[Cite as Goffstein v. Goffstein, 2014-Ohio-5060.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
JULIE B. GOFFSTEIN, : APPEAL NO. C-140010
TRIAL NO. DR-1001501
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. :
O P I N I O N.
PETER M. GOFFSTEIN, :
Defendant. :
Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
Division
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part, and Cause
Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 14, 2014
Timothy J. Bicknell, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
HILDEBRANDT, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Julie B. Goffstein appeals the judgment of the
Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, finding her
to be in contempt of court in a divorce action.
The Motion for Contempt
{¶2} Pursuant to orders of the trial court, Mrs. Goffstein was required to
permit defendant Peter M. Goffstein visitation with their minor children and to
provide for their education. Mr. Goffstein filed a motion for contempt, alleging,
among other things, that Mrs. Goffstein had interfered with his custodial rights by
violating the visitation order and by failing to enroll one of the children in school.
{¶3} Hearings were conducted on July 29, 2013, and December 9, 2013. At
the December hearing, Mrs. Goffstein conceded that she had not complied with the
court’s visitation order as it related to one of the children and that she had not
enrolled one of the other children in school as required by the court. The court
imposed nine days of incarceration for each of the two violations. But the trial court
held that Mrs. Goffstein could purge the contempt by providing compensatory
visitation time and by enrolling the child in school. The sentences and purge
conditions were journalized in an entry filed December 10, 2013.
{¶4} On December 17, 2013, without further hearing on the matter, the
trial court journalized an entry captioned “Amended Entry to the Entry of 12-10-
2013-Nunc Pro Tunc to 12-10-2013.” In the purported nunc pro tunc entry, the court
imposed additional conditions for Mrs. Goffstein to purge the contempt and avoid
jail time. Of particular concern here, the court required Mrs. Goffstein to pay Mr.
Goffstein’s attorney fees in the amount of $2,462.50, and to pay a fine of $250.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Contempt and Due Process
{¶5} We begin with Mrs. Goffstein’s second assignment of error, in which
she contends that the trial court violated her due-process rights in the manner in
which it conducted the contempt hearing.
{¶6} An alleged contemnor must be afforded due process in a civil-
contempt hearing. See, e.g., Askin v. Askin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-404, 2013-
Ohio-5606, ¶ 10. Due-process requirements, as well as R.C. 2705.03, mandate that a
person accused of indirect contempt be given adequate notice, an opportunity to
prepare a defense, and an opportunity to be heard. Id.; Culberson v. Culberson, 60
Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 397 N.E.2d 1226 (1st Dist.1978). But a trial court’s decision
finding a party to be in contempt will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
Wolf v. Wolf, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090587, 2010-Ohio-2762, ¶ 4.
{¶7} Mrs. Goffstein first argues that the court erred in basing its contempt
finding on the representations of Mr. Goffstein’s attorney. We find no merit in this
argument. Mrs. Goffstein herself, on the record and under oath, conceded that she
had not complied with the trial court’s orders to provide visitation and to enroll the
child in school. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s acceptance of Mrs.
Goffstein’s admission that she was in contempt.
{¶8} Mrs. Goffstein also argues that the trial court did not permit her to
present a defense to the contempt allegations or to cross-examine Mr. Goffstein
about the allegations. We are not persuaded. As we have already noted, Mrs.
Goffstein admitted that she was in contempt of the court orders. She has not
demonstrated that any defect in the hearing violated her due-process rights or
resulted in material prejudice.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶9} Finally, Mrs. Goffstein argues that she was not given the opportunity
to demonstrate that she was financially unable to comply with the trial court’s
orders. We find no merit in this argument. At the hearing before the trial court,
Mrs. Goffstein attempted to adduce evidence concerning her ability to meet the
financial obligations imposed by the court’s orders. The court declined to entertain
such evidence, stating on the record that it was confining its judgment to issues that
were unrelated to Mrs. Goffstein’s financial situation. As the court stated “[s]he’s
being incarcerated because of the failure to provide the * * * compensatory parenting
time * * *.” Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the evidence.
{¶10} Finding no error in the trial court’s original entry filed December 10,
2013, we overrule the second assignment of error.
The Nunc Pro Tunc Entry
{¶11} In her first assignment of error, Mrs. Goffstein argues that the trial
court erred in amending its entry nunc pro tunc to provide additional purge
conditions.
{¶12} “Nunc pro tunc entries are limited in proper use to reflecting what the
court actually decided, not what the court might have decided or what the court
intended to decide.” Miller v. Watkins, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-030065, 2004-
Ohio-3132, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner, 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 656 N.E.2d
1288 (1995). When a nunc pro tunc entry reflects a substantive change in the
judgment, it is inappropriate. Miller at ¶ 8.
{¶13} In this case, the nunc pro tunc entry was improper. In the later entry,
the trial court added numerous substantive purge conditions, including the
requirement that Mrs. Goffstein pay a $250 fine and that she pay Mr. Goffstein’s
attorney fees in the amount of $2,462.50. And these provisions were added after the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
trial court, at the hearing conducted on December 9, 2013, had explicitly stated that
it was imposing jail time only with respect to the custodial issues. Thus, the nunc pro
tunc entry went far beyond what the court actually decided on the date of the original
entry, and it deprived Mrs. Goffstein of the opportunity to challenge the additional
terms. We sustain the first assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶14} We affirm the judgment of the trial court as contained in the entry
journalized December 10, 2013. We vacate the nunc pro tunc entry and remand the
cause for further proceedings.
Judgment accordingly.
DINKELACKER and DEWINE, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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