NOTICE
2014 IL App (5th) 130150
Decision filed 12/03/14. The
text of this decision may be NO. 5-13-0150
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jackson County.
)
v. ) No. 10-CM-178
)
JAMES JAMISON, ) Honorable
) William G. Schwartz,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SCHWARM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Cates and Justice Chapman concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The defendant, James Jamison, appeals from his conviction for obstructing a peace
officer. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 On March 4, 2013, a Jackson County jury found the defendant guilty of
obstructing a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2010)). The underlying charge
alleged that on April 5, 2010, the defendant had knowingly obstructed Officer Zachary
Street's investigation of a domestic disturbance by ignoring his commands to open the
1
door to 619 North Springer in Carbondale so that he could speak with the reported victim,
Chelsea Burg. The evidence adduced at trial established the following.
¶4 On April 5, 2010, at approximately 3 p.m., the Carbondale police department
received a 9-1-1 call from Debra Wiseman, who was in Florida at the time. Wiseman
reported that her daughter, Chelsea Burg, had called her stating that Burg's boyfriend, the
defendant, was drunk and "cutting her things up." Wiseman also reported that Burg was
"not answering her phone now." Wiseman advised that Burg resided at 619 North
Springer and that Burg's newborn baby was also present in the home, "screaming its head
off."
¶5 Officer Zachary Street of the Carbondale police department was dispatched to
respond to the reported domestic disturbance on North Springer and was one of the first
officers to arrive. Pursuant to departmental policy, Street's intention was to speak with
all parties involved to "basically ensure everybody was okay." When Street approached
the residence and knocked on the door, the defendant came to the door but did not open
it. When Street advised the defendant why the police were there, the defendant
confirmed that Burg and her baby were inside but stated that they were neither coming to
the door nor going outside. While Street and the defendant talked through the door, the
defendant repeatedly refused to open it, and Street could not hear or see Burg or her baby.
Because Street was unable to make contact with them, "the situation changed," and he
feared that they were possibly hurt or dead.
¶6 Additional officers and "command staff" soon arrived at the scene, and a perimeter
was set up around the house. A hostage negotiator spoke with the defendant by phone for
2
over an hour, but she was unable to convince him to allow Burg and the baby to exit the
residence. The defendant sounded "very angry" and agitated, and the negotiator "felt that
[the defendant] was probably going to harm [Burg,] or he already had."
¶7 The police ultimately obtained a search warrant to enter the residence at 619 North
Springer. At approximately 5:25 p.m., after the defendant refused to open the door so
that the warrant could be executed, officers forced entry into the home. The defendant
was found sitting in a chair in the living room, and Burg and her baby were found in a
back bedroom unharmed. The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with
obstructing a peace officer.
¶8 After entering judgment on the jury's verdict, the trial court sentenced the
defendant to a 12-month term of probation. On March 29, 2013, the defendant filed a
timely notice of appeal.
¶9 DISCUSSION
¶ 10 On appeal, the defendant raises numerous issues, but we need only decide two:
whether the trial court's failure to strictly comply with Supreme Court Rule 401(b) (eff.
July 1, 1984) requires a reversal of his conviction and whether the evidence adduced at
trial was sufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt. We answer both questions in the
affirmative.
¶ 11 In June 2012, following a case-management conference, the trial court entered a
written order stating that the defendant had advised the court that he wanted to represent
himself. The order stated that the court had determined that the defendant understood
that he had the right to an appointed attorney and that he did not have to pay the attorney
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who had been appointed to represent him. The order further stated that the court had
determined that the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to an
appointed attorney. The trial court thus discharged appointed counsel, and the defendant
subsequently proceeded pro se. On appeal, the defendant argues that his conviction must
be reversed because the trial court failed to strictly comply with Rule 401(b)'s
requirement that a defendant's waiver of counsel must be recorded verbatim. We agree.
¶ 12 "The right to counsel is a cornerstone of our criminal justice system." People v.
Black, 2011 IL App (5th) 080089, ¶ 11. "The right to counsel is fundamental and will not
be lightly deemed waived." People v. Stoops, 313 Ill. App. 3d 269, 273 (2000). "[T]he
right to counsel is so fundamental that we will review as plain error a claim that there was
no effective waiver of counsel although the issue was not raised in the trial court."
People v. Herring, 327 Ill. App. 3d 259, 262 (2002).
