UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
________________________________
)
MARILYN KEEPSEAGLE, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 99-3119 (EGS)
)
TOM VILSACK, Secretary, U.S. )
Department of Agriculture, )
)
Defendant. )
________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court are two motions to intervene in this
case. Both groups of putative intervenors seek to participate in
proceedings regarding the Court’s consideration of a pending
motion to modify the cy pres provisions of the 2011 agreement
that resulted in the settlement of this class action (“the
Agreement”). First, the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and its
affiliated Jones Academy Foundation (“the Choctaw Movants”) seek
to intervene on the basis of their concern that the proposed
modification will adversely affect their opportunity to receive
cy pres funds. Second, a group of class members who successfully
obtained compensation under the Agreement (calling themselves
“the Great Plains Claimants”) seek intervention due to their
concern that Class Counsel has failed to request a modification
that would provide for additional payments to them.
Both motions raise questions regarding the requirements for
intervening in post-judgment proceedings involving cy pres
distributions. In this case, the Agreement created a cy pres
fund to distribute any leftover funds. That portion of the
Agreement was not objected to, and no appeal was filed from the
Court’s approval of it. So this is not a case where parties seek
to intervene to address whether cy pres is appropriate in the
first instance. The narrow issue before the Court is
modification: Should the cy pres provisions of the Agreement be
modified and, if so, how? It is on this issue that the putative
intervenors seek to be heard as parties.
The Choctaw Movants desire to maintain the status quo. They
oppose the proposed changes to the procedures for distributing
cy pres funds. In doing so, they assert that they have a legal
right to the cy pres funds, despite being neither members of the
class nor otherwise connected to the Agreement. The Choctaw
Movants lack standing, however. For one, it is highly
speculative that the proposed modification would harm, rather
than help, their ability to compete for a portion of the cy pres
funds. In any event, the Choctaw Movants lack legal rights under
the Agreement, which in no way expressed or implied an intent to
benefit them or a class to which they belong.
The Great Plains Claimants desire to propose an entirely
different modification. They would remove the cy pres provisions
2
altogether and distribute the leftover funds to class members
who have already completed the claims process and received
monetary awards. The Great Plains Claimants, however, do not
have a legally protected interest in those funds. By failing to
object to the cy pres provisions or otherwise appeal the
approval of the Agreement, and then participating in the claims
process, they settled their legal claims. Accordingly, the Court
cannot find that they retain a legal interest giving them
standing to intervene.
Upon consideration of the motions to intervene, the responses
and replies thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record,
the Court DENIES the motions.1
I. Background
A. The Parties Reach a Settlement Agreement.
Following over a decade of litigation, the parties to this
class action reached a Settlement Agreement. See Agreement, ECF
No. 621-2.2 The Agreement created a Compensation Fund (“the
1
The Court emphasizes that this Opinion does not resolve the
pending motion to modify the Agreement. Before any decision on
that request will be reached, the Court must determine whether
to direct notice of that motion to the class and hold a fairness
hearing (or other hearing at which class members may be heard).
The Court has directed the parties to submit briefs on this
issue, Minute Order of October 20, 2014, and welcomes
participation by amici curiae whose perspectives may differ from
those of the parties.
2
The Agreement was modified in 2012 to alter provisions related
to the distribution of Track A and B awards, an issue that does
3
Fund”) of $680,000,000 “for the benefit of the Class.” Id. ¶
VII.F (p. 7). The Fund was to be used in part to cover the
attorney-fee award and individual awards to those who served as
class representatives. See id. Primarily, however, the Fund
would “pay Final Track A Liquidated Awards, Final Track A
Liquidated Tax Awards, Final Track B Awards, and Debt Relief Tax
Awards, to, or on behalf of, Class Members pursuant to the Non-
Judicial Claims Process.” Id.
The Agreement described how leftover funds, if any, would be
disbursed: “In the event there is a balance remaining . . . the
Claims Administrator shall direct any leftover funds to the Cy
Pres Fund.” Agreement ¶ IX.F.9 (p. 37). “Class Counsel may then
designate Cy Pres Beneficiaries to receive equal shares of the
Cy Pres Fund.” Id. These designations “shall be for the benefit
of Native American farmers and ranchers.” Id. The Agreement made
eligibility as a recipient contingent upon being “recommend[ed]
by Class Counsel and approv[ed] by the Court.” Id. Potential
recipients were also only “non-profit organization[s], other
than a law firm, legal services entity, or educational
institution, that has provided agricultural, business
not affect the issues currently pending before the Court. See
Mot. to Amend, ECF No. 621 at 1; Redline Changes to Agreement,
ECF No. 621-3. For clarity, the Court refers throughout this
Opinion to the version of the Agreement as modified in 2012.
4
assistance, or advocacy services to Native American farmers
between 1981 and [November 1, 2010].” Id. ¶ II.I (pp. 6–7).
The Class received notice of all relevant provisions of the
Agreement. The Claim Form provided to potential claimants
contained a section that required the claimant to acknowledge
that “[y]ou . . . forever and finally release USDA from any and
all claims and causes of action that have been or could have
been asserted against the Secretary by the proposed Class and
the Class Members in the Case arising out of the conduct alleged
therein.” Ex. C to Agreement, ECF No. 576-1 at 63. The
Agreement, moreover, provided that the Class “agrees to the
dismissal of the Case with prejudice.” Id. ¶ VI.A (p. 15).3 The
Claim Form also notified Track A claimants that they would be
“eligible for . . . [a] cash award up to $50,000.” Ex. C to
Agreement, ECF No. 576-1 at 63. The Notice that was sent to the
Class similarly described the $50,000 maximum under Track A and
the fact that participation would result in a resolution of the
individual’s legal claim, and stated that “[i]f any money
3
See also id. ¶ X (pp. 51–52) (acknowledging that the Class is
“forever barred and precluded from prosecuting[] any and all
claims, causes of action, or requests for injunctive and/or
monetary relief, including, but not limited to, damages, tax
payments, debt relief, costs, attorney’s fees, expenses, and/or
interest, whether presently known or unknown, that have been or
could have been asserted in the Case by reason of, with respect
to, in connection with, or which arise out of, any matters
alleged in the Case that the Class Releasors, or any of them,
have against the Government Releasees, or any of them”).
