he intended to reap an economic reward, even
if not yet realized. Zhang’s “engineering curiosity” never moved him to download
a cache of Marvell files before leaving Netgear for Broadcom, one of Marvell’s
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competitors. See Chung, 659 F.3d at 828 (declining to credit a defendant’s
exculpatory explanation of conduct based on his own exculpatory testimony).
Zhang not only downloaded the files but transferred them to his Broadcom laptop.
And Zhang stated to the FBI that the information would benefit him at Broadcom.
A rational jury could conclude from this evidence that Zhang intended to benefit
himself or Broadcom economically. See Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1167.
Lastly, sufficient evidence shows that Zhang intended to or knew that his
offense would injure Marvell. Zhang misappropriated Marvell secrets, loaded
them onto his Broadcom laptop, and intended for the secrets to provide an
economic benefit to someone other than Marvell. Additionally, Marvell took a
range of measures to protect the secrets, indicating to Zhang that disclosure of the
information would cause Marvell injury. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 does not require proof
of actual injury; it requires knowledge that a theft “will” injure. 18 U.S.C. §
1832(a). A rational trier of fact could find that Zhang knew his offense would
injure Marvell when he took those secrets with him to his new employer
Broadcom, one of Marvell’s competitors.
2. The district court admitted the spreadsheet, which contemporaneously
recorded Wylea Kirkpatrick’s review of the employee files, as a business record.
See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Assuming without deciding that admission of that
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document was in error, the error was harmless because substantial evidence
supports the inference that Zhang knew that he was not permitted to obtain and use
Marvell documents for his own purposes. See GCB Commc’ns, Inc. v. U.S. S.
Commc’ns, Inc., 650 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2011).
3. The district court adequately supported its decision to close the
courtroom for one witness’ testimony. See United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223,
1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir.
2010). The court reasonably determined that closure was necessary to protect
Marvell’s trade secrets while the witness testified about the contents of the very
documents that the government alleged to contain trade secrets. Zhang had
multiple opportunities to object to the closure and, in fact, voiced those objections.
The court also heard the government’s and Marvell’s concerns that it would be
impractical to parse the witness’ testimony “question by question.” And the court
had previously adopted alternative measures to protect the trade secrets, including
turning the courtroom televisions away from the courtroom audience. These
findings and considerations were adequate to support closure. We therefore
conclude that Zhang’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was not violated.
• ! •
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED.
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