in the Interest of H.C., a Child

NUMBER 13-14-00341-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG IN THE INTEREST OF H.C., A CHILD On appeal from the County Court at Law of Aransas County, Texas. MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes Appellant T.C. challenges the trial court's judgment terminating his parental rights with respect to H.C., a minor child.1 We affirm. 1 We refer to appellant and the minor child by their initials in accordance with Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.8. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b) (providing that in a parental-rights termination case, "the court must, in its opinion, use an alias to refer to a minor, and if necessary to protect the minor's identity, to the minor's parent or other family member"); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) ("On the motion of the parties or on the court's own motion, the appellate court in its opinion may identify the parties by fictitious names or by their initials only."). I. COMPLIANCE WITH ANDERS Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that her review of the record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. 386 U.S. 738, 774–45 (1967); Porter v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) ("W]hen appointed counsel represents an indigent client in a parental termination appeal and concludes that there are no non- frivolous issues for appeal, counsel may file an Anders-type brief."). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ("In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance 'arguable' points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.") (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).2 In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 2014 WL 2865901, at *3, appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court's judgment. Counsel has informed this Court, in writing, that counsel has: (1) notified 2 The State did not file a brief. Instead, the State responded to the Anders brief by acknowledging that counsel for appellant concluded that the appeal was frivolous and without merit and informing us that it would not file an appellee’s brief unless necessary after reviewing any pro se response or upon order of this Court. 2 appellant that counsel filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant of appellant’s rights to file a pro se response,3 to review the record preparatory to filing that response, and to seek discretionary review if the court of appeals concludes that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided appellant with a copy of the record. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 2014 WL 2865901, at *3, Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409. II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, this Court must conduct a full examination of all proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); see also In re G.M., No. 13-08-00569-CV, 2009 WL 2547493, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel's brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ("Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1."); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 3 In the criminal context, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that "the pro se response [to a ‘frivolous appeal’ brief] need not comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues." In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)). 3 III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, counsel asks this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) ("If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.") (citations omitted)). We grant counsel's motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, we order counsel to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to appellant and to advise appellant of his right to pursue a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court.4 See In re K.D., 127 S.W.3d 66, 68 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). GREGORY T. PERKES Justice Delivered and filed the 23rd day of October, 2014. 4 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Supreme Court, she must either retain an attorney to file a petition for review or file a pro se petition for review. Any petition for review must be filed with the Texas Supreme Court clerk within forty-five days after the date of either this opinion or the last ruling by this Court on all timely filed motions for rehearing or en banc reconsideration. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53.7(a). Any petition for review must comply with the requirements of rule 53.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. at R. 53.2. 4