5
remains in the Settlement Fund after all payments to class
members and expenses have been paid, then it will be donated to
one or more organizations that have provided agricultural,
business assistance, or advocacy services to Native Americans.”
See Ex. I to Agreement, ECF No. 576-1 at 87, 88, 92.
B. The Court Approves the Agreement.
The parties first indicated to the Court that they had reached
a settlement on October 19, 2010. See Notice of Settlement, ECF
No. 570. On October 22, 2010, they moved for preliminary
approval of the Agreement. See Mot. for Preliminary Approval,
ECF No. 571. On November 1, 2010, the Court preliminarily
approved the Agreement. See Order, ECF No. 577. The Court also
approved the parties’ proposed notice to the Class, directed
that any objections to the Agreement be postmarked by no later
than February 28, 2011, and scheduled a fairness hearing for
April 28, 2011. See id. at 3.
On March 18, 2011, Class Counsel filed copies of thirty-five
letters raising objections to the Agreement. See Notice, ECF No.
585. Class Counsel filed their motion seeking final approval of
the Agreement, which also responded to those objections, on
April 1, 2011. See Mot. for Final Approval, ECF No. 589. Only
two written objections related to cy pres. See id. at 62–63. One
objector requested that his organizations be granted cy pres
funds. See Kent Objection, ECF No. 585-2 at 7–8. Class Counsel
6
noted that this request was premature. See Mot. for Final
Approval, ECF No. 589 at 62. Another objector indicated his
preference that excess funds be used for outreach purposes and
not be limited to groups that already existed in 1981. See
Givens Objection, ECF No. 585-4 at 19–20. Class Counsel noted
that this desire was entirely consistent with the existing cy
pres provisions. See Mot. for Final Approval, ECF No. 589 at 62–
63.
The Court held a fairness hearing on April 28, 2011. See
Minute Entry of April 28, 2011. The issue of cy pres was not
raised by any objector. See generally Transcript of April 28,
2011 Fairness Hearing, ECF No. 609. After hearing from all who
attended the fairness hearing, the Court found that the
Agreement was fair and reasonable and approved it pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). See Order, ECF No. 606.
No appeal was filed from the Court’s approval of the Agreement.
C. Class Counsel Seeks to Modify the Agreement.
On August 30, 2013 Class Counsel filed a status report,
notifying the Court that nearly all distributions from the Fund
had been made and approximately $380,000,000 remained leftover.
See Status Report, ECF No. 646 at 3. Class Counsel asserted that
this “render[ed] some of the conditions for cy pres distribution
impractical.” Id. at 5. Class Counsel also outlined a potential
modification of the Agreement, which would have involved the
7
endowment of a new foundation “which could fund non-profit
organizations serving the needs of Native American farmers and
ranchers.” Id. at 8. The Department of Agriculture opposed this
proposal. See Response to Status Report, ECF No. 649.
The filing of the August 30, 2013 status report prompted the
Choctaw Movants and the Great Plains Claimants to move to
intervene. See Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 647; Mot. to
Intervene, ECF No. 654. These motions, however, sought to
intervene in proceedings that did not yet exist. No one had
proposed any modification to the Court and the hypothetical
proposal outlined by Class Counsel was opposed by the defendant.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the parties additional time to
come to an agreement on whether and how to modify the Agreement.
On September 24, 2014, Class Counsel filed an unopposed motion
to modify the Agreement. See Mot. to Modify, ECF No. 709. The
modification proposes that 10% of the Cy Pres Fund be
distributed immediately to non-profit organizations “proposed by
Class Counsel and approved by the Court” that must also meet the
following criteria:
(1) they must have “provided business assistance,
agricultural education, technical support, or
advocacy services to Native American farmers or
ranchers between 1981 and November 1, 2010 to
support and promote their continued engagement in
agriculture”; and
(2) they must be “either a tax-exempt organization
described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
8
Revenue Code . . . educational organization
described in Section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Code;
or an instrumentality of a state or federally
recognized tribe, including a non-profit
organization chartered under the tribal law of a
state or federally recognized tribe, that furnishes
assistance designed to further Native American
farming or ranching activities.”
Proposed Addendum to Agreement, ECF No. 709-2 ¶ II.A.
The modification utilizes the remainder of the Cy Pres Fund to
create a trust “for the purpose of distributing the cy pres
funds” which “shall seek recognition as a non-profit
organization under § 501(c)(3).” Id. ¶ II.B. The trust would be
required “to distribute the funds over a period not to exceed 20
years” and would be charged with disbursing the funds to “not-
for-profit organizations that have served or will serve Native
American farmers and ranchers.” Mot. to Modify, ECF No. 709-1 at
1. The Trust would be authorized to make grants subject to the
following restrictions:
(i) “grants must be to a tax-exempt organization
described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Code;
educational organization described in Section
170(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Code; or an instrumentality
of a state or federally recognized tribe, including
a non-profit organization chartered under the tribal
law of a state or federally recognized tribe, that
furnishes assistance designed to further Native
American farming or ranching activities”; and
(ii) “the organization must use the funds to provide
business assistance, agricultural education,
technical support, and advocacy services to Native
American farmers and ranchers, including those
seeking to become farmers or ranchers, to support
9
and promote their continued engagement in
agriculture.”
Proposed Addendum to Agreement, ECF No. 709-2 ¶ II.B.
Shortly before the motion to modify the Agreement was filed,
the Great Plains Claimants filed a renewed motion to intervene.
See Second Great Plains Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 705. On
September 18, 2014, the Court denied without prejudice the
earlier motions to intervene of the Great Plains Claimants and
the Choctaw Movants and set a schedule for the briefing of
renewed motions to intervene. See Minute Order of September 18,
2014. The Choctaw Movants filed a renewed motion to intervene on
October 1, 2014. See Second Choctaw Mot. to Intervene, ECF No.