¶ 13 A defendant's waiver of counsel is governed by Supreme Court Rule 401, which
provides as follows:
"(a) Waiver of Counsel. Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The
court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense
punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally
in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the
following:
(1) the nature of the charge;
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(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law,
including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be
subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and
(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have
counsel appointed for him by the court.
(b) Transcript. The proceedings required by this rule to be in open court
shall be taken verbatim, and upon order of the trial court transcribed, filed and
made a part of the common law record." Ill. S. Ct. R. 401 (eff. July 1, 1984).
¶ 14 Although substantial compliance with Rule 401(a) may be sufficient to effectuate
a valid waiver of counsel (People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 236 (1996)), trial courts are
required to strictly comply with Rule 401(b) (People v. Herring, 327 Ill. App. 3d 259,
261-62 (2002); People v. Montgomery, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1098-1100 (1998)). "The
language of Rule 401(b) is clear and unambiguous: it mandates that, when the defendant
waives the right to counsel, the proceedings must be recorded verbatim." Montgomery,
298 Ill. App. 3d at 1099. Rule 401(b)'s verbatim requirement "is for the benefit of the
defendant as well as the trial court" and may be accomplished via court reporter,
audiotape, or videotape. Id. at 1099-1100.
¶ 15 Here, the record indicates that before accepting the defendant's waiver of counsel,
the trial court determined that he understood and knowingly waived his right to an
appointed attorney and wished to proceed pro se. It is undisputed, however, that the
proceedings were not transcribed or otherwise recorded verbatim. The State rightfully
concedes that the trial court thus failed to comply with Rule 401(b). Under the
5
circumstances, the defendant's waiver of counsel was ineffective, and his conviction must
be reversed. Herring, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 262; Montgomery, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1100.
¶ 16 Given our disposition, we need not address the defendant's remaining claims of
error. Black, 2011 IL App (5th) 080089, ¶ 28. To avoid any concerns of double
jeopardy, however, we will address his argument regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying his conviction. Id. ¶ 29.
¶ 17 The thrust of the defendant's argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is
his assertion that "in order to be convicted of 'obstructing' a peace officer, a defendant
must commit some type of physical act that impedes a peace officer." The defendant thus
maintains that his "passive" conduct in the present case is insufficient to sustain his
conviction as a matter of law. See People v. Cope, 299 Ill. App. 3d 184 (1998); People v.
Hilgenberg, 223 Ill. App. 3d 286 (1991). In People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 29,
however, our supreme court held that "the offense of obstructing a peace officer under
section 31-1(a) of the Code does not necessitate proof of a physical act." The court
further held that "[a]lthough a person may commit obstruction of a peace officer by
means of a physical act, this type of conduct is neither an essential element of nor the
exclusive means of committing an obstruction." Id. ¶ 23. "The legislative focus of
section 31-1(a) is on the tendency of the conduct to interpose an obstacle that impedes or
hinders the officer in the performance of his authorized duties," which is an inquiry for
the trier of fact "based upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Id.
¶ 18 Here, viewing the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the State,
a rational trier of fact could conclude that Street's investigation of the reported domestic
6
disturbance at 619 North Springer was an authorized duty that the defendant impeded or
hindered. See City of Champaign v. Torres, 346 Ill. App. 3d 214, 217 (2004). "Because
the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant, double jeopardy does not preclude
the defendant's retrial." People v. Liner, 356 Ill. App. 3d 284, 300 (2005).
¶ 19 CONCLUSION
¶ 20 For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the defendant's conviction and
remand for further proceedings.
¶ 21 Reversed and remanded.
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2014 IL App (5th) 130150
NO. 5-13-0150
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jackson County.
)
v. ) No. 10-CM-178
)
JAMES JAMISON, ) Honorable
) William G. Schwartz,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
__________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: December 3, 2014
__________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable S. Gene Schwarm, J.
Honorable Judy L. Cates, P.J., and
Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.,
Concur
__________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Ellen J. Curry, Deputy
for Defender, Richard J. Whitney, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of
Appellant the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 909 Water Tower
Circle, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
__________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Hon. Michael Carr, State's Attorney, Jackson County Courthouse,
for 1001 Walnut Street, Murphysboro, IL 62966, Patrick Delfino, Director,
Appellee Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Whitney E. Atkins, Staff Attorney,
Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, 730 East Illinois
Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
__________________________________________________________________________