NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 14-1945
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MATTHEW MITCHELLWILSON,
Appellant
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 4-13-cr-00175-001)
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 28, 2014
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Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 6, 2014)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Appellant Matthew Wilson appeals the sentence imposed by the District Court
following a guilty plea for making a false bomb threat in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e).
Wilson argues that the District Court did not give appropriate weight to his mental health
history and that the resulting sentence was substantively unreasonable. For the reasons
that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
Since we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the
essential facts.
On September 12, 2013, Wilson pled guilty to an information in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania charging him with making a false bomb threat to a federal prison
facility, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e). Following the guilty plea, Wilson was
released on a personal recognizance bond with pretrial services supervision. Supervision
occurred in North Carolina. On November 26, 2013, Wilson self-surrendered after a
warrant was issued for alleged bail violations. Wilson did not receive a bail revocation
hearing and was detained until he appeared before the District Judge for sentencing for
his § 844(e) violation.
At sentencing, the United States recommended a split-sentence consisting of a
period of imprisonment with credit for time served (approximately four months and ten
days), followed by commitment to a community confinement facility or halfway house
and a period of supervised release. In response to the government’s recommendation,
Wilson’s counsel argued that a sentence of time served with supervised release and
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mental health conditions would be appropriate.
The District Court adopted the factual findings and Guidelines calculation of the
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) in its entirety. Based on a Criminal History
Category I and a total offense level 12, Wilson faced an advisory guidelines range of 10-
16 months’ imprisonment. The District Court imposed a sentence of 16 months’
imprisonment. Wilson filed a timely appeal of his sentence.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion
standard. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
III. ANALYSIS
The only issue on appeal is whether the District Court’s sentence was
substantively unreasonable. We conclude that the sentence was not substantively
unreasonable.
An inquiry into the substantive reasonableness of a sentence asks “‘whether the
final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised
upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)]
factors.’” United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 770 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States
v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)). “Absent procedural error, we will
affirm the sentencing court ‘unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed
the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court
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provided.’” Id. (quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568). The party challenging the sentence
bears the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.
Applying this standard, we discern no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed.
The sentencing colloquy evidences that the District Court was thorough in its
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. The District Court considered the “nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” noting
specifically that Wilson has “an extensive history of mental illness and has exhibited a
repeated pattern of disturbing behavior and criminal acts.” App. 92.2
Furthermore, we find no merit to Wilson’s argument that the District Court failed
to give sufficient weight to Wilson’s mental health history as a mitigating factor under §
3553(a), and instead treated it as an aggravating factor. To the contrary, the District
Court acknowledged Wilson’s “extensive” history of mental illness. Id. There is no
basis in the record to infer that the District Court treated Wilson’s mental health as an
aggravating factor and calculated the length of Wilson’s sentence to ensure that he
receive certain rehabilitative services.3
The District Court’s sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment for making a false
bomb threat to a federal prison was substantively reasonable. The District Court fully
2
The PSR detailed an extensive pattern of Wilson’s past troubling and unlawful
behavior. See, e.g., PSR ¶¶ 24-29, 37, 42b, 44-45. For instance, prior to the bomb threat
in this case, Wilson set fires, made bomb threats at his schools, and left threatening notes
for family members. Id. ¶¶ 37, 44-45.
3
Compare Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2392 (2011) (finding that sentencing
court impermissibly imposed a sentence for rehabilitative reasons when it determined that
the defendant needed to be imprisoned “long enough to get the 500 Hour Drug
Program.”).
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justified its sentence and gave appropriate consideration to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors. The District Court’s sentence was within the Guidelines range and satisfies all of
the elements of a substantively reasonable sentence. Wilson has not met his burden of
showing that a reasonable sentencing court would not have imposed the same sentence.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction of the
District Court.
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