UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4342
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CURTIS WATKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver,
Jr., District Judge. (2:13-cr-00120-1)
Submitted: October 28, 2014 Decided: November 6, 2014
Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian J. Kornbrath, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D.
Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R.
Booth Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, C. Haley Bunn,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Curtis Watkins entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012), and was sentenced to
eighty-four months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised
released. Watkins’ plea preserved his right to appeal the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress. On
appeal, Watkins argues that the district court erred in
concluding that the officers’ stop-and-frisk satisfied the
reasonable suspicion standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).
When considering a district court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress, this court reviews the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.
United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013).
Where, as here, the district court denies a suppression motion,
we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir.
2013).
“[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer
has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
“Moreover, if the officer has a reasonable fear for his own and
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others’ safety based on an articulable suspicion that the
suspect may be armed and presently dangerous, the officer may
conduct a protective search of, i.e., frisk, the outer layers of
the suspect’s clothing for weapons.” United States v. Holmes,
376 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The officer must have “at least a minimal level of
objective justification for making the stop” and “must be able
to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at
123-24 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts
assess the legality of a Terry stop under the totality of the
circumstances, giving “due weight to common sense judgments
reached by officers in light of their experience and training.”
United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004).
Applying these principles, we conclude that, under the totality
of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to
stop Watkins and frisk him for weapons.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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