[Cite as In re S.P., 2014-Ohio-5075.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
In re S.P. Court of Appeals No. L-14-1113
Trial Court No. JC 13232363
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: November 12, 2014
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Adam H. Houser, for appellant.
Dianne L. Keeler, for appellee.
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JENSEN, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common
Pleas, Juvenile Division, terminating the parental rights of C.S. (“father”) and appellant
Si.P. (“mother”), and awarding permanent custody of S.P. to appellee, Lucas County
Children Services (“LCCS”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Factual Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Preliminarily, we note that father did not participate in the termination
hearing and has not filed a notice of appeal. Thus, our discussion and analysis will focus
on the facts as they pertain to mother.
{¶ 3} S.P. was born on March 4, 2012. Seven months later, LCCS received a
referral indicating that S.P. had missed several appointments with his pediatrician and
appeared underweight for his age. The referral also indicated that mother did not utilize a
car seat when transporting the infant in vehicles. LCCS intervened. Despite assistance
from her caseworker, mother failed to take S.P. to various medical appointments and
continued to transport the infant without a car seat.
{¶ 4} On February 1, 2013, LCCS filed a complaint in dependency and neglect in
In re S.P., Lucas C.P. No. JC13230110. Seven days later, mother took S.P. to the
emergency room for “bruises and bumps.” When the child was examined by emergency
room personnel, they could find no injuries on the child.
{¶ 5} On February 13, 2013, LCCS amended its complaint to include a request for
shelter care. LCCS was awarded interim temporary custody on February 13, 2013. The
initial complaint could not be heard within 90 days of its filing. Thus, the matter was
dismissed.
{¶ 6} On May 1, 2013, LCCS filed its complaint in the instant action alleging, in
part, that S.P. was underweight for his age, that mother did not utilize a car seat when
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transporting the child in vehicles, that mother slept most of the night and day and failed
to attend to the child, and that mother suffered from paranoid thoughts and delusions.
{¶ 7} On July 17, 2013, the parties, including mother and father, agreed to a
finding of dependency. The court awarded temporary custody of S.P. to LCCS. Case
plans were implemented with the goal of reunification. S.P. was placed in the care of a
maternal relative.
{¶ 8} A review hearing was held on October 24, 2013. Caseworker Tymeeka
Gipson indicated the placement was going well; S.P.’s needs were being met, and he was
“thriving to the best of his ability” within the relative’s home. Gipson further indicated
that mother completed her assessment and had been diagnosed with “psychotic disorder
none other specified.” Despite therapy sessions with a licensed social worker, mother
refused to recognize her diagnosis. When asked why mother had not been offered
parenting classes pursuant to the case plan, Gipson indicated LCCS would not make
parenting classes available until mother had “a clear understanding of her * * *
diagnosis.”
{¶ 9} Mother was allowed “level one” supervised visits with S.P. During the
visits mother often voiced concerns about bruises and marks on the child. When staff
members investigated mother’s concerns they generally found no bruises or marks.
{¶ 10} An annual review was held February 12, 2014. At the hearing, Gipson
reported that mother had “very little insight” and “did not understand the severity” of her
psychotic disorder. The evidence before the trial court indicated that mother continued to
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have delusional thoughts and continued to accuse LCCS staff of abusing her son.
Mother’s attendance at therapy was inconsistent and she refused to take the medication
prescribed for her.
{¶ 11} At the permanent custody hearing, Diann M. Hack, a licensed social
worker with Unison Behavior, indicated that mother had been diagnosed with a psychotic
disorder relating to nonbizzare type delusions. A copy of Hack’s diagnostic assessment
was made part of the record.
{¶ 12} Hack explained that mother’s delusions related to mother’s belief that
people, including her doctor and landlord, wanted to have sexual relations with her. Not
all of mother’s delusions related to sex, however. Mother believed that wherever she
went, people wanted her money, her food, and her food stamps. She accused neighbors
of entering into her apartment and taking silverware and dish soap. She felt like people
were always harassing her.
{¶ 13} Hack testified that mother’s psychiatric appointments were scheduled
“bimonthly to monthly” but that mother only showed up 30-40 percent of the time. Hack
explained that mother often called to cancel her appointments indicating she no longer
needed help. When asked whether mother was taking her medication as prescribed,
Hack indicated that mother “always stated that she had her meds and was taking them,
but it didn’t seem as if she was taking them * * * because she always made mention of
having issues with the pharmacy and getting the medications * * * .”