714. Class Counsel and the defendant oppose both motions, which
are now ripe for the Court’s consideration.
II. Applicable Law
A. Intervention as of Right
Requests to intervene as of right are governed by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 24(a). Rule 24(a)(2) requires the Court to
permit intervention by any party who “claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction that is subject of the
action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to
protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately
represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Accordingly,
10
a putative intervenor’s entitlement to intervention as of right
depends upon four factors: “‘(1) the timeliness of the motion;
(2) whether the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3)
whether the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
applicant’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) whether
the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by the
existing parties.’” New Hampshire v. Holder, 293 F.R.D. 1, 3–4
(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322
F.3d 728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
B. Permissive Intervention
Requests for permissive intervention are governed by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), which “states in relevant part
that ‘[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to
intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with the
main action a common question of law or fact.’” Holder, 293
F.R.D. at 4 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)) (alterations in
original). “When exercising its discretion, the district court
shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties.” EEOC v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042,
1045 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quotation marks omitted).
11
III. The Choctaw Movants’ Request to Intervene
The Choctaw Movants seek to intervene “for the limited purpose
of opposing Plaintiffs’ motion to modify the cy pres provisions
of the Settlement Agreement.” Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to
Intervene, ECF No. 713 at 1. Because they lack standing under
Article III and seek to raise the legal rights of others in
violation of the doctrine of prudential standing, the Choctaw
Movants are not entitled to intervene.
A. The Choctaw Movants May Not Intervene as of Right.
The Choctaw Movants assert that they qualify for intervention
as of right because they are potential beneficiaries under the
existing cy pres provisions and thus have an interest in
opposing any modification in order to “preserv[e] their current
opportunity to receive a full share of those funds.” Id. at 9.
Class Counsel asserts that “the injury about which [the Choctaw
Movants] express[] concern—i.e., that a modification to the
Settlement Agreement will affect the amount of money that [they]
may receive, or the timing of such awards, as a potential cy
pres beneficiary . . . is speculative.” Pls.’ Opp. to Mot. to
Intervene, ECF No. 717 at 3–4. Accordingly, Class Counsel
challenges the Choctaw Movants’ standing under Article III, as
well as their establishment of an interest in the litigation
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). The government
12
challenges the Choctaw Movants’ standing under Article III and
the doctrine of prudential standing.
The Court begins with Article III standing, “a prerequisite to
a federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction.” Nat’l Ass’n of
Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1160 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (quotation marks omitted). “Prudential standing, like
Article III standing, is a threshold, jurisdictional concept,”
so the Court considers it as well. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co.
v. FDIC, 717 F.3d 189, 194 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Because the
Choctaw Movants lack standing, the Court need not—and, indeed,
ought not—address Rule 24(a). Id.
1. The Choctaw Movants Lack Article III Standing.
“[A] movant seeking to intervene as of right must . . .
demonstrate Article III standing.” In re Endangered Species Act
Section 4 Deadline Litig., 704 F.3d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, the Choctaw Movants “‘must establish that (1)
[they] suffered an injury-in-fact; (2) there is a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and
(3) the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable
decision.’” Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Shiu, No.
13-1806, 2014 WL 1100779, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2014) (quoting
In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing, 627 F. Supp. 2d
16, 24 (D.D.C. 2009)). Their injury-in-fact must be “concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent.” Clapper v. Amnesty
13
Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quotation marks omitted).
The requirement that an injury be imminent “cannot be stretched
beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury
is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury
is certainly impending.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
The Choctaw Movants claim that “[a]s intended third-party
beneficiaries of the Agreement, members of this group of Cy Pres
Beneficiaries have standing to enforce its terms.” Mem. in Supp.
of Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 713 at 10. In essence, they
believe that the possibility that they currently qualify for and
could be selected to receive a cy pres distribution, and the
possibility that under the proposed modification they would
receive a lesser distribution, a distribution later in time, or
no distribution, creates a concrete injury-in-fact. The Court
disagrees because any injury will arise only if a multitude of
speculative events occur.
It is well-established that an injury-in-fact may be
demonstrated by the existence of an economic interest, so long
as that interest “faces an imminent, threatened invasion—i.e.,
one that is not conjectural or speculative.” Deutsche Bank, 717
F.3d at 193. The same is true for putative intervenors. For
example, where a lawsuit seeking to place Mongolian wildlife on
an endangered-species list could have “barr[ed] American hunters
from bringing their trophies home,” the Mongolian government had
14
standing to intervene based on the direct negative impact that
would result from reducing the number of hunters going to
Mongolia and paying hunting fees to the government. Fund for
Animals, 322 F.3d at 733.
The Choctaw Movants have no existing involvement with the Cy
Pres Fund. They have not received a cy pres distribution, been
approved to receive one, or had their eligibility assessed.
Accordingly, modification of the cy pres provision would not
affect them in the direct ways described in the cases they cite.
See id. (lawsuit could reduce the number of hunters continuing
to pay fees to the putative intervenor); Utahns for Better
Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 295 F.3d 1111, 1113, 1116
(10th Cir. 2002) (lawsuit could affect existing projects on
which putative intervenor had contracts); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 578
F.2d 1341, 1344 (10th Cir. 1978) (lawsuit could affect standards
applicable to putative intervenor’s request for renewal of its
uranium-processing license).
Indeed, the Choctaw Movants are no different from any other
organization: They could, upon satisfaction of four criteria,
receive a cy pres distribution of an indeterminate amount. They
would need to: (1) be a “non-profit organization, other than a
law firm, legal services entity, or educational institution,”
Agreement ¶ II.I (p. 6); (2) have “provided agricultural,
15
business assistance, or advocacy services to Native American
farmers between 1981 and [November 1, 2010],” id.; (3) be
“recommend[ed] by Class Counsel,” id. ¶ IX.F.9 (p. 38); and (4)
be “approv[ed] by the Court.” Id.
