Filed 11/24/14 P. v. Maravilla CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B255307
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA073508)
v.
IGNACIO CASTILLO MARAVILLA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Dalila C. Lyons, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Edward H. Schulman for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and
John Yang, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
Defendant Ignacio Castillo Maravilla was convicted by a jury of 11 counts of
lewd act upon a child under 14 years old. On appeal, he contends the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction on one of the counts involving C.P. Defendant
also challenges the denial of his requests for disclosure of the victims’ psychotherapy
and school records and the omission from the abstract of judgment of the sentence in
another case. We conclude that the evidence supports his conviction on all counts, and
the trial court properly refused to disclose the records at issue. We also conclude that
the abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect the sentence in another case,
including the presentence custody credits. We therefore affirm the judgment with
directions to amend the abstract of judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with 11 counts of lewd act upon a child under the age of
14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)).1 Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7 involved C.P. during the period
January 2001 through December 2004; counts 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 involved V.P. during
the period January 2001 through December 2004; and counts 13 and 14 involved L.S.
during the period November 2003 through November 2006. The information alleged as
to each count that defendant committed the offense against more than one victim
(§§ 667.61, 1203.066, subd. (a)(7)) and alleged as to some counts that he committed
substantial sexual misconduct (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)).2 Defendant pled not guilty.
1
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated otherwise.
2
The disposition of counts 1 through 3, and whether such counts were ever
alleged, is not clear from the record.
2
The evidence presented at trial showed that defendant’s wife, M., regularly
babysat her nieces C. and V. C. and V. lived upstairs from defendant and M. in an
apartment complex in Newhall. M. also sometimes cared for L., defendant’s niece. M.
sometimes left the children alone with defendant. The three girls testified that
defendant sexually molested them on multiple occasions from 2001 to 2004. They
testified that he sometimes gave them money afterwards and told them not to tell
anybody what had happened. C. testified that defendant stopped molesting her when
she was in third grade after her family moved from the Newhall apartment.
Defendant’s molestation came to light when V., C.’s sister, told her therapist
who, in turn, reported the allegations to the police. A police detective interviewed
defendant concerning the allegations in May 2012. During his interview, defendant
admitted to touching and putting his mouth on V.’s vagina and her touching his penis,
and he stated that he regretted it. Defendant also admitted to touching C.’s vagina and
L.’s vagina on one occasion each.
Before trial commenced, defense counsel subpoenaed records from the Child and
Family Center relating to V. The Child and Family Center and V.’s mother objected
and asserted the psychotherapist-patient privilege. On December 18, 2013, the trial
court deferred ruling on the matter until the trial.
Defense counsel also subpoenaed school records relating to all three victims.
The trial court inspected the school records in camera before trial. Balancing
defendant’s right to due process against the victims’ interests in confidentiality, the
court determined that none of the school records relating to V. and C. were relevant and
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material. On January 2, 2014, the court therefore ordered that the records be sealed and
not be disclosed to defense counsel. However, the court determined that some of the
school records relating to L. were relevant and material and ordered those records only
to be disclosed to defense counsel and the other records sealed.
Defense counsel requested an ex parte hearing to argue a basis for greater
disclosure. After the ex parte hearing on January 2, 2014, the trial court ordered the
disclosure of additional school records relating to all three victims. The court redacted
certain information from the disclosed records.
The trial commenced on February 25, 2014. The trial court inspected the Child
and Family Center records relating to V. during trial. The court determined that none of
those records were relevant and material. It therefore ordered that the records should
not be disclosed, and that the records be sealed.
The jury found defendant guilty on all 11 counts. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 45 years to life in state prison plus a consecutive term of 16 years, awarded
a total of 785 days of presentence custody credits (683 days of actual custody plus 102
days for conduct), and imposed restitution fines and other fees. At the time of
sentencing, the court also orally pronounced judgment in another case against defendant
in which he had previously pled guilty or no contest (L.A. Sup. Ct. No. PA076112).
The court imposed a sentence of eight months in that case to be served concurrently
with his sentence in the present case, imposed a fine and other fees, and awarded a total
of 198 days of presentence custody credits (99 days of actual custody plus 99 days for
conduct) in No. PA076112.
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CONTENTIONS
Defendant contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction on
one of the four counts involving C.; (2) this court should independently review all of the
sealed records to determine whether they should have been disclosed to defense
counsel; and (3) the abstract of judgment should be amended to include the sentence in
No. PA076112, including the presentence custody credits.
DISCUSSION
1. There was Sufficient Evidence of Four Molestation Incidents
Involving C.
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction on one
of the four counts involving C. because in her testimony she described only three
molestation incidents. We disagree.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction under
the substantial evidence standard. Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value such that a rational trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the judgment and accept as true all evidence tending to support the judgment, including
all facts that reasonably can be deduced from the evidence. We affirm the judgment
only if an examination of the entire record viewed in this light discloses substantial
evidence to support the judgment. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053;
People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
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C. testified that M. babysat her and her sister V. from Monday through Friday,
and sometimes on weekends, from the time C. was in kindergarten until third grade. M.
babysat other children as well. C. stated that M. sometimes left them alone with
defendant and that he would touch her vagina. When asked on direct examination how
often defendant touched her vagina, she responded, “Pretty often” and stated, “I just
remember it happening a lot. More than one occasion.” When asked if it happened
regularly, she stated, “I don’t remember if it was regularly, but it happened often, a lot.”
C. testified that the touching occurred in the main bedroom, the living room, and
the kitchen. She also described an incident when she and other girls lay on the living
room floor in a circle with their heads in the center and their legs facing outward.
Defendant then covered their faces with blankets, reached inside C.’s pants, and touched
her vagina.
