J-S38043-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES REID,
Appellant No. 977 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 27, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006081-2012
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES, and SHOGAN, JJ.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 25, 2014
Our standard of review for a sufficiency claim requires this Court to
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, including
drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 113 (Pa.Super.
2013) (en banc). We only reverse where “the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn
from the combined circumstances.” Id. This Court is not permitted “to re-
weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.”
Id. Since the learned majority disregards these well-ensconced principles
by focusing on what the Commonwealth did not present, I respectfully
dissent.
J-S38043-14
Here, the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth shows that Appellant spoke with Lorraine Harris inside a
Chinese take-out store before both exited three minutes later. Appellant
followed Harris out of the store and dropped a small object in front of her.
She then retrieved the item, looked at it, and continued to walk away.
Harris was stopped by police based on the suspicion that a drug transaction
occurred. Police recovered seventy-one milligrams of crack cocaine from
Harris in a small Ziploc packet. Appellant also was stopped and had ten
dollars in his possession. The trial court found Appellant guilty of possession
of crack cocaine.
Based on our standard of review, I cannot agree that this evidence is
so weak and inconclusive that no probability of fact can be drawn from these
circumstances. The reasonable and logical inferences based on this evidence
is that Appellant possessed the crack cocaine and dropped it on the ground
for Harris. The majority erroneously reweighs the evidence and opines that
the Commonwealth failed to present additional evidence such as expert
testimony, or testimony regarding the police officer’s experience, or that the
neighborhood in Philadelphia was a high crime area. This is immaterial in
conducting a sufficiency review. We do not consider what was not
presented; rather, we evaluate the evidence actually submitted.
The verdict here was not based on conjecture. It is both logical and
reasonable to conclude, based on the Commonwealth’s actual evidence, that
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J-S38043-14
Appellant and Harris engaged in a drug transaction. The majority’s reliance
on Commonwealth v. Walton, 63 A.3d 253 (Pa.Super. 2013), is also
misplaced since that case involved a suppression issue rather than a
sufficiency review. To the extent the majority distinguishes this case from
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478 (Pa.Super. 2014), I do not
disagree that Thompson involved different and more evidence. Of course,
the defendant therein was convicted of possession with intent to deliver.
Nonetheless, by comparing the evidence in this case to the evidence in
Thompson, the majority is improperly reweighing the actual evidence
presented in this matter.
As the majority reweighs the evidence and views it in a light most
favorable to Appellant, I respectfully dissent.
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