FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 04 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT BISHOP, No. 14-15145
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:11-cv-00094-SAB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KELLY HARRINGTON, Warden; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Stanley A. Boone, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted November 18, 2014***
Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge.
California state prisoner Robert Bishop appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation, due
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
Bishop consented to proceed before a magistrate. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
process, and deliberate indifference claims against numerous defendants at two
different prisons. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an
abuse of discretion a district court’s decision regarding joinder, but review de novo
the legal conclusions underlying that decision. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232
F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000); Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623
F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). We vacate and remand.
Although the district court properly concluded that Bishop’s action did not
meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2), the district court abused its
discretion in dismissing Bishop’s action because misjoinder of parties is not a
proper ground for dismissing an action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“Misjoinder of
parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court
may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any
claim against a party.”). Accordingly, we vacate and remand to the district court
for further proceedings, including possible severance of Bishop’s Eighth
Amendment claims arising out of the conditions of his confinement at Corcoran,
and Bishop’s due process claims arising out of his allegedly illegal transfer to
Corcoran.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bishop’s motions
for appointment of counsel because Bishop did not demonstrate exceptional
2 14-15145
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009)
(identifying the standard of review and explaining exceptional circumstances
requirement).
VACATED and REMANDED.
3 14-15145