UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4900
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HAFAN ANTONIO RILEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:12-cr-00251-JFA-1)
Submitted: November 24, 2014 Decided: December 2, 2014
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
G. Wells Dickson, Jr., WELLS DICKSON, P.A., Kingstree, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William Kenneth Witherspoon, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Hafan Antonio Riley appeals his conviction and the
240-month sentence imposed by the district court after he pled
guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). Riley’s
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that he has found no meritorious
grounds for appeal but questioning the denial of Riley’s motion
to suppress, the adequacy of the plea hearing, the validity of
the prior convictions used to determine the statutory sentencing
range, and reasonableness of Riley’s sentence. Although
informed of his right to do so, Riley has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief. We affirm the judgment of the district
court.
We decline to consider Riley’s challenge to the denial
of his motion to suppress because Riley waived this issue by
pleading guilty. See United States v. Bowles, 602 F.3d 581, 582
(4th Cir. 2010). Next, having reviewed the transcript of the
plea colloquy, we conclude that the district court substantially
complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and that
the court’s failure to inform Riley of his right to counsel at
every stage of the proceedings and the possibility of departing
from the Guidelines range did not affect Riley’s substantial
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rights. See United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th
Cir. 2009) (providing standard). With regard to the validity of
the prior conviction, we conclude that the information proffered
by the Government adequately supported the statutory range
applied by the district court. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A),
851 (2012). Finally, our review leaves us with no doubt that
there is no substantive or procedural error in the district
court’s imposition of the statutory minimum sentence of 240
months’ imprisonment. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
51 (2007).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious grounds for appeal and have found
none. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment and
deny Riley’s motion requesting copies of the grand jury
materials in this case. This court requires that counsel inform
Riley, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for further review. If Riley requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Riley. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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