UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4117
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PARKER ANTRON COLEMAN, a/k/a KP,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:10-cr-00238-RJC-DSC-1)
Submitted: November 25, 2014 Decided: November 26, 2014
Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian M. Aus, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M.
Tompkins, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Parker Antron Coleman appeals from the denial of his
motion to suppress evidence and his conviction following a jury
trial on drug-trafficking, firearm, and money-laundering
offenses. Coleman contends that the district court erred by
allowing the use of evidence seized during the search of his
residence and by allowing the admission of evidence of his prior
marijuana-trafficking conviction and the fact that he began a
romantic relationship with his probation officer, Stephanie
Peppers, who later provided money to enable him to start the
marijuana trafficking underlying these convictions. We affirm.
Coleman contends that the district court erred by
failing to suppress evidence seized from his residence because
the search warrant was not issued pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
41. Because Coleman failed to raise this argument in the
district court, we review this issue for plain error. United
States v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371, 383 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993)). Rule
41(b) provides that “[a]t the request of a federal law
enforcement officer . . . a magistrate judge with authority in
the district . . . has authority to issue a warrant to search
for and seize a person or property located within the district.”
As we have previously determined, when an investigation is
conducted by both federal and state agencies, the investigators
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can “use either federal or state investigatory tools.” United
States v. Claridy, 601 F.3d 276, 282 (4th Cir. 2010). The
warrant at issue in this case was issued by a state judicial
officer to a state law enforcement officer and directed the
officer to file a return with the state judge who issued the
warrant. Because the warrant was appropriately authorized under
state law, we find no error, much less plain error, by the
district court not sua sponte suppressing evidence discovered
pursuant to the state search warrant.
Coleman also contends that the district court erred by
allowing the admission of evidence of his prior conviction, that
Peppers was his probation officer, and that he and Peppers were
in a romantic relationship. Peppers testified that she met
Coleman in the summer of 2007, when she was assigned to be his
probation officer following his conviction in Mississippi for
trafficking marijuana. In January 2008, the relationship became
personal and she resigned from her job. In early 2009, Peppers
loaned Coleman $5000 so he could buy marijuana to start a drug
trafficking business. She testified that she knew he would
repay her based on his determination to be successful and the
fact that he had previously been involved in drug trafficking.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in overruling Coleman’s objections to the challenged
evidence. The evidence was intrinsic to the marijuana
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trafficking charges Coleman faced in the underlying trial. See
United States v. Otuya, 720 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 2013)
(allowing admission of evidence of acts intrinsic to the charged
crime), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1279 (2014). The prior
conviction led to Coleman meeting Peppers, developing a personal
relationship with her, borrowing money from her, and ultimately
making the purchases of marijuana. The prior conviction and the
fact that Peppers was his probation officer were relevant facts
that helped to “complete the story of the crime.” See United
States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 316 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, Peppers
testified that it was because of Coleman’s prior conviction that
she agreed to loan him the money he needed to start the
underlying marijuana business. We find no abuse of discretion
in the admission of this evidence. See United States v.
Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 314 (4th Cir. 2014) (providing
standard).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s rulings
and affirm Coleman’s convictions. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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