UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4381
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTIE LYNN HERRERA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (5:13-cr-00070-D-3)
Submitted: November 20, 2014 Decided: November 24, 2014
Before KING and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christie Lynn Herrera pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess
with the intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). The district court
sentenced her, below the advisory Guidelines range, to eighty-
four months’ imprisonment. Herrera timely appealed.
Counsel for Herrera filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), averring there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning the substantive
reasonableness of Herrera’s sentence. Herrera was advised of
her right to file a pro se supplemental brief but did not do so.
The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal of Herrera’s
sentence based on the appellate waiver provision in her plea
agreement. For the reasons that follow, we grant the
Government’s motion and dismiss this appeal as to Herrera’s
sentence, and we affirm her conviction.
We review de novo the validity of an appeal waiver.
United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 126 (2013). “We generally will enforce a
waiver . . . if the record establishes that the waiver is valid
and that the issue being appealed is within the scope of the
waiver.” United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A
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defendant’s waiver is valid if she agreed to it “knowingly and
intelligently.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627
(4th Cir. 2010).
Our review of the record confirms that Herrera
knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal her
sentence, reserving only the right to appeal a sentence in
excess of the Guidelines range established at sentencing.
Because the district court imposed a below Guidelines sentence,
we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the
appeal of Herrera’s sentence.
Herrera’s appeal waiver does not preclude appellate
review of her conviction. Counsel does not challenge the
conviction on appeal, and our review of the record, conducted
pursuant to Anders, revealed no potentially meritorious claims
relevant to the validity of Herrera’s conviction. We therefore
affirm the judgment as to Herrera’s conviction.
This court requires that counsel inform Herrera, in
writing, of her right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Herrera requests that such
a petition be filed, but counsel believes that the petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy of the motion was served on Herrera. We
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dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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