United States v. Rafael Lopez-Debora

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4430

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

RAFAEL JOSE LOPEZ-DEBORA, a/k/a Rafael Jose Lopez-Devora,
a/k/a Rafael Lopez Devora, a/k/a Rafael Jose Devora, a/k/a
Rafael Jose Lopez, a/k/a Armando Lopez Flores, a/k/a
Armando Lopez-Flores, a/k/a Armando Flores Lopez, a/k/a
Armando Flores, a/k/a Armondo Lopez Flores, a/k/a
Christopher A. Rodriguez,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00440-CCE-1)

Submitted: November 26, 2014 Decided: December 4, 2014

Before MOTZ, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Rafael Lopez-Debora appeals the fifty-seven month

sentence imposed following his guilty plea to illegal reentry

after removal subsequent to conviction of an aggravated felony,

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (2012). On appeal,

Lopez-Debora argues that his sentence was greater than necessary

to satisfy the goals of sentencing enumerated in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) (2012). * Finding no error, we affirm.

We review a sentence, “whether inside, just outside,

or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” for

reasonableness, applying “a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In

evaluating a claim that a sentence is not substantively

reasonable, we “examine[] the totality of the circumstances to

see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in

concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards

set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597

F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).

*
Although the Government addresses the procedural
reasonableness of Lopez-Debora’s sentence in its response brief,
Lopez-Debora’s opening brief challenges only the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. See United States v. Edwards,
666 F.3d 877, 887 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that arguments
not raised in appellate brief generally are not considered).

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 A reviewing court must accord deference to the trial

court’s determinations “and can reverse a sentence only if it is

unreasonable, even if the sentence would not have been the

choice of the appellate court.” United States v. Evans, 526

F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted). We presume on

appeal that Lopez-Debora’s below-Guidelines sentence is

substantively reasonable. See United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d

278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012). Lopez-Debora bears the burden to

rebut the presumption by demonstrating “that the sentence is

unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”

United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that Lopez-Debora fails to meet this

burden. The record demonstrates that the court credited

Lopez-Debora’s argument that the continuing nature of his

reentry offense caused his twenty-year-old felony convictions to

significantly enhance his Guidelines range, producing a sentence

greater than his offense merited. However, the court determined

that this factor warranted a less substantial downward variance

than Lopez-Debora requested, in light of Lopez-Debora’s lengthy

illegal presence in the United States and continued criminal

conduct following his most recent illegal reentry. The mere

fact that the court accorded less weight to this consideration

than Lopez-Debora sought does not render the resulting sentence

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unreasonable. See Susi, 674 F.3d at 290 (recognizing that

sentence is not unreasonable simply because district court could

have assigned different weight to § 3553(a) factors in

calculating its sentence). Moreover, although Lopez-Debora

identified various mitigating circumstances related to his

personal history and characteristics, these circumstances are

not so compelling as to require a greater departure than that

provided by the district court.

Because Lopez-Debora has not rebutted the presumption

of reasonableness accorded his sentence, we affirm the district

court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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