The government and Class Counsel question whether the Choctaw
Movants may ever satisfy the first two requirements. As to the
first, the parties assert that the Jones Academy Foundation is
likely an educational institution and that the Choctaw Nation is
not a “non-profit organization.” See Pls.’ Opp., ECF No. 717 at
8–9; Gov’t’s Opp., ECF No. 718 at 5–7. The Choctaw Movants
counter that the Jones Academy Foundation is separate from the
Jones Academy, and thus is not an educational institution, and
that tribes are included within the term “non-profit
organization.” Reply, ECF No. 722 at 3–5. The plaintiffs also
assert that the Choctaw Movants put forth no evidence
demonstrating that they “provided agricultural, business
assistance, or advocacy services to Native American farmers
between 1981 and [November 1, 2010].” Pls.’ Opp., ECF No. 717 at
9.
The Choctaw Movants correctly note that the Court must accept
as true their factual allegations regarding the basis for
intervention. See Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1914 (4th ed. 2014).
Accordingly, their allegation that they provided qualifying
16
assistance to Native American farmers during the relevant time
period is accepted as true. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to
Intervene, ECF No. 713 at 3. Similarly, the Court must accept
the allegation that the Jones Academy Foundation is a separate
entity that grants scholarships, rather than a fundraising arm
of the Jones Academy. See id. at 4. Accordingly, the Jones
Academy Foundation meets the first two eligibility criteria.
The Choctaw Nation, however, cannot establish that it is
eligible because the Agreement does not include tribal
governments as potential recipients of cy pres distributions.
The Agreement defines potential cy pres recipients as “non-
profit organization[s], other than a law firm, legal services
entity, or educational institution.” Agreement ¶ II.I (p. 6).
The Agreement does not define “non-profit organization,” but the
Choctaw Nation is not a 501(c)(3) organization. As the Choctaw
Movants admit, it is a government entity: “The Choctaw Nation
possesses the attributes of a classic non-profit organization
notwithstanding that it is also a governmental sovereign.”
Reply, ECF No. 722 at 5 (emphasis added). The Court finds it
difficult to believe that the parties used the term “non-profit
organization” intending to include tribal governments without
saying as much. Such a reading is especially difficult where the
subject matter of the Agreement relates to Native Americans, and
the provision at issue sought to identify a class of entities
17
that could be eligible for grants to benefit Native American
farmers and ranchers. If the Agreement was intended to include
tribes, it would have said so.
The term “non-profit organization,” moreover, is often used in
a way that excludes tribes, recognizing that they are distinct
entities.4 The Choctaw Nation argues that this usage is
inconsistent, relying on a footnote in Seminole Tribe v.
Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 314 n.7 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), which
indicated that the fact that a tribe’s profits from gambling
4
See, e.g., Blue Lake Rancheria v. United States, 653 F.3d 1112,
1118–19 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing a House Conference Report
regarding an amendment to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,
which noted that “[g]enerally, Indian tribes are not eligible
for the reimbursement treatment allowable to nonprofit
organizations”); Mason ex rel. Heiser v. Morrisette, 403 F.3d
28, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (referring to regulations, promulgated by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the
Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4852d,
which defined the term “lessee” to include “any entity that
enters into an agreement to lease, rent, or sublease . . .
including . . . Indian tribes, and nonprofit organizations”);
Am. Jewish Congress v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Serv., 323 F.
Supp. 2d 44, 47 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting that an AmeriCorps program
“is administered through grantees such as state and local
governments, Indian tribes, and non-profit organizations”),
rev’d on other grounds, 399 F.3d 351 (D.C. Cir. 2005); SEC v.
Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 03 Civ 2937, 2004 WL 885844, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2004) (grant-making entity created by
settlement of litigation made “[t]he following persons and
entities . . . eligible to apply for . . . grants: Non-profit
organizations and educational institutions; State agencies,
federal and local government units, and Indian tribes”);
Atlantic, Cape May & Parts of Burlington, Ocean & Cumberland
Cntys. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of N. Wildwood, No. 77-2609,
1979 WL 2018, at *6 (D.N.J. May 18, 1979) (reciting statutory
definition of “a grantee” under a particular statute, which
included “any state or political subdivision thereof, indian
tribe, or private or public non-profit organization”).
18
activities would “be invested for the betterment of the Indian
community” meant that the tribe “may not qualify as a charitable
organization within the letter of the statute [at issue], [but]
could be said to fall within the spirit of its permissive
intent.” That is the point, however. Even though tribal
governments operate for purposes that are similar to those of
charitable organizations, they are distinct entities.5
Regardless of whether the Choctaw Movants satisfy those
criteria, it is clear that they do not satisfy the third—that
they be “recommend[ed] by Class Counsel.” Agreement ¶ IX.F.9 (p.
38). The Agreement provides no standard for Class Counsel’s
decision, so the Choctaw Movants could obtain a cy pres
distribution only if Class Counsel were to exercise its
discretion to recommend them. This is problematic for standing,
as the Supreme Court is “reluctant to endorse standing theories
that require guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers will
exercise their judgment.” Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150. It is
5
The Choctaw Nation briefly mentions that the Government
Accountability Office has indicated that federal agencies
recently awarded grants to twenty-four non-federally-recognized
tribes because they were “organized as nonprofit organizations
and so were ‘eligible to receive federal funding from any
program authorized to fund nonprofits.’” Reply, ECF No. 722 at 4
n.4 (quoting Government Accountability Office, Federal Funding
for Non-Federally Recognized Tribes 11 (April 2012), available
at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-348). Unlike the tribes
described in the report, however, the Choctaw Nation is
federally recognized. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Intervene,
ECF No. 713 at 1.
19
thus hypothetical at best to assert that the Agreement will
result in any award to the Choctaw Movants.
