UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1365
GAIL S. JONES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:12-cv-00909-REP)
Submitted: October 30, 2014 Decided: November 25, 2014
Before SHEDD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gail S. Jones, Appellant Pro Se. Jonathan Holland Hambrick,
Robin Perrin Meier, Assistant United States Attorneys, Richmond,
Virginia; Beverly Hope Zuckerman, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gail S. Jones appeals the district court’s order
adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and upholding the
Commissioner’s denial of Jones’ application for disability
insurance benefits. We have reviewed the record and find no
reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant Jones leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. Jones v. Astrue, No. 3:12-cv-00909-REP (E.D. Va. Mar.
4, 2014).
Jones challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that her hearing
loss, knee pain, and foot issues did not render her disabled.
Our review of this conclusion is limited to evaluating whether
the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and
whether the correct law was applied. See Johnson v. Barnhart,
434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). “Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Craig v. Chater,
76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ on an
issue, we defer to the ALJ’s conclusion. Id.
First, Jones argues the ALJ should have given more
weight to the opinions of Audiologist Bridgette Fowler and Dr.
Julie Redmond and should have credited Jones’s statements
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regarding her alleged impairment. The ALJ permissibly afforded
less weight to the opinions of Fowler and Redmond because their
opinions were inconsistent with other substantial evidence
(e.g., Jones’s ability to drive, shop, attend church, and
communicate effectively at the hearings). See Mastro v. Apfel,
270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). Also, although Jones
testified regarding the extent of her impairment, Jones’s
description of her daily activities and Dr. Wayne Shaia’s
opinion and the ALJ’s impression that Jones could communicate
effectively despite her impairment support the ALJ’s decision
not to fully credit Jones’s testimony regarding her impairment.
Second, Jones argues the ALJ should have considered
the opinions of doctors from Colonial Heights Orthopedics before
concluding Jones is not disabled due to her knee condition.
This argument was not raised at the district court and cannot be
considered on appeal. See United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d
877, 887 (4th Cir. 2011). To the extent Jones challenges the
ALJ’s conclusion that her knee pain was not sufficiently severe,
the ALJ’s conclusion was supported by substantial evidence.
Although Jones reported pain and was diagnosed with crepitus,
there were no other abnormalities in her knee. Rather, the
evidence during the relevant period shows that Jones pulled her
knee on an exercise bike, not that she presented with a
potentially disabling condition.
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Finally, although Jones mentions her foot pain in her
informal brief, she does not provide an argument addressing the
ALJ’s rejection of her allegations of disability due to bursitis
and plantar fasciitis. She has, therefore, forfeited appellate
review of this issue. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the material
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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