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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DIVISION ONE
Appellant,
No. 71332-9-1
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STEVEN WILLIAM STINE,
Respondent. FILED: November 10, 2014
Dwyer, J. — In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Here,
Steven Stine challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's
verdict that he committed one count of assault in the third degree. Finding the
record replete with evidence in support of the verdict, we affirm.
The due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions require that
the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000);
U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Wash. Const, art. I, § 3. "[T]he critical inquiry on
review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must
be ... to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a
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finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson. 443 U.S. at 318. "[T]he
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 319.
A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all
reasonable inferences from that evidence. State v. Kintz, 169 Wn.2d 537, 551,
238 P.3d 470 (2010). Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence can be
equally reliable. State v. Delmarter. 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).
We defer to the jury on questions of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses,
and the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Killingsworth, 166 Wn. App.
283, 287, 269 P.3d 1064 (2012).
RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g) provides:
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree if he or she,
under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first or second
degree: . . . (g) Assaults a law enforcement officer or other
employee of a law enforcement agency who was performing his or
her official duties at the time of the assault.
Therefore, in order to convict Stine of assault in the third degree pursuant
to RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g), the jury was required to find that the State proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Stine intentionally assaulted a law enforcement
officer. The jurywas instructed on the following definitions of assault and
intention: "An assault is an intentional touching or striking of another person, that
is harmful or offensive, regardless of whether any physical injury is done to the
No. 71332-9-1/3
person," and "A person acts with intent or intentionally when acting with the
objective or purpose to accomplish a result that constitutes a crime."
II
The evidence adduced at trial included the following: On the evening of
October 3, 2013, at around 7:30 p.m., Lynnwood Police Officer Donald Blakely
was driving through an area of Lynnwood looking for a bicycle that had been
reported stolen. About two blocks from where Blakely took the initial report, he
saw Stine walking a bicycle along the sidewalk. Blakely, who was in full uniform
at the time, pulled his patrol car up to Stine and turned his spotlight on him.
Blakely made contact with Stine. Stine was slow to comply with Blakely's
commands and acted in a way that made Blakely concerned for his own safety.
As a result, Blakely told Stine to lie on the ground. Stine did not comply. After
telling Stine to lie on the ground several times without success, Blakely
approached Stine and grabbed his hand. Blakely told Stine that he was under
arrest.
When Blakely grabbed Stine's hand, Stine pulled away. Blakely was
unable to handcuff Stine because he kept pulling away. Blakely then took Stine
to the ground, with Stine lying face-forward and Blakely on top of him. Stine
continued to struggle and his arms flailed about, preventing the officer from
taking hold of both of his arms. Stine then quickly spun around and onto his
back, striking the officer in the face with either his elbow or his fist as he spun
toward him.
Blakely testified that the interaction changed at that point. It "went from
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No. 71332-9-1/4
passive resisting or resisting arrest to this is a fight." Stine punched Blakely in
the face and chest, and Blakely struck Stine in the face more than once. Blakely
testified both that Stine's arms were "just flailing around," and that Stine was
"trying to strike me." He described that Stine's fists were clenched and his arms
were moving in a striking motion.
Lynnwood Police Officer William Koonce soon arrived and took the place
of a civilian who had stopped to help Blakely. Koonce noted that Stine was
struggling and flailing around, trying to break free. He testified that "[i]t looked
like [Stine] was trying to maybe strike at them to get them to let go."
Finally, the officers managed to handcuff Stine with his hands behind his
back. After Stine was placed under arrest, Koonce advised him of his
constitutional rights. Stine waived his rights. When Koonce asked him about the
fight, Stine responded that he was "just wrestling turtle style."
As a result of the interaction with Stine, Blakely sustained a cut and
scrape to his lower lip and cuts or scrapes to a number of his fingers.1
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, sufficient evidence was
presented for a rational trier of fact to find that Stine acted intentionally in
assaulting Blakely, whom he knew to be a police officer. Blakely testified that
Stine was not just flailing about without intention but, rather, was trying to strike
him. Blakely described that Stine's fists were clenched and that he moved his
arms in a striking motion as Stine punched Blakely in the face and chest.
1Photographs of the injuries, taken that night, were admitted into evidence and published
to the jury.
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Koonce's testimony corroborated Blakely's account of events. Koonce testified
that it looked as if Stine was trying to strike at Blakely so that Blakely would let go
of him. The jury was entitled to credit the officers' testimony. Moreover, Stine's
statement that he was "just wrestling turtle style" also indicates that Stine was
fighting Blakely intentionally.
The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Stine intentionally assaulted law enforcement officer
Blakely. Stine's insufficiency of the evidence claim fails.
Affirmed.
We concur:
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