Even if the Choctaw Movants were to receive an award under the
Agreement, the amount of that award is highly speculative. The
Agreement provides for distribution in equal shares of the $380
million Cy Pres Fund. While it is conceivable that a small
number of qualifying organizations would be recommended by Class
Counsel, resulting in a large distribution to the Choctaw
Movants, it is equally conceivable that the opportunity to
obtain an immediate share of a large Cy Pres Fund would draw
applications from an array of eligible organizations, resulting
in a lower award. These twin uncertainties—whether the Choctaw
Movants would receive an award at all and, if so, how large an
award they would receive—render it highly speculative to assert
that the proposed modification would harm them.
This uncertainty is compounded by uncertainty regarding the
effect of the modification. Under the proposed modification,
eligibility to receive a distribution of the initial 10% is
contingent upon the discretion of Class Counsel to make
recommendations, but the modification makes clear that tribes
and educational institutions may qualify. See supra at 8–9. The
modification therefore increases the likelihood that the Choctaw
Movants qualify at the initial phase. The modification similarly
broadens the eligibility criteria for the distribution of the
20
remaining 90% of the Cy Pres Fund, while also removing the
discretionary role of Class Counsel. See supra at 9–10.
Similarly, it is far from clear that the timing and amount of
awards that the Choctaw Movants could receive under the
modification would differ negatively. The smaller amount of
money and laxer eligibility criteria applicable to the initial
10% distribution may make it likelier that Class Counsel would
propose smaller distributions to many organizations, but the
modification—unlike the existing Agreement—permits Class Counsel
to scale awards to an organization’s ability. Therefore, it is
just as likely that the Choctaw Movants would obtain a larger
amount due to their ability to provide a scaled proposal. See
Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 713 at 3 n.1.
Distributions from the trust could similarly be scaled in a
manner that could benefit the Choctaw Movants. Accordingly, the
modification may well result in a greater award for the Choctaw
Movants.
In view of the highly speculative nature of their claim, the
Choctaw Movants argue that their true injury is not the loss of
the funds, but the lost opportunity to compete for those funds.
See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 713 at 10–11. To
be sure, “[l]oss of an opportunity to compete for a benefit may
be an injury in fact if it is not merely ‘illusory.’” N.J.
Television Corp. v. FCC, 393 F.3d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In
21
light of the Choctaw Nation’s failure to qualify as a “non-
profit organization” under the Agreement, however, any
opportunity to compete using the joint proposal on which the
Choctaw Movants rely is illusory. In any event, the Choctaw
Movants lose no opportunity to compete under the modification.
The D.C. Circuit has recognized standing based on a lost
opportunity to compete when a putative applicant is foreclosed
from applying for the benefit due to a legal change. For
example, in CC Distributors, Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d
146, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1989), a group of former contractors for the
Department of Defense challenged the Department’s decision not
to renew certain contracts and to bring the program “in-house.”
The Court recognized an injury-in-fact arising out of “the loss
of a statutorily conferred opportunity to compete for a
contract.” Id. at 150. Similarly, in West Virginia Ass’n of
Community Health Centers v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1570, 1572–73,
1576 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the Court found standing for a group of
health centers that received funding from the Department of
Health and Human Services to challenge a decision to reduce
funding for their state. The Court held that “once appellants
demonstrated that they would qualify to receive these funds,
they need not shoulder the additional burden of demonstrating
that they are certain to receive funding.” Id. at 1576.
22
The Choctaw Movants find themselves in a very different
situation. Under the modification, they retain every ability to
compete for the same cy pres funds. Unlike the situations where
the D.C. Circuit has found standing based on a lost opportunity
to compete, the competitive opportunity would neither disappear
entirely, CC Distributors, Inc., 883 F.2d at 148, nor be reduced
by shrinking the pot of available funds. W. Va. Ass’n of Cmty.
Health Ctrs. v. Heckler, 734 F.2d at 1576. Indeed, as the above
discussion demonstrates, it is highly speculative to say that
the procedures under the modification harm rather than help the
Choctaw Movants’ ability to compete. See supra at 15–21.
Accordingly, even if the competitive-injury doctrine recognizes
injuries caused by adverse changes to procedures governing a
competition, the Choctaw Movants would not qualify because the
procedural changes are just as likely to improve their
competitive prospects. Accordingly, the Choctaw Movants do not
face a “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent”
injury. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (quotation marks omitted).
2. The Choctaw Movants Lack Prudential Standing.
Even if the Choctaw Movants suffered a lost opportunity to
compete, their claims suffer from a more fundamental flaw: They
seek to assert a legal right to compete under the existing
procedures for cy pres distribution that were created by a
settlement (which has nothing to do with them), to be
23
distributed for the benefit of a class (of which they are not a
part), to remedy claims of discrimination (which they did not
suffer). The funds have nothing to do with the Choctaw Movants,
yet they assert a legal right to obtain them (or, at least, to
compete for them). In doing so, they assert rights under the
Agreement that do not belong to them.
By raising rights that are not theirs, the Choctaw Movants run
afoul of the doctrine of prudential standing, which requires
that a party seeking to intervene in proceedings regarding the
interpretation of a contract must show that it is an intended
beneficiary of that contract; otherwise, “the basic point
remains that the contract does not protect their rights.”
Deutsche Bank, 717 F.3d at 194 (emphasis in original). The
Choctaw Movants assert that they do not actually seek to be
heard on the interpretation of the Agreement, Reply, ECF No. 722
at 6 n.5, but this contention is belied by their proposed brief
in opposition to the request for modification, which raises
disputes regarding the interpretation of various provisions of
the Agreement. See Proposed Opp. to Mot. to Modify, ECF No. 713-
2 at 3–4.
The Supreme Court has held that “a consent decree is not
enforceable directly or in collateral proceedings by those who
are not parties to it even though they were intended to be
benefited by it.” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
24
U.S. 723, 750 (1975). The D.C. Circuit has read this to
“prohibit only incidental third party beneficiaries from suing
to enforce a consent decree.” Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n,
995 F.2d 280, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (alteration omitted; emphasis
in original). “The test is not . . . only whether the
contracting parties intended to confer a benefit directly on the
third parties, but also whether the parties intended the third
party to be able to sue to protect that benefit.” SEC v.