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{¶ 14} Hack testified that mother had moved three times since April 2013, and that
during mother’s most recent appointment she was still suffering from delusions.
Specifically, mother had indicated that “people were still entering her apartment and
taking things.” During cross-examination, Hack was asked whether mother could have
benefited from parenting classes, Hack responded, “I believe she should have had an
opportunity to take parenting classes. I don’t know if she would have benefited.”
{¶ 15} Gipson testified that she was assigned to mother’s case in June 2013.
Gipson indicted that on several occasions she discussed with mother the importance of
attending her therapy session. In response, mother would often indicate that she was not
“depressed.” Then, Gipson would explain to mother that her diagnosis was not
depression, but a psychotic disorder. As a result of this interaction, Gipson firmly
believed that mother simply did not understand the nature and extent of her mental
illness.
{¶ 16} Gipson testified that mother often complained about her neighbors breaking
into her apartment to use dish soap and steal silverware. Gipson further indicated that
during visits, mother often complained that her son’s clothes and shoes were too little
when, in fact, S.P.’s clothing and shoes were appropriate for his size.
{¶ 17} Gipson indicated that mother did not understand S.P.’s feeding needs.
When Gipson would explain the need to feed the child age appropriate foods, mother
would “dismiss” the information.
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{¶ 18} When asked why mother was on “level one, the highest level of
supervision” with her child, Gipson explained that the heightened precautions were
necessary because mother had a “lack of insight as to the development of her child.”
{¶ 19} In regard to S.P., Gipson indicated that he was receiving Help Me Grow
services and early intervention for occupation and speech therapy, and that there were
some concerns with his fine motor skills. Gipson further indicated that there were
concerns about slow weight gain. She explained that S.P.’s pediatrician had prescribed
PediaSure on a daily basis. When asked whether mother understood S.P.’s special needs,
Gipson indicated that mom often indicated that she believed nothing was wrong with S.P.
To further that point, Gipson stated that mother had been observed throwing away some
PediaSure that had been packed in S.P.’s bag by the foster parent.
{¶ 20} Finally, Gipson indicated that in her opinion, it was in S.P.’s best interest
for LCCS to obtain permanent custody with the goal of adoption.
{¶ 21} Serra Pearson testified on behalf of mother. Pearson first met mother when
mother was removed from her parents. As a child, mother was in the foster care system
for approximately 12 years. Pearson testified that she was very fond of mother and that
mother generally reacted favorably to her.
{¶ 22} Pearson worked with mother throughout the instant case to help mother
understand the requirements of the case plan. Pearson encouraged mother to attend her
therapy appointments and take the medication prescribed to her.
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{¶ 23} On cross-examination, Pearson admitted that mother did not always follow
her advice. And, when asked what was in mother’s best interest, Pearson opined, “I do
believe that I would recommend that [mother] take care of herself because I don’t think –
she needs to take care of herself first, and that’s what I would recommend for sure. * * * I
would like her to meet her counseling appointments, take her medicine that is
recommended by her doctor.” When asked to further explain her response, Pearson
indicated, “I don’t feel that you can help anybody else unless you take care of yourself
first. You need to be healthy and strong as you can be and focus on yourself. Focus on
herself.”
{¶ 24} Anita Levin, the guardian ad litem for S.P., testified that she recommended
permanent custody based on mother’s “delusional thinking” and “inappropriate parenting
style.” She indicated that S.P. needed permanence and that it had been just about a year
since he had been out of his mother’s care. She indicated that the significant gains S.P.
had made in small motor and gross motor abilities during that time could only be
supported by permanence and stability. Levin opined that mother was not in a position to
take care of her child because “she doesn’t seem to have insight into the reasons” the
child was taken from her.
{¶ 25} On May 6, 2014, the trial court issued a judgment entry granting LCCS’s
motion for permanent custody. The court found that under R.C. 2151.414(E), S.P. could
not be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed
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with either parent, and that under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), a grant of permanent custody to
LCCS was in the child’s best interest. In support of its decision, the trial court explained,
[Mother] has failed to accept the seriousness of her mental illness
and the need for services to address it. The Court finds that although she
wants her child to be returned to her, she has not completed the case plan
that was approved by this Court or substantially remedied the conditions
that caused removal. The Court finds that she has not regularly attended
mental health therapy to address a psychotic disorder and is not regularly
taking medication prescribed for it. The Court finds her failure to follow
through with mental health services has significantly impacted her ability to
realistically understand and meet her child’s basic and special needs, which
she has demonstrated she cannot be counted on to do. Although there was
evidence that [mother] was in special classes when in school and did suffer
some delays, the Court finds that there is persuasive evidence that [mother]
was not so delayed that she was unable to understand that she needed to
participate in mental health services, which participation would have
enhanced her ability to obtain return of her child.
