UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4347
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LARRY LAWSON TAYLOR, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00087-JRS-1)
Submitted: October 30, 2014 Decided: November 6, 2014
Before AGEE and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jeffrey Lee Everhart, RICE AND EVERHART, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, Erik Sean Siebert, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Larry Lawson Taylor, Jr., pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to possession with intent to distribute
cocaine base. On appeal, Taylor’s counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether the district court appropriately considered the
statutory sentencing factors. The Government moves to dismiss
the appeal based upon Taylor’s appellate waiver provision in his
plea agreement. Taylor has filed a pro se supplemental brief,
alleging that he was improperly sentenced because the court did
not subpoena his psychiatrist or consider his mitigation
evidence and because his counsel did not properly prepare and
present his mitigation evidence. After careful consideration of
the entire record, we affirm.
We review de novo a defendant’s waiver of appellate
rights. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.
2005). “A defendant may waive his right to appeal if that
waiver is the result of a knowing and intelligent decision to
forgo the right to appeal.” United States v. Amaya-Portillo,
423 F.3d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To determine whether the waiver is knowing and
intelligent, we look “to the totality of the circumstances,
including the experience and conduct of the accused, as well as
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the accused’s educational background and familiarity with the
terms of the plea agreement.” United States v. General, 278
F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, we find that the totality of the circumstances
leads to the conclusion that the waiver is valid and
enforceable. At the time Taylor entered his guilty plea, he was
thirty-four years old, had an eleventh grade education, was
adjudged competent to plead guilty, and had experience with the
court system. The plea agreement — which Taylor acknowledged he
read, discussed with counsel, and understood — clearly and
unambiguously set out the appellate waiver provision, and the
district court specifically questioned Taylor’s understanding of
the waiver provision during the plea colloquy. See United
States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221-22 (4th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that, absent compelling evidence to the contrary,
“the truth of sworn statements made during a Rule 11 colloquy is
conclusively established”). Further, at no point has Taylor
asserted that he did not understand the plea agreement in
general or the waiver provision in particular. Thus, we find
that Taylor’s waiver of appellate rights was knowing and
voluntary, and the waiver provision is therefore valid and
enforceable.
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We will enforce a valid waiver so long as “the issue
being appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” Blick, 408
F.3d at 168. It is apparent that the sentencing issues raised
by counsel in the Anders brief and by Taylor in his supplemental
brief fall within the scope of the appellate waiver provision,
which “waive[d] the right to appeal the conviction and any
sentence within the statutory maximum . . . (or the manner in
which that sentence was determined) . . . on any ground
whatsoever.” Both Taylor and his counsel argue that his
sentence was the result of errors by the district court and,
according to Taylor, by his attorney. As Taylor’s waiver
contained no exemptions and barred challenges to both Taylor’s
conviction and sentence, we grant the Government’s motion to
dismiss.
In so doing, we recognize that there are certain
fundamental issues that cannot be waived. However, our review
of the record in accordance with Anders has not disclosed any
unwaived and potentially meritorious issues for review.
Accordingly, we dismiss Taylor’s appeal. This court requires
that counsel inform Taylor, in writing, of his right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Taylor requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
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Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Taylor. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED
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