Prudential Sec., 136 F.3d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also
Doe v. District of Columbia, 958 F. Supp. 2d 178, 203 (D.D.C.
2013); Ekwem v. Fenty, 666 F. Supp. 2d 71, 81 (D.D.C. 2009).
“To prove intended beneficiary status, the third party must
show that the contract reflects the express or implied intention
of the parties to the contract to benefit the third party.”
GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer St. Office v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 671
F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). The
contract, however, “need not name a beneficiary specifically or
individually” and may instead specify a particular class of
beneficiaries. Id. “A party has a cause of action as a third-
party beneficiary to a contract if the contracting parties
express an intent primarily and directly to benefit that third
party (or a class . . . to which that third party belongs).”
Vencor Hosps. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of R.I., 169 F.3d 677,
680 (11th Cir. 1999). In Vencor, for example, the Eleventh
25
Circuit recognized that a hospital was an intended third-party
beneficiary of an insurance contract that stated that “[b]enefit
payments may be paid to the doctor, hospital or to you directly
at our discretion.” Id. Although the contract did not grant the
hospital an absolute right to payment, the purpose of the
contract was to cover the costs of a medical service the
hospital had provided.
The Choctaw Movants argue that the Agreement was similarly
intended to create a trust of which they are intended
beneficiaries. They assert that “[t]he Settlement Agreement
defined a group of Cy Pres Beneficiaries among whom all of the
leftover settlement funds were to be distributed in equal
shares.” Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 713 at 10.
Accordingly, they claim, even though they “ultimately may or may
not be . . . selected,” they remain beneficiaries of the trust.
Reply, ECF No. 722 at 10. The class to which they belong,
however, was never the intended target of the Agreement.
It is important to remember that the funds at issue in this
case are cy pres funds. Although the cy pres doctrine provides
for the distribution of unclaimed settlement funds to non-
parties, the purpose is to put the funds to their “‘next best
use which is for indirect class benefit.’” Powell v. Ga.-Pacific
Corp., 843 F. Supp. 491, 497 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (quoting Newberg
on Class Actions § 11:20 (3d ed. 1992) (emphasis added). “The
26
object of applying the funds to the ‘next best’ class is to
parallel the intended use of the funds as nearly as possible by
maximizing the number of plaintiffs compensated.” Democratic
Cent. Comm. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n, 84 F.3d 451,
455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the point of
cy pres is to benefit the class as closely as possible, using
third-parties only as vehicles for providing that benefit to the
class when direct distribution is infeasible. This is nothing
like Vencor, where the contract was intended to provide payment
for services rendered by the third party.
The Agreement confirms that its purpose was geared toward the
Class. It settled claims of individuals who allegedly suffered
discrimination at the hands of the Department of Agriculture. In
doing so, it created a Fund “for the benefit of the class,”
provided a process for the distribution of that Fund to class
members, and created a Cy Pres Fund in the event that the full
amount of funds set aside to pay those claims was not exhausted.
The Cy Pres Fund was specifically intended “for the benefit of
Native American farmers and ranchers.” Agreement ¶ IX.F.9 (p.
33). The cy pres distribution criteria further this purpose by
guiding Class Counsel to organizations that could use the money
to benefit the class. Id. ¶ II.I (p. 3). Nothing in the
Agreement contradicts this statement or hints that it was
27
actually intended to provide a legally enforceable benefit to
unrelated organizations.
The cases relied on by the Choctaw Movants, by contrast, all
permitted individuals who were direct beneficiaries of a trust
to sue to enforce the terms of that trust. See Beckett, 995 F.2d
at 281 (consent decree that obligated employer to make pension-
related payments into a trust fund to be administered by the
airline pilots’ union could be enforced by former pilots who
claimed that the union failed to grant them required payments
because the consent decree created a trust for the benefit of
all pilots); Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 825 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Native Hawaiian seeking to enforce terms of trust holding
public lands “for the betterment of the conditions of native
Hawaiians”). Those cases did not involve third parties seeking
funds held for someone else’s benefit.
Finally, the Choctaw Movants rely on the Agreement’s use of
the term “beneficiary” to describe the organizations that may
receive a cy pres distribution, but the use of that word does
not trump the purposes of the cy pres doctrine and the
Agreement’s expressed intent to benefit class members. The mere
fact that those selected to be vehicles for distributing the
funds to the class’s benefit may themselves “benefit” from that
selection does not make them intended beneficiaries with legally
enforceable rights. Because the Choctaw Movants lack such
28
rights, they lack prudential standing to intervene to enforce
their preferred interpretation of the Agreement.
B. The Choctaw Movants May Not Intervene Permissively.
The Choctaw Movants’ lack of standing also dooms their request
for permissive intervention. The D.C. Circuit previously
indicated that it remained an open question whether standing is
required of a party seeking permissive intervention. See, e.g.,
Endangered Species Act Litig., 704 F.3d at 980. The Circuit
recently settled that question, however. In Deutsche Bank
National Trust Co. v. FDIC, the D.C. Circuit rejected the
argument that a party seeking to intervene as of right as a
defendant need not demonstrate standing, noting that “[i]t is
therefore circuit law that intervenors must demonstrate Article
III standing.” 717 F.3d at 193. Judge Silberman (who authored
the unanimous opinion) wrote separately to emphasize:
If we were authorized to dispense with the standing
requirement for a defendant-intervenor, then any
organization or individual with only a philosophic
identification with a defendant—or a concern with a
possible unfavorable precedent—could attempt to
intervene and influence the course of litigation. To
be sure, parties seeking intervention as of right
would still need to meet the specific standards
articulated in Rule 24(a), but district courts have
discretion to grant permissive intervention under Rule
24(b), which requires only that a party have a claim
or defense that shares with the main action a common
question of law or fact. Opening participation to
parties without standing would be quite troublesome in
direct review in the court of appeals, but intolerable
at the district court level, where individual parties
have substantial power to direct the flow of
29
litigation and affect settlement negotiation. Our rule
requiring all intervenors to demonstrate Article III
standing prudently guards against this possibility.