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{¶ 26} Mother appealed and advances one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The termination of Appellant’s parental rights was against the
manifest weight of the evidence as the agency failed to make reasonable
efforts to reunify the child with the mother and mother substantially
complied with the case plan services.
Standard of Review
{¶ 27} Before a trial court may terminate parental rights and award permanent
custody of a child to the moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of
both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned, orphaned, has
been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-
month period, or that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable
time or should not be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C.
2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best
interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D). In re R.L., 9th Dist.
Summit Nos. 27214, 27233, 2014-Ohio-3117, ¶ 22, citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and
2151.414(B)(2); In re Williams, 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 99, 661 N.E.2d 738 (1996).
{¶ 28} A trial court’s determination in a permanent custody case will not be
reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re A.H.,
6th Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1057, 2011-Ohio-4857, ¶ 11. The factual findings of a trial
court are presumed correct since, as the trier of fact, it is in the best position to weigh the
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evidence and evaluate the testimony. In re Brown, 98 Ohio App.3d 337, 342, 648 N.E.2d
576 (3d Dist.1994). Moreover, “[e]very reasonable presumption must be made in favor
of the judgment and the findings of facts [of the trial court].” Karches v. Cincinnati, 38
Ohio St.3d 12, 19, 526 N.E.2d 1350 (1988). Thus, judgments supported by some
competent, credible evidence going to all essential elements of the case are not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.
{¶ 29} Here, the trial court found that the first prong of the permanent custody test
was satisfied by a finding that the child could not be placed with either parent in a
reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).
In so finding, the court relied upon R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), failure to remedy conditions,
and R.C. 2151.414(E)(2), mother’s chronic mental illness.
{¶ 30} R.C. 2151.414(E) provides, in relevant part:
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home
and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the
child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and
repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be
placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have
substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental
utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and
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rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to
the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to
resume and maintain parental duties.
(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, mental
retardation, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is
so severe that it makes parent unable to provide an adequate permanent
home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year
after the court holds the hearing pursuant to division (A) of this section or
for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised
Code.
{¶ 31} In her sole assignment of error, mother asserts the trial court erred when it
ruled that mother “failed to remedy the [R.C] 2151.414(E)(1) and (2).” In her brief,
mother does not specifically challenge the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2)
relating to mother’s chronic mental illness. Rather, she argues the problems that initially
caused the child to be placed outside the home—mother’s inability to properly dress, feed
and interact with the child—“could have been resolved through a parenting class.”
Without addressing the severity of her mental illness, mother contends that LCCS’s
failure to refer her to the case plan’s interactive parenting class prevented reunification
with her child.
{¶ 32} “Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, the existence of only one of
the factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) is sufficient to determine that a child cannot be placed
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with a parent within a reasonable time.” In re R.L., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27214, 27233,
2014-Ohio-3117 at ¶ 24. See R.C. 2151.414(E) (“If the court determines * * * that one or
more of the following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding
that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not
be placed with either parent.”) To demonstrate reversible error, mother “must
demonstrate not only that the trial court committed error but also that the error negatively
affected the outcome of the case.” In re A.S., 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 14CA010532,
14CA010534, 2014-Ohio-2458, ¶ 11 (citations omitted). “Because the trial court is
required to find only one statutory ground to support the first prong of the permanent
custody test, * * * any error in its alternate findings is not prejudicial as long as one of the
trial court’s stated grounds is proper.” Id. Thus, even assuming merit in mother’s
challenge to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), the trial court’s second and alternative finding under
R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) stands. Id.
{¶ 33} We have reviewed the record and determined that the evidence fully
supports the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) that mother “has failed to
accept the seriousness of her mental illness and the need for services to address it” and
that the failure has “significantly impacted [mother’s] ability to realistically understand
and meet her child’s basic and special needs.” Mother has failed to demonstrate the
alleged error under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) negatively affected the outcome of the case. See
In re R.L., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27214, 27233, 2014-Ohio-3117 at ¶ 24. Accordingly,
mother’s sole assignment of error is not well-taken.
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{¶ 34} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Appellant mother is ordered to pay the
costs of this appeal in accordance with App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
James D. Jensen, J.
