FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 24 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-30288
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 9:11-cr-00014-DWM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERVIN JOSEPH RAMON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2014**
Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Ervin Joseph Ramon appeals from the district court’s judgment imposed
following his guilty-plea conviction for failure to register as a sex offender under
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA” or “the Act”), in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Ramon challenges the district court’s denial of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
his motion to dismiss the indictment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo, see United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, 756 F.3d
1125, 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 124 (2014), and we affirm.
Ramon first contends that SORNA violates the non-delegation doctrine
because it allows the Attorney General to legislate SORNA’s retroactive
application. This claim is foreclosed. See United States v. Richardson, 754 F.3d
1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Ramon’s suggestion that the delegation
was not effective because the Attorney General did not promulgate notice rules for
pre-Act offenders is unpersuasive. Nothing in the Act indicates that the Attorney
General’s power to declare the Act retroactive was contingent on the promulgation
of notice rules. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d). Moreover, the final guidelines issued
by the Attorney General concerning the retroactivity determination contained
notice rules for pre-Act offenders. See 73 Fed. Reg. 38030, 38063-64 (July 2,
2008).
Ramon next contends that the government was required to plead and prove
that he had actual notice of SORNA’s registration requirements. This claim is also
foreclosed. See United States v. Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2012).
Finally, Ramon contends that SORNA did not require him to register in
Montana until Montana had implemented a SORNA-compliant registry because it
2 11-30288
was impossible for him to register “as required by” SORNA until Montana had
done so. This argument, too, has been rejected by this court. See United States v.
Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1920
(2014) (“Because Elk Shoulder could have registered with the State of Montana’s
registry, and because this would have allowed him to register ‘as required by’
SORNA, it was not impossible for Elk Shoulder to meet the requirements of §
2250(a).”).
AFFIRMED.
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