UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4482
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMARIO ARTEZ FORD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (3:12-cr-00040-JFA-1)
Submitted: November 20, 2014 Decided: November 24, 2014
Before KING and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Howard W. Anderson, III, LAW OFFICE OF HOWARD W. ANDERSON, III,
LLC, Clemson, South Carolina, for Appellant. Stanley D.
Ragsdale, William Kenneth Witherspoon, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamario Artez Ford pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to brandishing a firearm during the commission of a
crime of violence (Count 5), and discharging a firearm during
the commission of a crime of violence (Count 9). The district
court imposed mandatory minimum sentences on both counts for a
total of 384 months of imprisonment (84 months for Count 5 and
300 months consecutively for Count 9). On appeal, Ford’s
attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), alleging there are no meritorious issues in
light of Ford’s late notice of appeal and appellate waiver in
his plea agreement. Ford was notified of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief, but has not filed a brief. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
We first note that Ford’s notice of appeal was
untimely and that the district court did not grant an extension
of time to file or reopen the filing period. In criminal cases,
appeals periods are not jurisdictional, but are court-prescribed
claim-processing rules that do not affect this court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction. See Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 810-11
(4th Cir. 2010) (stating that non-statutory claim-processing
rules are not jurisdictional); United States v. Urutyan, 564
F.3d 679, 685 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he non-statutory time limits
in Appellate Rule 4(b) do not affect subject matter
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jurisdiction.”). The appeal period may still be enforced by
this court when the Rule 4(b) time bar is invoked by the
government; however, in this case, the government has not
invoked the Rule 4(b) time bar or moved to dismiss the appeal as
untimely. Therefore, we conclude that dismissal of the appeal
based on the untimely notice of appeal is not appropriate.
Next, we observe that Ford waived the right to appeal
his conviction and sentence in his plea agreement except for
ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct. A
defendant may waive the right to appeal if the waiver is knowing
and intelligent. United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 270
(4th Cir. 2007). However, the government has not chosen to
enforce the waiver, and it is our policy not to raise this issue
sua sponte. Therefore, we need not consider whether the waiver
is dispositive of this appeal. See id. at 271 (stating that, if
an Anders brief is filed in a case with an appellate waiver, the
government’s failure to respond “allow[s] this court to perform
the required Anders review”). Accordingly, we conclude that our
review is not limited by the appeal waiver.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Our review of Ford’s plea hearing reveals he knowingly
and voluntarily pled guilty to his offenses and that the
proceeding was conducted in compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
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Accordingly, we find no reversible error. See United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that when a
defendant does not seek to withdraw his guilty plea or otherwise
preserve any allegation of Rule 11 error, this court reviews his
plea colloquy for plain error). Review of Ford’s sentencing
hearing also reveals no reversible error. As noted by the
district court, it imposed the mandatory minimum sentences for
both offenses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (seven year
mandatory sentence for brandishing), (c)(1)(C) (twenty-five year
mandatory sentence for subsequent § 924(c) conviction) (2012).
Thus we find that Ford’s sentence was reasonable. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (discussing appellate
reasonableness review of sentences for an abuse-of-discretion
standard).
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment and
deny counsel’s motion to withdraw. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may renew his motion in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. Finally, we dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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