Id. at 195–96 (quotations marks and citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Choctaw Movants’ lack of standing renders them
ineligible for permissive intervention.6
IV. The Great Plains Claimants’ Request for Intervention
The Great Plains Claimants seek to intervene “to ensure that
their interests are adequately represented in the context of any
amendments to the Settlement Agreement.” Mot. to Intervene, ECF
No. 705-1 at 1. They assert that they would like Class Counsel
to seek to modify the Agreement to provide for additional
payments to successful claimants, but that Class Counsel has
failed to do so and has failed to keep them apprised of relevant
case developments. See id. at 3–5. Because they lack Article III
standing, the Great Plains Claimants are not entitled to
intervene.
A. The Great Plains Claimants May Not Intervene as of Right.
As discussed above, putative intervenors “must . . .
demonstrate Article III standing,” Endangered Species Act
Litig., 704 F.3d at 976, by “‘establish[ing] that (1) [they]
suffered an injury-in-fact; (2) there is a causal connection
6
The Choctaw Movants also did not dispute the government’s
argument that permissive intervenors must demonstrate standing,
thereby conceding the argument. See, e.g., Inst. for Pol’y
Studies v. U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 246 F.R.D. 380, 386
n.5 (D.D.C. 2007).
30
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the
injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.’”
Associated Builders & Contractors, 2014 WL 1100779, at *4
(quoting Polar Bear Listing, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
The Great Plains Claimants assert that “[a]s successful
Keepseagle class members, the Great Plains Claimants are direct
beneficiaries of the Settlement Agreement” and therefore “have
legally protected interests in the distribution of the Cy Pres
Fund.” Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 705-1 at 16–17. It is
undisputed that none of the Great Plains Claimants objected to
the cy pres provisions of the Agreement, and that no one
appealed the Court’s approval of the Agreement.7 It is also
undisputed that the Great Plains Claimants participated in the
Agreement’s procedures for filing a claim under Track A. That
process included an affirmative choice to proceed under Track A,
knowing that the maximum possible cash award was $50,000. See
7
For this reason, the Court cannot accept assertions that the
Great Plains Claimants “never agreed to participate in a
settlement which provides that a majority of the funds would not
go to class members” and that “[h]ad the original Settlement
Agreement contained such provisions, many would have objected
and/or opted out.” Reply, ECF No. 723 at 8; see also id. at 14
(citing Knight Declaration, ECF No. 723-1 ¶¶ 13–14; Petersen
Declaration, ECF No. 723-2 ¶¶ 13–14). The Great Plains
Claimants—like Class Counsel and the government—may not have
anticipated that so few claimants would come forward and
therefore may not have expected the Cy Pres Fund to be as large
as it is. All of the provisions creating this result, however,
were part of the proposed Agreement, of which the Great Plains
Claimants received notice and to which they did not object.
31
Ex. C to Agreement, ECF No. 576-1 at 63. They also acknowledged
that they were “forever and finally releas[ing] USDA from any
and all claims and causes of action that have been or could have
been asserted . . . in the Case arising out of the conduct
alleged therein.” Id. The notice initially provided to the Class
reiterated these points and also made clear that all unclaimed
funds would be “donated to one or more organizations that have
provided agricultural, business assistance, or advocacy services
to Native Americans.” See Ex. I to Agreement, ECF No. 576-1 at
87, 88, 92. Accordingly, the Great Plains Claimants, with
notice, have intentionally satisfied their legal claims.
It is well-established that this extinguishes a legal claim.
“An agreement between the parties dismissing all claims is the
equivalent of a decision on the merits and thus claims settled
by agreement are barred by res judicata.” Chandler v. Bernanke,
531 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (D.D.C. 2008). Indeed, as the Great
Plains Claimants appeared to acknowledge, Reply, ECF No. 723 at
7, the Agreement binds class members who did not opt out. Once
the Agreement was approved and no appeal was filed, the claims
of class members who did not opt out were extinguished, in
accordance with the Agreement’s terms. See Agreement ¶¶ VI.A (p.
15), X (pp. 51–52).
This conclusion is entirely consistent with the weight of
precedent regarding unclaimed settlement funds. “In approaching
32
the question of the appropriate distribution of such funds,
various courts have determined that ‘neither the class members
nor the settling defendants have any legal right to unclaimed or
excess funds.’” Diamond Chem. Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 517
F. Supp. 2d 212, 217 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Powell, 843 F. Supp.
at 495, aff’d, 119 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1997) (“neither party
has a legal right to the unclaimed funds”)); see also Wilson v.
Southwest Airlines, 880 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1989) (“We agree
with the district court that . . . none of the parties in this
case has a legal right to the balance of the fund.”); In re
Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1254 (7th Cir.
1984) (“we agree that neither the plaintiff class nor the
settling defendants have any right to the reserve fund”); In re
Motorsports Merchandise Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392,
1393 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“Neither the class members nor the
settling defendants have any legal right to unclaimed or excess
funds.”) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Once a
settlement agreement is final, “all class members who presented
their claims received the full payment due them, and those who
did not present claims have waived their legal right to do so.
Thus, the class has no further legal rights in the fund.”
Wilson, 880 F.2d at 811–12.
Professor Rubenstein echoes this position in the most recent
edition of Newberg on Class Actions. Although there is some
33
dispute over the property status of unclaimed funds, “most
courts start from the proposition that neither the plaintiff
class nor the settling defendants have any right to the
unclaimed or excess funds.” Newberg on Class Actions § 12:28
(5th ed. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). The argument that
unclaimed settlement funds are property of the class is
problematic, he posits:
The premise that the recovery fund is the property of
the plaintiff class is not quite right because the
settlement fund does not truly belong to the class as
a whole, but rather to the class members individually.
