FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 08 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIET M. EDWARDS, No. 13-56352
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-05875-SS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Suzanne H. Segal, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 3, 2014**
Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Juliet M. Edwards appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review the district court’s order de novo. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d
1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). We may set aside the denial of benefits only if it is not
supported by substantial evidence or rests on legal error. Id.
Edwards first contends that, because a vocational expert testified that she
would be unable to perform her past relevant work or any other work if she needed
a cane to walk, the district court erred by not considering her use of a cane in
determining her residual functional capacity. Because Edwards failed to raise this
argument before the district court, this issue is waived. See Greger v. Barnhart,
464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006).
Edwards next contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred by
finding that her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of her symptoms and her need for a cane were not credible. The ALJ
provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Edwards’s testimony
concerning the debilitating effects of her pain and her need for a cane. First,
Edwards’s subjective complaints of pain were not supported by the medical
evidence. See Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 670-71 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the ALJ properly relied on medical evidence undermining the claimant’s
subjective assessment of limitations). Medical treatment records following
Edwards’s injury indicate that she reported only mild tenderness in her mid-lumbar
2 13-56352
spine and was prescribed a non-narcotic pain reliever and physical therapy, which
she later reported resolved her symptoms. She was found to have no permanent
disability and was released back to work with no restrictions.
In addition to considering medical evidence to assess Edwards’s credibility,
the ALJ properly took into account that Edwards stopped working due to a felony
conviction, not because of debilitating back pain. See Bruton v. Massanari, 268
F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (relying on the claimant’s layoff as a permissible
ground for disbelieving complaints of severe pain).
Finally, in assessing Edwards’s credibility regarding her pain and need for a
cane, the ALJ properly considered that Edwards received only conservative
treatment. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that
evidence of conservative treatment permits the ALJ to discount the claimant’s
testimony regarding the severity of an impairment).
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that
Edwards had the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work and
therefore was not disabled.
AFFIRMED.
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