CONCUR. _______________________________
JUDGE
Stephen A. Yarbrough, P.J _______________________________
CONCURS AND WRITES JUDGE
SEPARATELY.
YARBROUGH, P.J.
{¶ 35} I concur in the majority’s decision affirming the juvenile court’s judgment.
I write separately to address appellant’s argument challenging the juvenile court’s
findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1).
{¶ 36} In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49
(2000), the United States Supreme Court noted that parents’ interest in the care, custody,
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and control of their children “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.” The protection of the family unit has always been a vital
concern of the courts. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d
551 (1972).
{¶ 37} Ohio courts have long held that “parents who are ‘suitable’ persons have a
‘paramount’ right to the custody of their minor children.” In re Perales, 52 Ohio St.2d
89, 97, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (1977). Therefore, parents “must be afforded every procedural
and substantive protection the law allows.” In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16, 601
N.E.2d 45 (6th Dist.1991).
{¶ 38} Thus, a finding of inadequate parental care, supported by clear and
convincing evidence, is a necessary predicate to terminating parental rights. “Before any
court may consider whether a child’s best interests may be served by permanent removal
from his or her family, there must be first a demonstration that the parents are ‘unfit.’”
In re Stacey S., 136 Ohio App.3d 503, 516, 737 N.E.2d 92 (6th Dist.1999), citing Quillon
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978). Parental unfitness is
demonstrated by evidence sufficient to support findings pursuant to R.C. 2151.414. See
In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 661 N.E.2d 738 (1996), syllabus.
{¶ 39} In order to terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a
child to a public services agency under R.C. 2151.414, the juvenile court must find, by
clear and convincing evidence, two things: (1) that one of the enumerated factors in R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(d) apply, and (2) that permanent custody is in the best interests of the
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child. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). As previously indicated, the juvenile court in this case
examined the factors contained in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and found that the child could not
be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either
parent under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). Moreover, the court examined R.C.
2151.414(D)(1) and concluded that an award of permanent custody to LCCS was in the
best interests of the child. The court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) were based
upon additional findings under R.C. 2151.414(E), which provides, in relevant part:
(E) In determining * * * whether a child cannot be placed with either
parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the
parents, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court
determines, by clear and convincing evidence, * * * that one or more of the
following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a
finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home
and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the
child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and
repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be
placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have
substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental
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utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and
rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to
the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to
resume and maintain parental duties.
(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, mental
retardation, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is
so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent
home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year
after the court holds the hearing pursuant to division (A) of this section or
for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised
Code.
{¶ 40} In its judgment entry, the juvenile court found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)
and (2) were applicable in this case. In particular, the court concluded that appellant
failed to accept the seriousness of her mental illness and the need for services to address
it. The court further found that appellant had not substantially remedied the conditions
that caused removal. In support of its findings, the juvenile court noted appellant’s
inconsistent attendance at therapy sessions and her failure to take medication that was
prescribed to treat her psychosis.
{¶ 41} In her appellate brief, appellant argues that the juvenile court’s findings
under R.C. 2151.414(E) were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Referring to
R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), appellant contends that LCCS failed to “exercise reasonable case
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planning and to make diligent efforts to remedy the problems that initially caused the
child to be placed outside the home.” In support of her contention, appellant notes that
LCCS failed to offer her an interactive parenting class. However, a review of Tymeeka
Gipson’s testimony from the October 24, 2013 review hearing makes it clear that the
parenting classes sought by appellant were withheld as a result of appellant’s refusal to
recognize her mental health issues. Indeed, at a subsequent review hearing that was held
four months later, Gipson indicated that appellant was still refusing to acknowledge her
mental health issues. Rather, she persisted in accusing LCCS staff members of abusing
the child despite no evidence to support the accusation. Moreover, Gipson testified that
appellant refused to take her medication.
{¶ 42} In addition to the testimony offered at the review hearings, the testimony
from the permanent custody hearing reveals that appellant only appeared at her
psychiatric appointments 30-40 percent of the time. Further, Diann Hack testified that, as
of the date of the permanent custody hearing, appellant was still suffering from delusional
thoughts. Hack was skeptical as to whether appellant could have realized any benefit
from parenting classes.
{¶ 43} In light of the foregoing, I find that the juvenile court’s judgment regarding
the applicability of R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) was supported by the record and was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Furthermore, based on the evidence presented at the
permanent custody hearing as to appellant’s persistent mental health issues, I conclude
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that the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
{¶ 44} Accordingly, I concur in the judgment affirming the juvenile court’s award
of permanent custody to LCCS.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.
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