Filed 11/18/14 Marriage of Phillips CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re the Marriage of LUZVIMINDA B. and
STEWART H. PHILLIPS.
D064712
LUZVIMINDA B. PHILLIPS,
Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. DN174329)
v.
STEWART H. PHILLIPS,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kelly C. Dowlan, Commissioner. Affirmed.
William C. Halsey for Appellant.
Sara R. Neumann for Respondent.
In 2013, Luzviminda Phillips filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Stewart
H. Phillips. Stewart moved to quash the petition on the ground a court in Guam
entered a final judgment of divorce in 2011, Luzviminda never challenged the validity
of the judgment in Guam and the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit. The
trial court granted the motion and dismissed the dissolution petition. Luzviminda
appeals, contending the Guamanian divorce (1) is void because both parties were
domiciled in California and (2) was obtained by fraud. We reject her contentions and
affirm the order.
DISCUSSION
Luzviminda notes that when the parties signed a marital settlement agreement
in 2011 that was later incorporated into the Guamanian judgment of divorce, both
parties listed California as their address. Accordingly, Luzviminda asserts both parties
were domiciled in California and the Guamanian judgment of divorce is void under
Family Code section 2091. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Family
Code.) We disagree.
Marriage dissolution is a proceeding in rem where the marriage is the res that is
adjudicated. (Zaragoza v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 720, 724-725.)
" 'The res which is the subject of adjudication is an intangible. Jurisdiction is exercised
not by taking custody of a tangible article, but by serving process [] upon the other
spouse.' " (Id. at p. 725.) Section 2091 is part of the Uniform Divorce Recognition
Act. (§ 2090 et seq.) Section 2091 provides the following: "A divorce obtained in
another jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect in this state if both parties to the
marriage were domiciled in this state at the time the proceeding for the divorce was
commenced." The seemingly broad language of section 2091, however, is tempered
by section 2093, which provides that "[t]he application of this chapter [which includes
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section 2091] is limited by the requirement of the Constitution of the United States that
full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of every other state." (See also, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 ["[J]udicial
proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."].)
To be entitled to full faith and credit, the issue of jurisdiction need not have
been actively litigated in the court rendering the divorce decree. (Heuer v. Heuer
(1949) 33 Cal.2d 268, 271.) Where a party participated in the proceedings and had full
opportunity to litigate the issue, the divorce "decree is binding even though a
relitigation of the question of jurisdictional residence requirements in another state
might result in a finding that the domiciliary claim was fraudulently asserted for the
purpose of obtaining a decree which as a matter of policy could not be procured in the
state of actual domicile." (Ibid.)
California generally accords full faith and credit to a divorce recognized as
valid in the state in which it was originally granted. (Estate of Grimble (1974) 42
Cal.App.3d 741, 748-749.) Under the Family Code, " '[s]tate' means a state of the
United States, the District of Columbia, or a commonwealth, territory, or insular
possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." (§ 145.) Guam is an
unincorporated territory of the United States (48 U.S.C.A. § 1421a); thus, Guam is a
state within the meaning of the Family Code. Accordingly, the judicial proceedings of
Guam are entitled to full faith and credit if the Guamanian court properly adjudicated
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the divorce. To determine whether Guam properly adjudicated the parties' divorce, we
must examine the Guamanian statutes.
In Guam, a court may grant an uncontested divorce if both parties agree to the
terms of the divorce and at least one spouse has resided in Guam for a minimum of
seven days immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. (19 G.C.A. § 8318,
subd. (b).) If the consent to a divorce is signed in the United States, it must be verified
before a notary public. (19 G.C.A. § 8319, subd. (b).) The Guamanian court may
grant an uncontested divorce based upon the verified complaint if it appears to be in
the interests of justice. (19 G.C.A. § 8320.) If the Guamanian court dissolves the
marriage, it enters an interlocutory judgment (19 G.C.A. § 8321), followed by a final
divorce decree (19 G.C.A. § 8320).
In 2011, the parties filled out and signed a marital settlement agreement form in
California agreeing to settle all matters regarding their marital affairs and intending
that the marital settlement agreement be incorporated into any subsequent divorce
decree. The marital settlement agreement was notarized. The following month, a
Guamanian court entered an interlocutory judgment of divorce and a final divorce
decree. The interlocutory judgment stated that the matter was uncontested, the court
acquired jurisdiction based on Stewart's residency in Guam for seven days,
Luzviminda entered her appearance and consented that the cause be heard as a default
matter. The court approved the marital settlement agreement and ordered the parties to
perform the terms of the agreement. The final divorce decree reaffirmed the terms of
the interlocutory judgment.
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The recitations within the interlocutory judgment and final divorce decree show
the Guamanian court complied with Guamanian statutes governing dissolution of
marriage. Nonetheless, where a court decides a collateral attack on the validity of
another forum's dissolution judgment, the court is not bound by the first forum's
jurisdictional recitals and may make a de novo determination based on extrinsic
evidence. (Crouch v. Crouch (1946) 28 Cal.2d 243, 249-250.) Here, however,
nothing in Luzviminda's sworn declaration challenged the recitations within the
interlocutory judgment and final divorce decree. In contrast, Stewart's declaration
states he went to Guam in July 2011 to file the divorce action. Accordingly, the trial
court properly concluded that the Guamanian divorce decree was entitled to full faith
and credit.
Luzviminda next argues she is entitled to relief from the Guamanian divorce
decree because Stewart procured it by fraud. She claims Stewart repeatedly told her
the divorce was " 'pretend.' " Stewart, however, denied telling Luzviminda the divorce
was " 'pretend' " and claimed Luzviminda willingly participated in the divorce and later
held herself out as divorced. Based on this conflicting evidence, the trial court could
reasonably reject Luzviminda's claim of fraud.
In summary, because the parties' Guamanian divorce was valid in Guam, it is
entitled to full faith and credit here. Thus, the trial court properly granted Stewart's
motion to quash as the res of the marriage no longer existed and there was nothing to
dissolve. (In re Marriage of Zierenberg (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1445.)
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
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