UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4941
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEPHEN SYLVESTER WALKER, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge.
(1:11-cr-00290-JKB-1)
Submitted: October 30, 2014 Decided: November 7, 2014
Before KEENAN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven H. Levin, Sarah F. Lacey, LEVIN & CURLETT LLC, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Michael C. Hanlon, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stephen Sylvester Walker, Jr., was convicted by a jury
of possessing a firearm and ammunition after having been
convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012), and sentenced
to 293 months’ imprisonment. He appeals, challenging the denial
of his motion to suppress.
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to
the Government, United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th
Cir. 2013), the evidence before the district court established
the following. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on January 30, 2011,
Baltimore County Police Sergeant James MacNeil was on duty,
monitoring the Cheers Bar and Grill as it closed for the night.
According to MacNeil, the area had a history of violent crime,
including shootings. MacNeil received a call from the 911
dispatcher for a “man with a gun at the Denny’s” -- a restaurant
located in the same shopping center as the Cheers Bar and Grill.
As MacNeil exited his vehicle, he encountered two men who
simultaneously pointed to Walker and said “That’s the guy with
the gun.” MacNeil then approached Walker, drew his service
weapon, and ordered Walker to the ground. Instead of complying,
Walker attempted to move out of view, between two cars in the
parking lot. After other officers arrived on the scene, Walker
eventually complied and a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol was
removed from the front of Walker’s pants waistband.
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Walker moved to suppress, arguing that his arrest and
the seizure of his property were made without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. After a hearing, the district
court denied the motion, finding that both the initial stop and
subsequent taking of the gun were lawful.
We review the district court’s factual findings
regarding the motion to suppress for clear error, and the
court’s legal conclusions de novo. See United States v.
Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 452 (4th Cir. 2012). When, as here, a
motion to suppress has been denied, this court views the
evidence presented in the light most favorable to the
Government. Black, 707 F.3d at 534.
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer
may stop a person for investigative purposes when the officer
has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts “that
criminal activity ‘may be afoot’ . . . .” United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Whether there is reasonable
suspicion to justify the stop depends on the totality of the
circumstances, including the information known to the officer
and any reasonable inferences to be drawn at the time of the
stop. See id. at 273-74; United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243,
246 (4th Cir. 2011). The reasonable suspicion determination is
a “commonsensical proposition,” and deference should be accorded
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to police officers’ determinations based on their practical
experience and training. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d
776, 782 (4th Cir. 2004).
Walker argues that the officers lacked a reasonable
articulable suspicion because they only “received tips from two
anonymous bystanders pointing in the direction of Mr. Walker and
stating that he had a gun.” However, we have distinguished
face-to-face encounters from anonymous tips in the context of
the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d
141, 144-45 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that “unlike the anonymous
tipster, a witness who directly approaches a police officer can
also be held accountable for false statements”). We find that
the officers here had ample reasonable articulable suspicion
that Walker was committing a crime based on the totality of the
circumstances—an area known for violent criminal activity; a 911
call that a man had a gun at Denny’s; two bystanders pointing to
Walker and stating that he was the one with the gun; and
Walker’s initial evasive behavior. Therefore, the district
court properly concluded that the initial stop was proper.
The court also properly found that the search of
Walker’s person was lawful. “[I]f the officer has a reasonable
fear for his own and others’ safety based on an articulable
suspicion that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous,
the officer may conduct a protective search of, i.e., frisk, the
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outer layers of the suspect’s clothing for weapons.” United
States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Walker’s motion
to suppress and affirm his conviction. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
addressed in the materials before and this court and argument
would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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