C. testified that defendant sometimes gave her money, told her to “keep quiet,”
and then touched her inappropriately. She also stated that he sometimes touched her
first and then offered her money to keep quiet. When asked on direct examination, “Did
the money situation happen a lot, where the defendant would give you money?” C.
answered, “Yes.” When asked, “The times you described the defendant touching you in
the bedroom, the living room, and the kitchen, are those times different from the time
that the defendant touched your vagina when you were in the circle?” C. answered,
“Yes, because it would just be me.” She stated that during the incidents in the bedroom,
the living room, and the kitchen that she had referred to earlier she was alone with
defendant.
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On cross-examination, C. testified that defendant did not offer her money after
the circle incident. When defense counsel asked, “When you were in the bedroom,
were you offered money?” C. answered, “Most of the time.” When asked, “And when
you were in the living room, were you offered money,” she answered, “Most of the
time.”
Defendant cites the following exchange on recross-examination.
Defense counsel: “Just to clarify, the time that you say that somebody touched
you when you were in the circle, that was in the living room, or the bedroom?”
C.: “That was in the living room.”
Defense counsel: “Okay. So that was the time in the living room that you’re
speaking of?”
C.: “Yes.”
Defense counsel: “Not a separate time in the living room?”
C.: “No.”
Defendant argues that this testimony shows that only one molestation incident
occurred in the living room. We acknowledge that this testimony arguably contradicted
C.’s earlier testimony in which she distinguished the touching that occurred when she
was alone with defendant in the bedroom, the living room, and the kitchen from the
touching that occurred in the circle incident when other children were present.
However, her testimony that defendant did not offer her money after the circle incident
but offered her money when touching occurred in the living room “Most of the time”
suggests that other molestation incidents occurred in the living room apart from the
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circle incident, as did her testimony that the touching occurred “Pretty often” and
“a lot.”
“ ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not
justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or
jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon
which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor
evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s
verdict. [Citation.]” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
“ ‘[I]t is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Where the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s
conclusion the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary
finding does not warrant the judgment’s reversal. [Citation.]” (People v. Zamudio,
supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 357-358.) Contradictions in a witness’s testimony cannot
justify a reversal unless they render the witness’s testimony inherently improbable,
meaning impossible to believe or obviously false. (People v. Ennis (2010)
190 Cal.App.4th 721, 728-729; People v. Mejia (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 86, 98-99.)
We conclude that the testimony cited by defendant did not render inherently
improbable C.’s other testimony indicating that more than one molestation incident
8
occurred in the living room. As such, substantial evidence supports defendant’s
conviction on all four counts involving C.
2. The Undisclosed Records Were Not Material to the Defense
Defendant contends he was entitled to the disclosure of privileged and
confidential records for purposes of cross-examination at trial if the records were
material. He bases this contention on his right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. He also appears to invoke his due process right to the disclosure of
favorable, material evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or persons acting on
behalf of the prosecutor (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 [83 S.Ct. 1194]),
although he does not attempt to show that the records were in the possession of the
prosecutor or persons acting on behalf of the prosecutor. Defendant requests that this
court review the records that the trial court refused to disclose in order to determine
whether they should have been disclosed. The People state that they do not oppose the
requested review.
Appellate courts routinely review sealed records withheld from disclosure after
an in camera inspection by the trial court to determine whether the records were
material and should have been disclosed. (People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399,
453; People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1285.) Evidence is material for these
purposes only if there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure to the defense would
have produced a different result. (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 453;
City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 7-8.) We also consider the
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effect of the nondisclosure on defense counsel’s investigations and trial strategy.
(People v. Martinez, supra, at p. 454.)
We have independently reviewed the sealed transcripts of the in camera
proceedings in which the trial court adequately described the contents of the records and
its reasons for not requiring disclosure of those records. We conclude that the
undisclosed information in those records was not material to the defense. We therefore
conclude that the court properly refused to disclose the records.
3. The Abstract of Judgment Must be Amended
Finally, defendant contends the abstract of judgment should be amended to
include the sentence in No. PA0786112, including the presentence custody credits. The
People state that the sentence imposed in that case “is now intertwined with the sentence
from the current case” and agree that the abstract of judgment should be amended to
include the sentence in No. PA0786112.
“[T]he abstract of judgment is not itself the judgment of conviction, and cannot
prevail over the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment to the extent the two conflict.
(§§ 1213, 1213.5; People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 303,
26 P.3d 1040]; People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471 [121 Cal.Rptr. 473, 535 P.2d
337]; People v. Hartsell (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 8, 14 [109 Cal.Rptr. 627].) However, the
abstract is a contemporaneous, statutorily sanctioned, officially prepared clerical record
of the conviction and sentence. It may serve as the order committing the defendant to
prison (§ 1213), and is ‘ “the process and authority for carrying the judgment and
sentence into effect.” [Citations.]’ (In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890 [59 Cal.Rptr.
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429, 428 P.2d 293].) As such, ‘the Legislature intended [it] to [accurately] summarize
the judgment.’ (Mitchell, supra, at p. 186, citing with approval People v. Hong (1998)
64 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1080 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 23].)” (People v. Delgado (2008)
43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070.)
This court has the authority to correct clerical errors in an abstract of judgment.
(People v. Mitchell, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 186-187.) The superior court clerk is
directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the judgment in No. PA0786112,
including, without limitation, the conviction, sentence, and presentence custody credits
in that case.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The clerk is directed to prepare an amended abstract
of judgment in accordance with this opinion and to forward a copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
LAVIN, J.*
WE CONCUR:
KITCHING, Acting P. J.
ALDRICH, J.
*
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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People v. Maravilla CA2/3
Combined Opinion