When a class member does not claim her share of the
fund, it is not at all obvious that her share
therefore belongs to the other class members. If, for
example, the government distributed a tax refund to a
group of taxpayers but some did not cash their checks,
no one would seriously propose that the unclaimed
funds are the property of, and should be distributed
pro rata to, those other citizens who received tax
refunds. . . . Additionally, an individual’s presence
as a class member in a class action hardly expands her
property rights to include the property of the other
class members. Even if it is the case that the
claiming class members have received less than the
full value of their claims by the settlement, that
fact does not magically make the nonclaimaints’
property theirs.
Id. § 12:30.
The Great Plains Claimants have received the full value of
their claims pursuant to the Agreement and thereby fully
satisfied those legal claims. The fact that their claims, if
ultimately successful at trial, could have resulted in higher
34
damages awards changes nothing. As the Court emphasized during
the April 28, 2011 fairness hearing:
There are risks in litigation as we all know. This
case could have gone to trial, presumably, and the
Plaintiffs not recovered anything. Class certification
was not a foregone conclusion, and you’re aware, I’m
sure, of other cases in this court, not before this
judge, wherein class certification issues were not as
successful as the class members would have liked. . .
. So there were no guarantees that this case went
forward at all.
Transcript of April 28, 2011 Fairness Hearing, ECF No. 609 at
24:9–18. Settlements, by definition, are compromises in which
plaintiffs accept less than their full claim of damages in
exchange for avoiding the risks of further proceedings and
trial. The Great Plains Claimants accepted that trade off,
consented to an Agreement that provided for a maximum award of
$50,000, and recovered that amount. They cannot now claim a
property right in funds that were intended to pay the claims of
other class members who did not claim their award.
The Court is not persuaded by their arguments to the contrary,
which rely on two distinguishable cases:
First, they correctly note the Fifth Circuit’s recent
statement that “settlement-fund proceeds . . . belong solely to
the class members.” Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 658 F.3d 468,
474 (5th Cir. 2011). That case, however, “[wa]s not a case where
the settlement agreement itself provide[d] that residual funds
shall be distributed via cy pres,” and the Fifth Circuit noted
35
that “the relevant provisions” of the Agreement “shape the
property interest created by the Agreement.” Id. at 476, 478.
The decision, moreover, related to the use of cy pres even
though the excess funds could have been used to pay claims that
were due to another subclass under the Agreement. Id. at 478.
Here, any property interest that was shaped or created by the
Agreement was limited by the Agreement’s provisions making the
Track A maximum $50,000, and providing for a cy pres
distribution of leftover funds from the outset.8
Second, the Great Plains Claimants rely on the Third Circuit’s
recent decision in In re Baby Products Antitrust Litigation, 708
F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013). That decision addressed a claim by a
class member (who objected to the settlement agreement during a
fairness hearing and filed an appeal) that “the settlement
notice was inadequate because it did not identify the cy pres
recipients who will receive excess settlement funds.” Id. at
180. The Court held that the notice (which was issued before the
8
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002), on which the Choctaw
Movants rely for the proposition that members of a class have
interests in a settlement sufficient to support Article III
standing, is even more distinct. That case addressed the claim
of a class member who objected to a proposed settlement at a
fairness hearing, and sought to appeal the district court’s
approval of the settlement. See id. at 4–6. The Supreme Court
held “that this issue does not implicate the jurisdiction of the
courts under Article III of the Constitution” because “[a]s a
member of the retiree class, petitioner has an interest in the
settlement.” Id. at 6. The Great Plains Claimants, by contrast,
never objected or appealed and they have already had their legal
claims fully resolved.
36
identity of the cy pres recipient was known) was sufficient, and
noted without deciding that “to the extent putative class
members have a property interest in the unclaimed funds and
object to the cy pres recipients selected, they may typically
intervene in the lawsuit for purposes of appealing an eventual
order directing a cy pres distribution.” Id. at 181. To the
extent that tentative statement may be read to grant property
rights in leftover funds to class members who participate
successfully in a settlement agreement’s claims process, receive
the maximum award permitted by the settlement agreement, and who
neither object to nor appeal from the entry of that settlement
agreement, the Court disagrees. See supra at 32–35.
Because the Great Plains Claimants retain no legal claim to
the fund, their desire that the Agreement be modified to provide
for additional payments to previously successful class members,
while understandable, is not a legal interest that faces
imminent invasion. Accordingly, they lack standing.9
9
The Court also agrees with the government’s contention that any
injury the Great Plains Claimants may suffer by virtue of not
receiving additional payments beyond those received to satisfy
their claims is not causally linked to an action of the
defendant in this case; rather, it is a product of their assent
to and participation in the Agreement. See B’hood of Locomotive
Engs. & Trainmen v. Surface Transp. Bd., 457 F.3d 24, 28 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
37
B. The Great Plains Claimants May Not Intervene
Permissively.
As discussed in Part III.B, supra, the same standing
requirements applicable to intervention as of right apply to
permissive intervention. Like the Choctaw Movants, moreover, the
Great Plains Claimants have not attempted to argue otherwise.
See supra at 30 n.6 (noting that the Choctaw Movants conceded
that standing was required for permissive intervention by
failing to oppose the government’s argument). Accordingly, their
lack of standing precludes them from obtaining permissive
intervention.
C. The Great Plains Claimants May File an Amicus Curiae
Brief.
The Great Plains Claimants request, in the alternative, that
the Court grant them leave to participate in the settlement-
modification proceedings as amici curiae. See Mot. to Intervene,
ECF No. 705-1 at 21. Neither party objects to this request.
Moreover, the Great Plains Claimants rightly note that this
Court has broad discretion to permit participation of amici
especially where, as here, the proposed amici may provide a
unique perspective on issues pending before the Court. See id.
Accordingly, the Great Plains Claimants may enter their
appearance as amici curiae.
38
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to intervene filed by
the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and the Jones Academy Foundation,
and by the Great Plains Claimants are DENIED. The request of the
Great Plains Claimants to participate in the pending settlement-
modification proceedings as amici curiae is GRANTED. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
November 7, 2014
39